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Although the anti-commandeering doctrine was developed by the 
Supreme Court to protect state sovereignty from federal overreach, 
nothing prohibits flipping the doctrine in the opposite direction to protect 
federal sovereignty from state overreach. Federalism preserves a balance 
of power between two sovereigns. Thus, the reversibility of the anti-
commandeering doctrine appears inherent in the reasoning offered by the 
Court for the doctrine’s creation and application. In this Article, I contend 
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that reversing the anti-commandeering doctrine is appropriate in the 
context of contemporary immigration federalism laws. Specifically, I 
explore how an unconstitutional incursion into federal sovereignty can be 
seen in state immigration laws such as Arizona’s controversial Senate Bill 
1070 (SB 1070), the subject of the Court’s recent decision in Arizona v. 
United States, and also in the Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA), the 
subject of the Court’s consideration in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting 
during the prior term. The Court upheld Section 2(B) of SB 1070 in 
Arizona, and upheld LAWA in Whiting, finding these state laws were not 
preempted by federal immigration law. Yet, in this Article, I conclude that 
these laws nonetheless interfere with the federal government’s exclusive 
power to control immigration policy at the national level. Thus, the 
constitutionality of state immigration laws such as SB 1070 and LAWA 
should be interpreted within an anti-commandeering framework. This 
doctrinal shift, from the preemption doctrine to the anti-commandeering 
doctrine, allows federal courts to examine the constitutionality of state 
immigration laws through a more explicit federalist lens. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence is designed to protect 
the dual system of government established by the Constitution. To 
that end, the Court has prohibited the federal government from 
trenching upon state sovereignty. The anti-commandeering doctrine, 
therefore, was developed to restrain the federal government from 
commandeering or coercing state legislatures, as well as state officers, 
to enact and enforce federal regulatory programs.1 But, how should 
federal courts respond if the situation is reversed? Does the logic of 
the Court’s anti-commandeering doctrine extend to posting limits on 
state governments in cases where the state has the capacity to usurp, 
by commandeering or coercing, crucial aspects of federal sovereignty? 
In this Article, I examine this question: whether the Court’s anti-
commandeering jurisprudence can be flipped in the opposite 
direction. In the name of federalism, the anti-commandeering doctrine 
has been employed by the Court to prevent the exercise of otherwise 
constitutional powers by the federal government where the effect is to 
commandeer states to the detriment of their status as co-equal 
sovereigns in the federal system. The Court has noted, however, that 
federalism involves two sovereigns and both must be restrained from 
encroaching on the sovereignty of the other. Thus, I explore whether 
the underlying reasoning of the anti-commandeering doctrine lends 
 
 1 E.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding Congress may 
not commandeer state officials to be enforcement agents of federal regulatory 
programs); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (asserting that 
Congress may not commandeer the legislative process of the states by compelling the 
enactment and enforcement of federal regulatory programs). 
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itself to, or even logically implies, protecting the federal sovereign as 
well as the state sovereign. 
In other words, I discuss whether there is an anti-reverse-
commandeering doctrine that is inherent within the Court’s anti-
commandeering doctrine.2 Anti-reverse-commandeering as a doctrine 
simply means reversing — without, of course, undoing — the 
protections that the anti-commandeering doctrine provides to the state 
sovereign. Such a flip in the doctrine thereby institutes judicially-
enforced constitutional limits on state and local governments in the 
name of preserving federal sovereignty. I argue flipping the anti-
commandeering doctrine in the opposite direction is necessary and 
appropriate in some instances to preserve the system of dual 
sovereignty of which federal sovereignty is a component. 
 
 2 The term “reverse-commandeering” is first mentioned, to my knowledge, in 
James Leonard’s article, The Shadows of Unconstitutionality: How the New Federalism 
May Affect the Anti-Discrimination Mandate of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 
ALA. L. REV. 91, 183 n.646 (2000). In a footnote, Leonard reserves development of the 
concept of reverse-commandeering for future scholars, noting, “I will let others decide 
whether ‘reverse commandeering’ should enter the English language.” Id. Thus far, it 
appears that, in addition to myself, two other scholars have taken up Leonard’s call: 
Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Paul Diller. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a 
Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 484 (2012); Paul A. 
Diller, The City and the Private Right of Action, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1109, 1154 n.231 
(2012) (citing Leonard, supra). In Bulman-Pozen’s article, she examines the various 
forms of “cooperative federalism” between the federal and state governments, and 
argues this phenomenon serves to promote “separation of powers values.” Bulman-
Pozen, supra, at 461-63. In the course of this discussion, which includes cooperative 
federalism between the state and federal governments in environmental protection, 
administration of federal benefits, and consumer protection, she briefly examines 
whether Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070 in effect “commandeers the federal executive in a 
relatively limited way.” Id. at 485. Bulman-Pozen’s use of the term is closest to my 
own, although my Article concludes that state reverse-commandeering laws pose a 
threat to the vertical separation of powers, while Bulman-Pozen characterizes this 
commandeering as a form of state “goading,” and concludes that state “goading” 
serves to protect the horizontal separation of powers. Id. at 485-86. In other words, 
according to Bulman-Pozen, the separation of powers is protected by state attempts to 
“goad” the federal executive in enforcing federal immigration control laws, finding 
Arizona’s state immigration law “effectively compels federal executive action.” Id. at 
485. Consequently, although we both agree that the state statute, Senate Bill 1070, is a 
form of commandeering, we appear to draw opposite conclusions on whether the 
Arizona immigration law positively or negatively impacts federalism values. In Diller’s 
article, he argues that the primary justification for the “‘private law exception’” to 
“broad ‘home rule’ authority” does not justify the costs. Diller, supra, at 1109. 
Specifically, he cites to Leonard in a brief discussion exploring whether city and 
municipal courts can reverse-commandeer federal judicial resources by creating “new 
private rights of action enforced in those courts . . . . [and] why the reverse-
commandeering objection does not justify a private law exception.” Id. at 1154.  
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The need to protect federal sovereignty is particularly clear in the 
context of the current tidal wave of state immigration laws. 
Specifically, I explore how an unconstitutional incursion into federal 
sovereignty can be seen in state immigration laws such as Arizona’s 
controversial Senate Bill 1070 (SB 1070),3 the subject of the Court’s 
recent decision in Arizona v. United States,4 and also in the Legal 
Arizona Workers Act (LAWA),5 the subject of the Court’s 
consideration in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting6 during the prior 
term. The Court upheld Section 2(B) of SB 1070 in Arizona and 
upheld LAWA in Whiting, finding these state laws were not preempted 
by federal immigration law. These state immigration laws were drafted 
pursuant to what legal scholars have come to call “mirror-image 
theory.”7 Under this theory, states argue that their immigration laws 
can survive federal preemption challenges by parroting federal 
immigration law and policy, often word-for-word. Yet, in this Article, I 
contend that these mirror-image laws nonetheless interfere with the 
 
 3 Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, ch. 113, 2010 
Ariz. Sess. Laws 450 (codified in scattered sections of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 11, 13, 
23, 28, 41 (2010), amended by Act of Apr. 30, 2010, ch. 211, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 
1070. In United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 366 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted 132 
S. Ct. 845 (2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).  
 4 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
 5 Legal Arizona Workers Act, 2007 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1312 (codified at ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2009, 23-211 to 23-214 (2008)). 
 6 Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973 (2011). 
 7 Gabriel “Jack” Chin and Marc Miller are responsible for formally introducing 
the term “mirror-image theory” into legal discourse. They provide an excellent and 
thorough discussion on this theory and its constitutional implications in the context 
of state attempts to regulate immigration through state criminal laws such as SB 1070. 
See Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of 
Immigration Through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 251, 253-54 (2011). The theory is 
attributed to former constitutional law scholar Kris Kobach, Kansas Secretary of State 
and the “architect” of SB 1070, who argues that “[s]tate governments possess the 
authority to criminalize particular conduct concerning illegal immigration, provided 
that they do so in a way that mirrors the terms of federal law.” Kris W. Kobach, 
Reinforcing the Rule of Law: What States Can and Should Do to Reduce Illegal 
Immigration, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 459, 475 (2008) [hereinafter Kobach, Reinforcing]. 
Kobach was involved in the drafting of LAWA, SB 1070, and other state immigration 
laws. See, e.g., Jeremy Duda, Some States Take Lessons From Arizona’s SB 1070, Others 
Ignore Them, ARIZ. CAPITOL TIMES, June 23, 2011 (stating that Kobach contributed to 
similar Alabama legislation); Gary Grado, Architect of Arizona’s SB1070 Insists 
Immigration Law Will Survive Appeals, ARIZ. CAPITOL TIMES, Sept. 10, 2010 (explaining 
Kobach’s contribution to both LAWA and SB 1070); Kris W. Kobach, Defending 
Arizona: Its Statute Will Withstand the Inevitable — and Already Begun — Challenges in 
Court, NAT’L REV., June 7, 2010, at 31 (asserting Kobach’s role as “architect” of SB 
1070). 
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federal government’s exclusive power to control immigration policy at 
the national level.8 
Consequently, the Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an 
overview of the anti-commandeering doctrine and explains why the 
logic of the doctrine permits flipping it in the opposite direction to 
protect federal sovereignty from state reverse-commandeering. Part II 
focuses on the respective roles the federal and state governments have 
held in the field of immigration law and policy.9 It critiques a problem 
of concurrent jurisdiction in immigration law.10 Under the trend of 
 
 8 See David Martin, Reading Arizona, 98 VA. L. REV. In Brief 41, 42 (2012), 
available at http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2012/04/14/Martin_Web.pdf 
(noting that “this mirror-image reasoning undergirds many of the recent state and 
local efforts to adopt their own restrictive immigration laws”). 
 9 Migration policy is, and historically has been, a politically charged issue. See, 
e.g., HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING 8 (Oxford University Press 2006) 
(deemphasizing exclusion and placing emphasis of immigration law on the inclusive 
treatment of all immigrants, documented and undocumented, “as future citizens, and 
immigration as a transition to citizenship”). This in turn provides an incentive for 
states to take action with regard to the policing of migrants and guarding the entrance 
and conditions of residence of migrants in a state. See, e.g., GERALD L. NEUMAN, 
STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION viii (Princeton University Press 1996) (exploring a 
variety of early state-imposed immigration policies “conducted primarily as an 
exercise of ‘police power,’” and “involved qualitative restrictions on undesired 
migrants”). Scholars have particularly focused on the shaping of migration law and 
policy in a post-9/11 political environment and historically in times of national 
insecurity. See also DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS (The New Press 2006) (discussing the 
treatment of immigrants as state enemies and threats to national security historically); 
LEGAL BORDERLANDS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN BORDERS 2-4 (Mary L. 
Duziak & Leti Volpp eds., The Johns Hopkins University Press 2006) (explaining that 
borders are constructed through legal controls on entry and exit, as well as the 
conferral or denial of rights and privileges).  
 10 See, e.g., Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power 
Over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557 (2008) [hereinafter Stumpf, States of 
Confusion] (discussing the shift of immigration law from subset of foreign policy to 
being entrenched within other domestically-based and concurrent federal-state 
enforcement schemes: “Federal immigration law has evolved from a stepchild of 
foreign policy to a national legislative and regulatory scheme that intersects with the 
triumvirate of state power: criminal law, employment law, and welfare.”); see also 
Ingrid V. Eagly, Local Immigration Prosecution: A Study of Arizona Before SB 1070, 58 
UCLA L. REV. 1749, 1811-12 (2011) (“What Arizona has done is move criminal 
immigration law from the exclusively federal jurisdiction of immigration law into the 
concurrent state-federal realm that dominates much of criminal law. In this way, the 
Arizona project invites localities to leave behind their role of merely supporting the 
federal government in the enforcement of federally defined immigration priorities. 
Instead, Arizona empowers its officials to direct their own system for handling illegal 
immigration.”) (citing Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative 
Federalism, 118 YALE L. J. 1256, 1263 (2009)); Stephen Lee, De Facto Immigration 
Courts, 101 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (on file with author) (exploring 
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concurrent jurisdiction,11 the federal government’s attempt to re-assert 
its traditional primacy in immigration policy faces significant obstacles 
because the federal statutory and policy scheme itself invites states to 
play a role in the enforcement of immigration law. Yet, historically, 
the federal government’s exclusive power to dictate immigration 
policy was grounded constitutionally, not in the federal statutory 
scheme.12 The shift of immigration law away from a constitutional 
framework to a statutory one is crucial because of the advent of 
mirror-image theory.13 State mirror-image statutes are intentionally 
drafted to mirror federal laws and standards as a way to survive 
preemption analysis.14 Because the Court ratified mirror-image theory 
in Whiting and adapted this mirroring theory in Arizona, the 
preemption doctrine has been significantly weakened. 
Specifically, Part III examines how mirror-image laws allow for the 
devolution of the federal power to control immigration to the states 
and enables state reverse-commandeering. The state takeover of 
federal immigration database screening protocols effectually 
commandeers federal resources to serve state ends. Those databases, in 
turn, enable state authorities or their delegates to screen individuals 
for violations of federal immigration laws, which state and local 
authorities can now prosecute under mirror-image laws. This enables 
another form of reverse-commandeering: the usurpation of federal 
enforcement discretion because state authorities can now make 
 
manner in which state criminal courts and prosecutors are seizing reins of federal 
policymaking discretion through state and local immigration screening and exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion, resulting in downstream consequences, such as deportation).  
 11 See generally Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption 
Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253 (2011) (discussing the 
manner in which the historical trend of concurrent jurisdiction has challenged the 
development of a consistent preemption doctrine as the Court’s role is no longer 
simply sorting what matters of law should fall on the “truly local” or “truly national” 
side of previously recognized lines of federal-state division).  
 12 See, e.g., T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE 
CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (Harvard University Press 2002) 
(discussing the historical underpinnings for the immigration law’s plenary power 
doctrine despite no mention of immigration law in the Constitution); NEUMAN, supra 
note 9 (exploring the history of constitutional governance of immigration law, and the 
increasingly complex relationship between immigration policy and constitutional 
foundations); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: 
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 550-54 
(1990) [hereinafter Motomura, Phantom Constitutional Norms] (observing that the 
foundation of what is considered classical immigration law is rooted in constitutional 
law, including the story of the rise of the plenary power doctrine). 
 13 See Chin & Miller, supra note 7. 
 14 Id. 
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competing choices about where, when, and how vigorously to enforce 
the federal laws mirrored in their state statutes. Mirror-image laws also 
reverse-commandeer in another respect: while they enable state 
authorities to make independent immigration policy and enforcement 
decisions, they also leave the national government accountable for any 
fallout in the sphere of foreign relations for treatment of foreigners by 
state authorities. The anti-commandeering doctrine was designed 
precisely to prevent the shifting of the fiscal and political costs by one 
sovereign’s policies onto the back of the other sovereign in our dual 
sovereign federalist system. 
In Part IV, I anticipate potential objections to reversing the anti-
commandeering doctrine. In spite of potential objections, I conclude 
that the preemption doctrine is incapable of protecting federal 
sovereignty in the same way that the Court’s anti-commandeering 
doctrine protects state sovereignty.15 The strong claim explored here is 
that the anti-commandeering doctrine should be, according to its 
inherent logic, applicable to the federal sovereign to prevent reverse-
commandeering. The more modest claim is that the Court’s 
preemption doctrine, to fully satisfy its purpose, can be reinvigorated 
through adopting principles set forth in the Court’s federalism 
jurisprudence and relying more heavily upon the logic of the anti-
commandeering doctrine. This reinvigoration is needed to address the 
usurpation of federal sovereignty that state laws can now achieve 
when the state law mirrors or incorporates federal provisions and 
standards. 
I. COMMANDEERING & REVERSE-COMMANDEERING 
An unprecedented historical movement is underway: a hostile 
takeover of federal immigration law and policy by state and local 
governments.16 Since Congress’s failure to pass comprehensive 
 
 15 See, e.g., Lauren Gilbert, Immigrant Laws, Obstacle Preemption and the Lost 
Legacy of McCulloch, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153 (2012) (stating that many state 
and local immigration laws challenged under preemption will be upheld as long as 
they track federal standards). 
 16 See Keith Aoki & John Shuford, Welcome to Amerizona — Immigrants Out! 
Assessing “Dystopian Dreams” and Usable Futures” of Immigration Reform, and 
Considering Whether “Immigration Regionalism” is an Idea Whose Time Has Come, 38 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 4-5 (2010) (discussing historically unprecedented nature of 
contemporary state and local immigration activity); Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, 
Forced Federalism: States as Laboratories of Immigration Reform, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1673, 
1674-75 (2011) (“Immigration law is undergoing an unprecedented upheaval . . . . 
These attempts to wrestle control of enforcement decisions from the federal 
government have cast into doubt the doctrinal core of immigration law: federal 
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immigration reform legislation during the 2006-2007 terms, state and 
local governments have considered over 7,000 immigration-related 
proposals and have enacted hundreds of them.17 A tiny handful of the 
most controversial state laws — such as Section 2(B) of SB 1070, 
upheld in Arizona during the last term, and LAWA, upheld in Whiting 
in the prior term — have received challenges in federal court.18 
 
exclusivity.”). 
 17 State Laws Related to Immigration and Immigrants, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immigration/state-laws-related-to-
immigration-and-immigrants.aspx (last visited Feb. 1, 2012); see also Anna Gorman, 
Ariz. Law Is Just One of Many, L.A. TIMES, July 17, 2010, at A1 (discussing a horde of new 
or proposed state immigration laws). Not all state and local immigration-related 
proposals are restrictionist, and some are properly characterized as “pro-immigrant” 
actions. See PRATHEEPAN GULASEKARAM & S. KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN, AM. CONSTITUTION 
SOC’Y FOR LAW AND POL’Y, RESTRICTIVE STATE AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION LAWS: SOLUTIONS IN 
SEARCH OF PROBLEMS 7 n.22 (Nov. 15, 2012), available at http://www.acslaw.org/ 
sites/default/files/Gulasekaram_and_Ramakrishnan_-_Restrictive_State_and_Local_ 
Immigration_Laws_1.pdf (“In our dataset of over 25,000 cities across the United States, 
from May 2006 to December 2011, 125 had proposed restrictive ordinances and 93 had 
proposed pro-immigrant ordinances, including measures limiting cooperation with 
federal authorities on deportations.”). Multiple scholars have explored the benefits of 
state and local immigration regulations. See, e.g., Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right 
Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1373 (2006) (stating that state and local governments are passing non-cooperation laws 
to limit their cooperation with federal immigration laws); Cristina Rodríguez, The 
Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008) (arguing 
any presumed “inherent authority” of state and local law enforcement to regulate 
immigrants is preempted under Supremacy Clause by existing federal immigration 
enforcement statutory scheme); Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism 
Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57 (arguing in favor of recent state and local 
immigration efforts as constitutional notwithstanding plenary power doctrine); Peter J. 
Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627 (1997) 
(arguing that state regulation of immigration policy is more efficient and reflects 
variation in voter preferences); Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration 
Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1619, 1619 (2008) (addressing the limitations of federal 
immigration legislation, advocating instead that these regulations are best addressed 
through a localism perspective in which “the incentive structure of localism channels 
local action”). 
 18 The constitutionality and legality of immigration federalism efforts has been at 
the center of a robust academic discussion. See, e.g., Jennifer M Chacón, A Diversion of 
Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563 (2010) (addressing the procedural deficiencies of 
immigration enforcement); Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 
U. PA. L. REV. 341 (2008); Pratheepan Gulasekaram, No Exception to the Rule: The 
Unconstitutionality of State Immigration Enforcement Laws, 5 ADVANCE: J. OF ACS ISSUE 
GROUPS 37 (2011) (arguing that the Whiting decision does not alter the division of 
power between federal and state governments regarding immigration policy); Clare 
Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 
787, 788 n.6 (2008) (arguing that the text and structure of the Constitution allows for 
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Consequently, such challenges mark only the tip of an immigration 
federalism iceberg.19 
 
shared authority between state and federal governments in the realm of immigration 
policy); Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration 
Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819 
(2011) [hereinafter Motomura, The Discretion That Matters] (arguing federal policies 
delegating immigration gatekeeping to state and local law enforcement, or allowing 
gatekeeping laws such as Arizona SB 1070 to stand, permit state and local 
governments undue discretion in dictating the terms of federal immigration 
enforcement priorities in violation of the federal government’s plenary power to 
control immigration policy); Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-Related State and Local 
Ordinances: Preemption, Prejudice, and the Proper Role for Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 27, 34 (2007) (suggesting that state and municipal legislation intended to 
regulate immigration generally is unconstitutional, while local efforts that do not 
interfere with federal authority, such as in-state tuition privileges, are constitutional); 
Juliet P. Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 
AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006) (utilizing membership theory to explore and explain the 
growing convergence of criminal law and immigration law); Michael J. Wishnie, 
Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and 
Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 532-52 (2001) (exploring within the context of the 
1996 Welfare Reform Act whether Congress has authority to extend a historically 
federal power, such as immigration regulation, to the states). Many scholars 
specifically explore the equal protection consequences of state immigration laws. See, 
e.g., Linda S. Bosniak, Immigrants, Preemption and Equality, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 179 
(1994) (addressing immigration law in the equal protection context); Mary D. Fan, 
Post-Racial Proxies: Resurgent State and Local Anti-”Alien” Laws and Unity-Building 
Frames for Antidiscrimination Values, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 905 (2011) (analyzing anti-
alien legislation as a product of political unrest and a desire to express race-based 
distrust, and exploring the role of federal preemption in preventing discriminatory 
legislation); Kevin R. Johnson, A Case Study of Color-Blindness: The Racially Disparate 
Impacts of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and the Failure of Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 2 
U.C. IRVINE L. REV 313 (2012) (discussing the racially disparate impact immigration 
laws have on undocumented and lawful immigrants).  
 19 Hiroshi Motomura is credited with first coining the term “immigration 
federalism” in legal discourse. See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 18, at 788 n.6 (2008) 
(citing Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration 
Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1361 (1999) (defining immigration 
federalism as “states and localities play[ing a role] in making and implementing law 
and policy relating to immigration and immigrants”)); Spiro, supra note 17, at 1627 
n.a1 (crediting Hiroshi Motomura with coining the term “immigration federalism”). 
Examined through the scholarship of Motomura and others, immigration federalism 
can be understood as the efforts of states and local governments to assert a role for 
themselves in shaping a national immigration policy. Immigration federalism 
describes both a historical phenomenon (insofar as states and local governments have 
always sought to regulate immigration within their jurisdictions) and, as used here, 
the contemporary manifestation of that phenomenon. As a historical phenomenon, 
states and localities have always played a role in shaping migration policies. See 
Huntington, supra note 18, at 837-38. Typically, the federal government, rather than 
assuming a proactive role in establishing a national immigration policy, has crafted its 
immigration policies in reaction to state and local efforts. See Hiroshi Motomura, The 
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Although setting and enforcing a national immigration policy has 
traditionally been understood to be an exclusively federal 
responsibility,20 the recent tsunami of state and local immigration laws 
aim, often expressly, to commandeer federal immigration laws.21 Thus, 
the growing proliferation of thousands of state and local immigration 
laws can best be described as reverse-commandeering — a deliberate 
attempt to break the exclusive power of the federal government to 
dictate immigration policy.22 Increasingly, state and local attempts to 
control unwanted immigration exemplify the inverse of the problem 
posed by the impermissible commandeering of state resources by the 
federal government under the Court’s federalism jurisprudence. 
Part I explains how the anti-commandeering doctrine is logically 
consistent with the goal of protecting federal sovereignty. Specifically, 
I show how the Court has developed its anti-commandeering 
jurisprudence in order to protect our federalist system of dual 
sovereignty. The Court’s commandeering cases thus far have protected 
state sovereignty from federal encroachment. Yet, their guiding 
principle is designed to protect the federalist system, not just state 
sovereignty. Accordingly, states, like the federal government, should 
be subject to the Court’s anti-commandeering doctrine and thereby 
prohibited from commandeering aspects of federal sovereignty. 
Likewise, state efforts to carve themselves a role in areas committed by 
the Constitution to the federal government should be subject to an 
anti-reverse-commandeering analysis. 
 
Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 
1729 (2010) (“Only after the Civil War did today’s prevailing view of immigration 
federalism — that federal immigration regulation displaces any state laws on the 
admission and expulsion of noncitizens — begin to emerge.”). 
 20 See discussion infra Part II.A. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law 
and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 255 (1984) 
(examining the history of the plenary power doctrine and arguing that the “the Court 
should abandon the special deference it has accorded Congress in the field of 
immigration”).  
 21 See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen, supra note 2, at 484 (“A strong instance of [state] 
goading, which we might call reverse commandeering, is playing out across the 
country right now in the realm of immigration law, as states seize on mandatory 
provisions of federal law to attempt to drive federal executive action. Following 
Arizona’s lead, numerous states have passed laws that challenge the enforcement of 
federal immigration law and seek not only to supplement federal enforcement with 
state enforcement, but also to force the federal executive itself to take more action.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 22 See, e.g., Eagly, supra note 10 (discussing how SB 1070, when viewed 
comprehensively within the framework of Arizona’s body of criminal immigration law 
enacted in recent years, illuminates Arizona’s functional regulation of immigration law 
and policy). 
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A. Anti-Commandeering Doctrine & Protecting Federal Sovereignty 
Structurally, the Constitution establishes federalism as a system of 
shared governance. This system of dual sovereignty, in theory, 
allocates specific enumerated powers to the federal government and 
leaves all other powers to the states.23 Defense of the dual sovereign 
system of governance has been a complex and difficult endeavor.24 In 
fact, how best to structure that defense has been referred to by 
constitutional law scholar H. Jefferson Powell as “the oldest question 
of constitutional law.”25 
This defense typically involves asserting the values derived from 
strong state governments.26 State governments offer a multiplicity of 
 
 23 See, e.g., AKHIL AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, A BIOGRAPHY 29-31 (Random 
House 2005) (explaining process by which “each ratifying state pledged vertical 
allegiance to the United States” through ratification of the Constitution, with the 
vertical separation of powers now being the federal and state governmental structure).  
 24 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 39-40 (2010) 
(questioning traditional federalism defenses, such as preserving traditional values 
within a locality and promoting innovation, by arguing that such rationales may 
disrupt national harmony or require a common federal framework of “uniform 
standards”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different 
Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1326 (2004) (“[A] broad vision of 
inferred preemption invalidates beneficial state laws.”); Philip Hamburger, 
Unconstitutional Conditions: The Irrelevance of Consent, 98 VA. L. REV. 479, 492 (2012) 
(arguing that there are limits to federal use of economic incentives to encourage state 
action because a state cannot consent to waive a limit the people placed upon the 
federal government); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative 
Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. 
L. REV. 813, 938 (1998) (rejecting existence of mutually exclusive dual sovereign 
spheres and favoring anti-commandeering doctrine’s role in protecting state autonomy 
because it serves federal-state intergovernmental relations functionally); Vicki C. 
Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 2180 (1998) (arguing that an analysis of the benefits of federalism is not 
dispositive of whether courts should enforce categorical federalism-based limits on 
federal legislation, and advocating for a more flexible approach). 
 25 H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 
633, 635 (1993) (discussing Justice O’Connor’s opinion in New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144 (1992), within context of “the historical search for a principled law of 
federalism,” and noting that this search is “‘perhaps our oldest question of 
constitutional law’; the underlying basis for ‘the proper division of authority between 
the Federal Government and the States’” (quoting Justice O’Connor, New York, 505 
U.S. at 149)). 
 26 Debates about the values of federalism rage on as the basis for academic 
critiques of the Court’s jurisprudence and whether it is properly giving effect to the 
federalist values of our founders. That debate is complicated and long-running, and 
this Article makes no attempt to contribute to it here. My present point is much 
humbler: federalism is designed to protect two sovereigns, not just to foster state 
sovereignty, and the anti-commandeering doctrine’s logic can be extended in both 
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regulatory regimes, which in turn provides both a testing lab and a 
competitive framework for developing the best policies.27 The 
multiplicity of state governments provides the national citizenry with 
choices about which state policies are most conducive to their needs.28 
Moreover, political processes occurring at the state level (as opposed 
to the national level) are said to provide more opportunity for 
accountability, meaningful political participation, and the promotion 
of community (resulting from people working together to achieve 
meaningful political ends).29 Finally, states can serve as rallying points 
for opposition to national policies and as a restraining force against 
overreach by the national government.30 
These justifications for a robust federalist system react against an 
unconstitutional alternative: the consolidation of all real governing 
authority at the national level. At the same time, federalism is much 
more than a vehicle for advancing the rights of state power and 
autonomy. Federalism involves two bodies of sovereignty. The well-
being of that system of governance requires that both bodies of 
sovereignty remain intact and in a careful balance with each other. 
The powers reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment, therefore, 
are only meaningful in the context of those powers expressly granted 
to the federal government.31 Moreover, the Court has recognized that 
 
directions to protect federal sovereignty as well as state sovereignty. 
 27 For a summary of these federalist values, see Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist 
Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 51-63 (2004). Young’s concern is not so 
much to argue the merits of these values as to summarize them in order to question 
whether the Supreme Court’s federalist jurisprudence adequately serves “the values 
that motivate our attachment to federalism in the first place.” Id. at 64; see also Neil S. 
Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REV. 
1629, 1648-50 (2006) (providing a detailed discussion concerning scholarship 
addressing federalism values and how best to protect state sovereignty). 
 28 Young, supra note 27, at 57. 
 29 See id. at 60. 
 30 The Court, of course, is not shy about iterating federalist values in decisions 
where it intends to curb national power. For example, in Gregory v. Ashcroft, the 
Court explained: “This federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people 
numerous advantages. It assures a decentralized government that will be more 
sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogenous society; it increases opportunity for 
citizen involvement in democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and 
experimentation in government; and it makes government more responsive by putting 
the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 
458 (1991). 
 31 Put slightly differently, “[T]he creation of a list of enumerated powers was not 
simply an attempt to limit the new federal government for its own sake. It was 
designed to realize a basic structural idea [of dual sovereignty].” JACK M. BALKIN, 
LIVING ORIGINALISM 146 (Harvard Univ. Press 2011). That is also the view of the 
  
548 University of California, Davis [Vol. 46:535 
the federal government is not the only sovereign capable of overreach 
and, thus, not the only sovereign subject to restraints in the federalist 
system: “Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate 
branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the 
accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance 
of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce 
the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.”32 Under this federalist 
system, the state sovereign must live with the national sovereign and 
vice versa. And it is the responsibility of the judicial branch to ensure 
that neither makes inroads on the sovereignty of the other in 
derogation of the Constitution.33 
Constitutional scholars have noted a renewed commitment by the 
judicial branch to police the boundaries of federal and state power in 
order to ensure that any inroads on state sovereignty are proscribed. 
Specifically, much academic discourse has been dedicated to a 
discussion on the significance of a “federalism revival” in the Court’s 
jurisprudence in recent decades that seeks doctrinal and prudential 
methods to more robustly protect state autonomy and sovereignty.34 In 
addition to the “federalism revival” attached to “breath[ing] new life 
into the [Tenth] amendment’s seemingly truistic language,”35 scholars 
have noted that “the Commerce Clause, the Eleventh Amendment, 
and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment experienced similar 
federalism revivals.”36 As will be discussed in more detail below, the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in the Affordable Care Act during the 
last term now sweeps the Spending Clause into the “federalism 
revival” as well. Most relevant to this Article, however, is the manner 
in which the anti-commandeering doctrine was born from the Tenth 
Amendment jurisprudence set forth by the Rehnquist Court of the 
1990s. 
Through principles set forth in New York v. United States,37 and 
reinforced in Printz v. United States,38 the Court has concluded that 
commandeering is unconstitutional under principles of federalism, as 
 
Court: “The principles of limited national powers and state sovereignty are 
intertwined. While neither originates in the Tenth Amendment, both are expressed by 
it.” Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2366 (2011). 
 32 Ashcroft, 501 U.S. at 458. 
 33 See M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 359 (1918).  
 34 Siegel, supra note 27, at 1630-31; Jackson, supra note 24, at 2213. 
 35 Siegel, supra note 27, at 1630-31. 
 36 Id. at 1630 n.3 (citations omitted). 
 37 505 U.S. 144, 185-86 (1992). 
 38 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). 
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commandeering violates the vertical separation of powers between the 
state and federal governments. What this means in practice is that 
while federal law can regulate people, it cannot regulate states.39 New 
York held that the “take title” provision of the Low-Level Radioactive 
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 was unconstitutional.40 
Specifically, the federal law mandated states to “take title” to 
radioactive waste by a certain date or otherwise “be liable for all 
damages directly or indirectly incurred.”41 The Court concluded that 
“[t]he Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or 
administer a federal regulatory program.”42 Thus, federal laws may not 
require state legislatures to enact specific laws to implement federal 
regulatory programs because doing so amounts to the commandeering 
by one sovereign of the legislative power of another. Along similar 
lines, the federal government may not compel state officers to 
implement federal ends because this also amounts to the 
commandeering of one sovereign by another. Printz’s specific holding 
prohibited a federal law that would have required state law 
enforcement officers to temporarily screen firearm sales to ensure they 
are lawful under the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 
1993.43 The general principle remains that one sovereign may not 
commandeer another sovereign to the detriment of the latter 
sovereign’s co-equal status under our federalist system of government. 
In New York, the first anti-commandeering case, the Court initially 
appeared to rely upon the Tenth Amendment as the basis for the 
doctrine it articulated.44 The Court acknowledged that the Tenth 
Amendment has traditionally been regarded as a “tautology” or 
“truism.” The Tenth Amendment reserves to states all powers not 
explicitly committed to the federal government by the Constitution.45 
Thus, if the federal government lacks a power, then the states must 
have it; resolving one inquiry must resolve the other.46 However, the 
 
 39 Printz, 521 U.S. at 920. 
 40 New York, 505 U.S. at 175. 
 41 Id. at 153.  
 42 Id. at 188.  
 43 Printz, 521 U.S. at 920.  
 44 New York, 505 U.S. at 156-57. 
 45 U.S. CONST. amend. X.  
 46 New York, 505 U.S. at 156. The Tenth Amendment, in other words, was once 
viewed as a “tautology,” simply resolving a question of which sovereign can claim 
what remaining powers are not expressly delegated by the Constitution. This is why it 
has also been traditionally read as a “truism” and not as an Amendment that should be 
read for implicit meaning. The Court has continued to recognize the viability of this 
view of the Tenth Amendment even if it is no longer predominant in light of the 
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New York Court appeared to give this Amendment teeth when it 
departed from this long-standing view and determined instead that the 
Tenth Amendment was something much more than a truism. The 
Court found this Amendment could be read to have positive content 
and that it in fact “restrains the power of Congress” by shielding state 
sovereignty from the exercise of powers that otherwise are 
constitutionally permissible.47 These aspects of state sovereignty thus 
mark a positive limit posted by the Tenth Amendment on federal 
prerogatives.48 In other words, the Court has begun to delineate a 
limiting principle or border for federal constitutional powers, even 
plenary powers, where those powers trench on state sovereignty 
through unconstitutional commandeering. 49 That inquiry has given 
rise to the Court’s anti-commandeering jurisprudence.50 
The Court’s transformation of the Tenth Amendment inquiry moves 
beyond asking whether a federal action finds its authority in some part 
of the Constitution and instead tries to locate a dividing line between 
what is properly within the sphere of federal sovereignty and what is 
properly within the sphere of state sovereignty.51 As explained by the 
 
evolution of the anti-commandeering doctrine. See Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 
2355, 2367 (2011) (“Whether the Tenth Amendment is regarded simply as a ‘truism,’ 
or whether it has independent force of its own, the result here is the same.”) (internal 
citations omitted) (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 156). 
 47 New York, 505 U.S. at 156; see Powell, supra note 25, at 675-88 (discussing how 
although New York cannot locate a justification for the expansion of this new 
federalism principle based in a historical examination of the founders’ discussion or 
subsequent historical record of the constitutional debate, this conception of federalism 
is justified on prudential grounds). 
 48 For a discussion of the evolution of the Court’s Tenth Amendment 
jurisprudence over time, see Siegel, supra note 27, at 1636-42. Siegel sees Gregory v. 
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991), as marking the starting point of the “Rehnquist Court’s 
reinvigoration of the Tenth Amendment.” Siegel, supra note 27, at 1637. 
 49 See Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress 
Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1060-
88 (1995) (exploring normative objections to nonjudicial commandeering and 
critiquing the Court’s anti-commandeering doctrine as “reflect[ing] a wooden, 
simplistic response to a problem that is conceptually and normatively complex”).  
 50 See id.  
 51 That at least is the inquiry that gives rise to Court holdings that find the 
national government is improperly commandeering the states to achieve national 
ends. In practice, the inquiry appears to boil down to whether a federal enactment 
commandeers either a state legislature in contravention of the Court’s holding in New 
York, or whether the enactment commandeers state actors in contravention of Printz. 
For example, in Reno v. Condon, the Court dismissed a Tenth Amendment 
commandeering claim, explaining that the federal statute under challenge “does not 
require the South Carolina Legislature to enact any laws or regulations, and it does 
not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating 
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New York Court, the “Tenth Amendment thus directs us to determine 
[in a given case] whether an incident of state sovereignty is protected 
by a limitation on a [federal power].”52 This inquiry is in effect a 
sorting process, determining what belongs on the state side of the dual 
sovereign line. Thus, that inquiry can be flipped, so to speak, to 
determine what aspects of federal sovereignty cannot be usurped by 
states in the process of exercising their sovereign powers.53 
In Printz, the Court made clear that the anti-commandeering 
doctrine really derives from the nature of our federalist system of 
government, rather than from the Tenth Amendment, which the Court 
now characterized as a signifier of that federalist system of 
government. In so doing, the Court developed anti-commandeering 
principles to engage in a constitutional inquiry as to whether a federal 
statute requiring state law enforcement officers to participate in its 
implementation violated the vertical separation of powers, even 
though “there is no constitutional text speaking to this precise 
question.”54 
The Court starts out by recognizing that the Constitution establishes 
a “system of ‘dual sovereignty.” It then proceeds to elaborate how the 
Constitution positively protects a “residuary and inviolable [state] 
sovereignty.” The Court ends its analysis on this score by noting that 
the Tenth Amendment merely “rendered express” the protection of 
“residual state sovereignty” in the Constitution’s limiting of Congress 
to “discrete, enumerated” governmental powers.55 All of this is not a 
departure from the approach in New York, but rather reflects a shift in 
 
private individuals.” Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000). Of course, the Court 
remains free to expand the scope of the anti-commandeering doctrine based on its 
view that it is charged by the Tenth Amendment with protecting aspects of state 
sovereignty from federal incursion. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. 
Ct. 2566, 2604-05 (2012). 
 52 New York, 505 U.S. at 157.  
 53 Typically one does not expect states to attempt to usurp federal prerogatives 
and, in any event, the Supremacy Clause and the corresponding preemption doctrine 
provide the typical vehicle for addressing state incursions onto the federal side of the 
dual sovereign line the Court purports to patrol with its anti-commandeering 
jurisprudence. However, as discussed below and illustrated by Whiting, preemption 
doctrine is not always adequate to protect federal sovereign prerogatives from state 
usurpation. Finally, in Printz, the Court often takes a “what’s good for the goose is 
good for the gander” approach in assessing when the federal exercise of constitutional 
powers infringes on state sovereignty — which is to say, the Court notes that if states 
tried to pull the same thing on the federal government, it would be clearly 
unacceptable. 
 54 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997). 
 55 Id. at 919. 
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emphasis. Anti-commandeering analysis serves federalism by engaging 
the Court in a query as to whether an otherwise valid federal action in 
this instance threatens the “structural protection[]” provided by the 
Constitution’s establishment of a “separation of the two [state and 
federal] sovereign spheres.”56 
The application of the anti-commandeering doctrine, therefore, does 
not hinge upon an inquiry or challenge pursuant to the Tenth 
Amendment. In fact, the Tenth Amendment arguably has been 
misread as the primary vehicle for protecting federalism values.57 In 
light of these considerations, the Court’s analysis in New York and 
Printz, in other words, is not simply designed to protect the state 
sovereign from overreaching action by the federal government. 
Though, as a practical matter, that is what the Court’s anti-
commandeering cases have accomplished thus far. Rather, it is 
important to note that the doctrine’s purpose is to protect the 
federalist system of governance, which requires maintaining a careful 
balance between the dual sovereigns comprising that system. It was 
just such a balance that the Court concluded was threatened when it 
determined in Printz that the “power of the federal government would 
be augmented immeasurably if it were able to impress into its service 
— and at no cost to itself — the police officers of the fifty States.”58 
Consequently, although the anti-commandeering doctrine was 
developed by the Court to protect state sovereignty from federal 
overreach, nothing prohibits flipping the doctrine in the opposite 
direction to protect federal sovereignty from state overreach. Indeed, 
 
 56 Id. at 921. 
 57 See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 31, at 141-49 (“[T]he purpose of enumeration was 
not to displace the [structural] principle but to enact it[.]”); Siegel, supra note 27, at 
1634 (“This disconnect between legal doctrine and animating values suggests that the 
Rehnquist Court’s Tenth Amendment legacy has more to do with a symbolic and 
judicially manageable gesture in the direction of ‘states’ rights’ than with the substance 
of federalism as constitutional law intended to safeguard state autonomy.”). The Tenth 
Amendment provides that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X. Thus, the Tenth Amendment operates in a 
unidirectional manner; therefore, if the Tenth Amendment were the purported basis 
for the anti-reverse-commandeering doctrine, the doctrine would collapse. But, as the 
Printz Court has said, “This argument also falsely presumes that the Tenth 
Amendment is the exclusive textual source of protection for principles of federalism. 
Our system of dual sovereignty is reflected in numerous constitutional provisions and 
not only those, like the Tenth Amendment, that speak to the point explicitly. It is not 
at all unusual for our resolution of a significant constitutional question to rest upon 
reasonable implications.” Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 n.13 (1997) 
(citation omitted). 
 58 Printz, 521 U.S. at 922. 
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such a potential reversal of the doctrine seems implicit in its federalist 
logic because the doctrine serves to ensure a balance between the dual 
sovereigns of the federalist system, not to advance the prerogatives of 
one of the sovereigns in particular. 
B. Applying Anti-Commandeering Doctrine to Reverse-Commandeering 
Laws 
It follows from all this that where the powers of the states would be 
augmented immeasurably — and to the detriment of a functioning 
system of dual sovereignty — anti-commandeering principles would 
have equal application to state reverse-commandeering laws that may 
threaten federal sovereignty. If states, for example, could put federal 
officers and resources to state ends, implement federal law directly, or 
coerce the enactment of federal law or regulations indirectly, then the 
same constitutional principles that protect states from commandeering 
should come into play to protect the federal government from reverse-
commandeering. The Printz Court makes exactly this point: “It is no 
more compatible with this independence and autonomy that [state] 
officers be ‘dragooned’ . . . into administering federal law, than it 
would be compatible with the independence and autonomy of the 
United States that its officers be impressed into service for the 
execution of state laws.”59 
Specifically, Printz holds unconstitutional federal legislation that 
seeks to compel state law enforcement officers to carry out federal 
aims. In reaching its holding, the Court considered a wide range of 
troubling implications that would derive from otherwise holding such 
legislation constitutional. The Court noted the obvious power 
imbalance resulting from allowing one sovereign, whether state or 
federal, to require another’s law enforcement personnel to carry out its 
ends. But, it also noted that such commandeering was also 
problematic because it effectually allowed one sovereign to shift the 
fiscal burdens of implementing its policies and programs to another 
sovereign.60 
Moreover, such commandeering is problematic because it allows a 
legislature to evade the consequences of its own actions in terms of its 
public perception and thereby allows it to evade accountability. That is 
 
 59 Id. at 928. 
 60 “By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a 
federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can take credit for ‘solving’ 
problems without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher 
federal taxes.” Id. at 930. 
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because by commandeering a second sovereign’s officers to implement 
its laws or policies, the second sovereign becomes the public face of 
the policy and the target of all popular disapprobation for that policy’s 
limits and failings.61 
Finally, the Court explained that regardless of how ministerial the 
function for which another sovereign’s officers are commandeered, 
there would inevitably be a usurpation of that sovereign’s ability to 
make independent policy and regulatory choices. The Court expressed 
doubt about the feasibility of distinguishing “between ‘making’ law 
and merely ‘enforcing’ it, between ‘policymaking’ and mere 
‘implementation’ ” because “Executive action that has utterly no 
policymaking component is rare.”62 The Court developed this point, 
explaining that by commandeering state officers, the federal 
government was also commandeering state policymaking authority 
insofar as the state now had to determine how to allocate law 
enforcement resources and time between the new federal directive and 
the other state objectives.63 
Additionally, the anti-commandeering doctrine’s reach was 
expanded with the Court’s recent healthcare ruling, National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB).64 The Court, in 
effect, transformed the anti-commandeering doctrine into an anti-
coercion doctrine. Under the new conceptualization of the anti-
commandeering doctrine, even when Congress does not compel states 
to act, a law can be struck on anti-commandeering grounds if the 
practical impact of the law is one that coerces another sovereign’s 
power. “The relevant inquiry is now practical rather than formal: has 
Congress left the states with a ‘real option’ of saying no to the federal 
government’s conditions?”65 
NFIB demonstrates that the Court does not view the doctrine as 
limited to restraining the federal government’s exercise of its 
Commerce Clause powers because here the doctrine limits the scope 
of the conditional spending power under the Spending Clause as 
well.66 In NFIB, the Court held that, although state participation in 
 
 61 “And even when the States are not forced to absorb the costs of implementing a 
federal program, they are still put in the position of taking the blame for its 
burdensomeness and for its defects.” Id. 
 62 Id. at 927. 
 63 Id. at 927-28. 
 64 See 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2659-61 (2012). 
 65 Bradley W. Joondeph, The Health Care Cases and the New Meaning of 
Commandeering (forthcoming 2012), available at http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/ 
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1333&context=aca. 
 66 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2603. 
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Medicaid was technically voluntary, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
violated anti-commandeering principles by attempting to 
unconstitutionally coerce state participation in the ACA’s new 
Medicaid provision. Specifically, the recent holding makes clear that 
commandeering does not have to be express to be unconstitutional. A 
sovereign can be commandeered without an explicit legislative 
pronouncement, for example, by prescribing duties for the other 
sovereign or commandeering the officers or fiscal resources. The 
upshot is that the Court found one sovereign can be commandeered or 
coerced in fact, even if that sovereign is not commandeered or coerced 
in form.67 This is a dramatic re-conceptualization of the prior anti-
commandeering doctrine. 
Specifically, in NFIB, the Court found the ACA’s amendments to 
Medicaid amount to an impermissible “commandeering” of the states, 
in essence, because of the sheer volume of federal funding states stand 
to lose if the states fail to comply with the ACA’s mandates.68 Under an 
anti-reverse-commandeering analysis, state attempts to coerce the 
allocation of federal resources for the enforcement of state laws can be 
read as posing a similar offense to federalism. Even if Congress can 
take action to correct a state action that may be perceived as coercive 
or commandeering in nature, the Court’s recent healthcare decision 
indicates that the practical coercive effect of a law alone can justify 
striking down a provision on anti-commandeering grounds. 
In summary, the Court’s anti-commandeering doctrine does not 
turn on concerns specific to the states that cannot also be shared by 
the federal government.69 Federal commandeering of state law 
enforcement officers is not, for example, objectionable because it 
disrupts the regulatory diversity presented by fifty different state 
governments fashioning independent policies. Rather, through its anti-
commandeering doctrine, the Court has expressed concern that 
permitting such commandeering would enable federal sovereignty to 
 
 67 Bradley W. Joondeph, Conditional Spending, Coercion, and Commandeering: 
The Affordable Care Act and the Federal Regulation of State Taxation 2 (Sept. 21, 
2011) (unpublished manuscript) (Tax Law Speaker Series at the University of San 
Diego: Conditional Spending, Coercion, and Commandeering), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/bradley_joondeph/3/.  
 68 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604-05 (2012). 
 69 NFIB’s holding that Congress’s tax and spending power can be used coercively 
in a way that amounts to commandeering a state’s ability to make a choice does not 
concern a power that states also have. But NFIB more broadly shows that 
commandeering does not require a clear mandate from one sovereign to another in 
order to upset the federalist system and run afoul of the anti-commandeering doctrine. 
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overshadow state sovereignty and thereby disrupt the balance between 
the two sovereigns that is federalism. 
One of the Court’s primary concerns, in fact, has been that through 
commandeering, the federal government could evade political and 
fiscal accountability for national policies by shifting their costs onto 
the states.70 
The federal government possesses expansive powers the states lack 
and if commandeering occurs, it is most likely to be the federal 
sovereign that is doing the commandeering. However, it still remains 
possible for the state sovereign to commandeer as well. Indeed, the 
real concern of states usurping, through state legislation, powers 
constitutionally committed to the national government can be seen as 
early as Gibbons v. Ogden.71 Spheres of power that have been 
considered truly “national” in scope have included, for example, 
foreign affairs and entering into foreign treaties, national security and 
national defense strategies, matters of national and international 
commerce, and setting a national currency.72 Thus, although this 
Article grounds the notion of reverse-commandeering by states in the 
context of state immigration laws, an anti-reverse-commandeering 
doctrine could be applicable in any context in which states might 
encroach upon exclusive federal powers in a way that interferes with 
the federal government’s ability to exercise a national responsibility. 
I next turn to the immigration context to suggest a concrete instance 
where states are engaged in attempting to commandeer or usurp 
federal authority. The federal government is currently wrestling with 
state governments over the direction of national immigration policy, 
with state governments enacting laws designed to carve out a role for 
themselves in enforcing federal immigration statutes. Examining this 
struggle between sovereigns in some detail will, hopefully, 
demonstrate that states also can shift political and fiscal responsibility 
 
 70 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182-83 (1992).  
 71 22 U.S. 1, 199-200 (1824) (“But, when a State proceeds to regulate commerce 
with foreign nations, or among the several States, it is exercising the very power that is 
granted to Congress, and is doing the very thing which Congress is authorized to 
do.”). The Court developed its dormant commerce clause jurisprudence to ensure 
state sovereignty does not overshadow federal sovereignty in the sphere of commerce 
regulation. Erin F. Delaney, Note, In the Shadow of Article I: Applying a Dormant 
Commerce Clause Analysis to State Laws Regulating Aliens, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1821, 
1840-42 (2007). 
 72 See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 31, at 145-47 (“Examples of federal problems 
include questions of foreign and military policy where the nation needs to speak with 
a single voice, to marshal resources for the common defense, and to prevent foreign 
powers from pushing the state around or engaging in divide-and-conquer strategies — 
whether relating to trade, immigration, military threats, or diplomatic alliances.”). 
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for their actions to the federal government. The power to set and 
implement immigration policy has been traditionally construed as 
falling within the sole prerogative of the federal government because 
immigration policy has been deemed by the Court to be a subset of the 
foreign affairs power.73 Consequently, these laws present an 
unconstitutional incursion into federal sovereignty.74 
II. FROM PLENARY POWER TO PREEMPTION 
Immigration policy is a field where domestic economic policy 
intertwines with foreign policy. The field of immigration law has 
traditionally, and perhaps more so than other fields, been a place 
where state and federal sovereign interests merge and collide. The 
migration of foreigners into the country has historically been a matter 
for Congress to regulate.75 The decisions about which nationals are 
welcome and which are not has obvious ramifications on foreign 
policy, which is a sphere committed to the federal government, not the 
states.76 
 
 73 See Brief for Madeline K. Albright at 9-10, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 
845 (2012) (No. 11-182), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs/11-182_respondentamcufmrgovofficials. 
authcheckdam.pdf (asserting that authority to regulate immigration lies solely within 
the federal domain) (citing Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003); Toll v. Moreno, 
458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982); Kleindiest v. 
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972)). 
 74 I should note that scholars question just how effectively the anti-
commandeering doctrine serves federalist values. See Siegel, supra note 27, at 1673 
(arguing that prohibiting federal commandeering may actually frustrate federalism 
insofar as the federal government may resort to other means, like preemption, which 
leave states with less of a role to play in a given regulatory regime than they would 
have had if they had been simply commandeered); Young, supra note 27, at 23 
(arguing that the Court’s federalism cases, while promoting state sovereignty, do not 
do much for state autonomy). That debate takes me too far afield. For present 
purposes, it is enough that the anti-commandeering doctrine exists and that to the 
extent that doctrine’s purpose is to preserve federalism, it should have application to 
state commandeering as well as federal commandeering. 
 75 De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976), superseded by statute, Immigration 
Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, sec. 101, § 274A(h)(2), 100 
Stat. 3359, 3368, as recognized in Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. 
Ct. 1968 (2011). 
 76 See CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 327 (2d ed. 2006) (comparing landmark immigration cases such as Hines v. 
Davidowitz and De Canas v. Bica); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 cl. 1 (“No State shall 
enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation . . . .”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. cl. 2 
(“No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on 
Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary . . . .”); U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 10. cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any duty of 
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At the same time, foreign nationals entering this country do not 
merely enter the United States; they must also enter individual states 
and communities. Although their presence is a matter of foreign 
policy, it is also both a contribution to and a burden on the local and 
state jurisdictions where they reside. This is, of course, true of the 
presence of any person within the bounds of a state. Immigrants have 
been seen as different historically, however, because they are not 
citizens, and they have often been perceived as having deleterious 
impacts on local governments and residents.77 Those arguing in favor 
of state immigration laws which strive to curb migration or expel 
migrants have claimed such unwanted migrants threaten jobs;78 
overburden schools;79 pose health, safety, and welfare risks;80 impose 
language and cultural challenges; and other social burdens.81 
The federal government early on asserted its prerogative to regulate 
in the field with the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798.82 Supporters of 
 
Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or 
Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless 
actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.”).  
 77 See Kobach, Reinforcing, supra note 7, at 462 (arguing “consequences of illegal 
immigration — health care costs and criminal costs — only exacerbate the fiscal 
burdens imposed by illegal immigration upon states and cities”).  
 78 See, e.g., Making Immigration Work for American Minorities: Hearing Before 
Subcomm. on Immigration Policy and Enforcement of the Comm. on Judiciary Subcomm. 
Jurisdiction, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Rep. Elton Gallegly, Chairman, 
Subcomm. on Immigration Policy and Enforcement), available at 
http://www.house.gov/gallegly/media/media2011/030111immigration.htm (examining 
the relationship between unemployment and immigration, arguing that immigrants 
should not be permitted to fill jobs that U.S. citizens would be otherwise qualified to 
undertake).  
 79 See, e.g., Jonathan Serrie, School Officials: Alabama Law on Reporting Illegal 
Students is ‘Impractical’, FOX NEWS (July 26, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/ 
politics/2011/07/26/illegal-immigration-crackdown-stirs-debate-in-alabama/ (asserting 
that the national cost of educating children of unauthorized immigrants is nearly $52 
billion per year). 
 80 See, e.g., Is Illegal Immigration Bad for America’s Health?, FOX NEWS (July 26, 
2010), http://www.foxnews.com/health/2010/07/26/illegal-immigration-bad-americas-
health/ (arguing that unauthorized immigrants pose an especial health risk because 
they have not been checked for, inter alia, tuberculosis, syphilis, HIV, gonorrhea, and 
narcotic drug addiction). 
 81 See, e.g., Welfare Tab for Children of Illegal Immigrants Estimated at $600M in 
L.A. County, FOX NEWS (Jan. 19, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/ 
01/19/welfare-tab-children-illegal-immigrants-estimated-m-la-county/ (reporting that 
Los Angeles County Supervisor released statistics estimating that taxpayer burden for 
foodstamps, public safety, and health benefits total approximately $600 million for the 
children of undocumented immigrants). 
 82 The Alien Enemies Act, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798), codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 21-
24 (authorizing President to deport resident aliens when the United States is at war 
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the Acts claimed that the Commerce Clause, Necessary and Proper 
Clause, Migration Clause, and the War Powers Clause suggested that 
the U.S., as a sovereign, had the inherent authority to regulate 
“aliens.”83 Nevertheless, throughout the nineteenth century, states also 
passed laws regulating who was permitted to enter their borders, 
spurring a series of court challenges. By 1875, the Court held that the 
power to regulate migration was exclusively federal pursuant to its 
power to regulate foreign commerce,84 as well as its foreign affairs 
power.85 
Thus, Part II focuses on the respective roles the federal and state 
governments have in the field of immigration law and policy. While 
setting immigration policy is clearly committed to the federal 
government, without question state governments often bear the 
burdens associated with immigration, and thus have a continuing 
incentive to attempt to regulate immigration and immigrants at the 
state level.86 Moreover, in recent decades, the federal government has 
 
with the alien’s home country); The Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) 
(criminalizing the publication of “false, scandalous, and malicious writing” against the 
United States); The Alien Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798) (authorizing President to 
deport resident aliens determined to be “dangerous to the peace and safety of the 
United States”). 
 83 See also Sarah Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, 
Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 
TEX. L. REV. 1, 90 (2002) (detailing the historical genesis of the Alien and Sedition Acts 
of 1798 and its constitutional justification). See generally NEUMAN, supra note 9 
(introducing historical overview of constitutional foundations of U.S. immigration 
law). 
 84 See Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 259, 271-72 (1876) 
(invalidating a New York statute that required the master of every vessel arriving at 
the port of New York to report all aliens on board and post a bond of $300 to 
indemnify the state and local authorities against expenses incurring in public 
assistance for the alien within four years, or pay $1.50 per arriving alien passenger; 
according to the Court, this statute unconstitutionally infringed upon the federal 
power to “regulate commerce with foreign nations”). 
 85 See Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 275, 280 (1875) (The Supreme 
Court invalidated a California statute that gave state officials discretion to refuse 
admission to certain arriving passengers unless the master or owner of their transport 
vessel met one of two conditions. Either he could post a bond of $500 in gold to 
indemnify all California counties, towns, and cities against liability for support and 
maintenance for two years, or he could pay a sum to be set by the state official (who 
would retain twenty percent “for his services”). The Court reasoned that the statute 
unconstitutionally interfered with the conduct of foreign affairs by the federal 
government.). 
 86 Immigration is, and historically has been, a politically charged issue and that 
also provides an incentive for political branches at the state level to take action with 
regard to immigrants entering and residing in a state. 
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encouraged states to assist it in enforcing federal immigration laws. 
State and local governments have gone further and, through the 
enactment of mirror-image laws, now seek to assert an independent 
role in the enforcement of federal immigration law standards. These 
laws are drafted to survive preemption challenges by mirroring federal 
statutes. Preemption doctrine thus far has had only limited success in 
protecting federal sovereignty in the same way that the Court’s anti-
commandeering doctrine protects state sovereignty. This is borne out 
by a discussion of how the preemption claims made by the United 
States fared in both Whiting and Arizona. 
A. Plenary Power Doctrine: Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction in 
Immigration Law 
Court acknowledgment of federal supremacy in the immigration 
field is enshrined in the plenary power doctrine.87 “Scholars and courts 
generally understand the plenary power doctrine in immigration law 
to sharply limit judicial scrutiny of the immigration rules adopted by 
Congress and the President.”88 The doctrine is commonly seen “as a 
statement of uniquely unconstrained congressional authority.”89 That 
doctrine significantly limited the ability of the states to regulate 
immigration. States could not exclude individuals from their 
territories on the basis of national origin, determine the length or 
conditions of their stay in the United States, nor discriminate between 
citizens and noncitizens outside of the entry and removal context.90 In 
addition, the plenary power doctrine gave full authority to the federal 
legislative and executive branches to regulate immigration.91 By the 
close of the nineteenth century, “the Court’s holdings [had] stripped 
the states of the power to act where they had previously reigned 
almost alone, and enthroned the federal government as the exclusive 
sovereign over immigration.”92 
 
 87 See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 704-07 (1893). 
 88 Adam B. Cox & Christina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 
119 YALE L.J. 458, 460 (2009). 
 89 Id. at 477.  
 90 Kevin R. Johnson, Race and Immigration Law and Enforcement: A Response to Is 
There a Plenary Power Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 289, 289-90 (2000); Motomura, 
Phantom Constitutional Norms, supra note 12, at 565; Peter H. Schuck, The 
Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6, 22 n.117 (1984); Margaret 
H. Taylor, Detained Aliens Challenging Conditions of Confinement and the Porous Border 
of the Plenary Power Doctrine, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1087, 1091 (1995). 
 91 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889). 
 92 Stumpf, States of Confusion, supra note 10, at 1576. 
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In the 1876 case of Chy Lung v. Freeman,93 the Court explained that 
states have only a limited role in immigration matters because state 
laws addressing immigration can have foreign policy implications and 
create foreign policy problems that the national government will be 
tasked with resolving.94 The Court noted that the state which 
promulgated the law, here California, would not be held responsible 
because “by our Constitution, she can hold no exterior relations with 
other nations.”95 Rather, the federal government would be held 
accountable for the state’s conduct toward foreigners.96 This logic 
would be repeated by the Court over the years, most recently in 
Arizona.97 Thus, from the nineteenth century on, the Court recognized 
that state immigration laws presented the impermissible possibility of 
co-opting national authority to establish foreign relations because such 
state laws could impact ongoing national relations with foreign 
countries. At the same time, the Court recognized that state sovereigns 
were not restrained by political accountability for their foreign relation 
impacts because, in the end, any problems caused would be the federal 
government’s responsibility. In effect, the state was commandeering a 
power committed to the federal government for its own ends, and that 
was constitutionally impermissible.98 
Chy Lung did not necessarily foreclose all state legislation touching 
upon immigration matters. The Court made clear, however, that it was 
not faced with a statute that constituted a proper exercise of the state’s 
police power in the context of immigration law. It noted that a state’s 
power “to protect herself by necessary and proper laws against paupers 
and convicted criminals from abroad,” when exercised “in the absence 
of legislation by Congress,” might be proper if limited to “provisions 
necessary and appropriate to that object alone.”99 Along similar lines, 
 
 93 92 U.S. 275, 279-80 (1876).  
 94 Id. Specifically, the Court explained that a state immigration law affecting 
foreign citizens could lead to an “international inquiry” or a “direct claim of redress.” 
Id. at 279. 
 95 Id. at 279. 
 96 “If that government should get into a difficulty which would lead to war, or to 
suspension of intercourse, would California alone suffer or all the Union?” Id. 
 97 See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012). 
 98 It is worth noting at this juncture that the Chy Lung Court did not strike the 
statute on preemption grounds — there were no federal laws regulating immigration 
that potentially conflicted with the California law, or at least none that the Court 
considered. Rather, the problem with the statute was that it in effect usurped a power 
committed by the Constitution to the national government with the practical effect 
that a state policy would have national implications for which the state would not be 
held accountable. 
 99 Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 280. 
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two years later, the Court struck down a Missouri statute that 
prohibited bringing cattle into the state during certain months of the 
year, explaining that “unless the [state] statute can be justified as a 
legitimate exercise of the police power of the State, it is a usurpation of 
the power vested exclusively in Congress.”100 The Court recognized 
the overlap of federal and state authority over the matter of commerce. 
It struggled to define the proper scope of state authority over that field 
insofar as it implicated interstate commerce.101 It recognized, at the 
same time, that none of a state’s “large police powers [] can be 
exercised to such an extent as to work a practical assumption of the 
powers properly conferred upon Congress by the Constitution.”102 The 
Court concluded by describing its role in negotiating the ground 
where state police powers and federal constitutional commitments 
might overlap: “And as its [state police power] range sometimes comes 
very near to the field committed by the Constitution to Congress, it is 
the duty of the courts to guard vigilantly against any needless 
intrusion.”103 
These types of cases make clear that at earlier points in our history, 
the Court has expressed concern about state sovereignty 
overshadowing its federal counterpart. In more contemporary times, 
the Court has increasingly expressed its concern that federal 
sovereignty must not overshadow historic state powers. In some 
respects, the Court’s anti-commandeering doctrine is merely a 
continuation of the judicial responsibility enunciated in cases such as 
Chy Lung, ensuring that federal constitutional powers do not work to 
unnecessarily denude states of their historically-recognized police 
powers, just as state powers may not usurp traditional national 
powers. 
B. IRCA & IIRIRA: Concurrent Jurisdiction in Immigration Law 
Although it is well-settled that immigration law is a federal 
responsibility, states have consistently sought ways to play a role in 
the regulation of immigrants. States have argued that this position is 
reasonable given that they shoulder the day-to-day problems 
associated with those who reside within their borders, including 
immigrant populations. Moreover, in recent decades, federal 
immigration policy has embraced a concurrent jurisdiction approach 
 
 100 R.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 468-69 (1877).  
 101 Id. at 470-71. 
 102 Id. at 472. 
 103 Id. at 474. 
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seeking to partner with states.104 In other words, even though the 
Court has resolved the question of federal supremacy over 
immigration matters, states continue to play a role in immigration 
policy, sometimes at the invitation of the federal government, and 
federal authority continues to be challenged at the state and local 
level. 
Thus, states have fought hard to develop some type of meaningful 
role in setting immigration policy. The Court, in turn, has been willing 
to let states regulate immigrants even as it has struck down state laws 
that it viewed as seeking to establish an independent immigration 
policy. For example, in the 1970s, at the height of a severe economic 
recession, state lawmakers became frustrated with the perceived 
failure of the federal government to take appropriate action to curb 
unauthorized immigration from Mexico.105 Consequently, states began 
to pass employer sanctions laws: state immigration laws that penalized 
and sanctioned employers for hiring undocumented workers.106 In De 
Canas v. Bica, the Supreme Court upheld one of these laws after 
concluding that the regulation of the employment and labor of state 
residents, including employment of unauthorized immigrants, was a 
historic state police power.107 The Court reasoned that a state could 
engage in historic police powers that regulated the activities of 
immigrants, but it could not regulate federal immigration policy, as 
the “[p]ower to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a 
 
 104 For a discussion of concurrent jurisdiction see supra notes 10-11.  
 105 See BILL ONG HING, DEFINING AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY 156-160 
(Temple University Press 2004); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES: ILLEGAL ALIENS: 
ESTIMATING THEIR IMPACT ON THE UNITED STATES 45-49 (1980), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/129063.pdf; Carl E. Schwarz, Employer Sanctions Laws, 
Worker Identification Systems, and Undocumented Aliens, 19 STAN. J. INT’L L. 371, 371-
79 (1983). 
 106 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805 (1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51K (1972); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 705 (1976); FLA. STAT. § 448.09 (1977); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
4409 (1973); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 26, § 871 (1977); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 19C 
(1976); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-121 (1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-A:4-a (1976); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 444a (1977); VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-11.1 (1977). 
 107 De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976), superseded by statute, Immigration 
Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 274A(h)(2) (1986), 100 Stat. 
3359, 3368, as recognized in Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 
1968, 1974 (2011). The Court explained that “[i]n attempting to protect California’s 
fiscal interests and lawfully resident labor force from the deleterious effects on its 
economy resulting from the employment of illegal aliens, [the statute] focuses directly 
upon these essentially local problems . . . .” Id. at 357. 
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federal power.”108 Consequently, the De Canas Court created a carve-
out exception for immigration enforcement. 
A federal response came in the mid-1980s, through the enactment of 
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA). In that 
statute, Congress incorporated an employer sanctions provision into a 
comprehensive immigration reform bill. In a historically 
unprecedented way, Congress thus experimented in the delegation of 
immigration enforcement to private third-parties, namely 
employers.109 For the first time in history, employers faced federal civil 
and criminal penalties for knowingly hiring undocumented workers if 
the employers failed to adequately screen the identity and immigration 
documents of new hires.110 Thus, IRCA deputized third-party 
immigration screeners (e.g., all private and public employers) to help 
control immigration.111 At the same time, IRCA expressly preempted 
the growing patchwork of state immigration laws regulating the 
workplace that had proliferated after De Canas.112 
The next wave of immigration federalism laws marked a change of 
course, in that new federal immigration laws now responded to the 
growing patchwork of state immigration laws by requiring the states to 
participate in the enforcement of federal law. In the early 1990s, 
 
 108 Id. at 354. The Court characterized the California statute as a “local regulation” 
having no more than a “purely speculative and indirect impact on immigration” which 
was therefore not a “constitutionally proscribed regulation of immigration.” Id. at 355-
56. Thus, De Canas is often cited for the proposition that while states may not regulate 
immigration (“essentially a determination of who should or should not be admitted 
into the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain”), they 
are free to pass statutes impacting aliens and immigrants (“the fact that aliens are the 
subject of a state statute does not render it a regulation of immigration”). De Canas, 
424 U.S. at 355. The distinction is not particularly clarifying since the question 
remains when does regulation of aliens effectually amount to the regulation of 
immigration? See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 18, at 845-47. 
 109 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 96-603, § 101, 100 
Stat. 3359, 3360 (1986) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a). 
 110 Id. 
 111 Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the Workplace, 61 STAN. L. REV. 
1103, 1130 (2009); Huyen Pham, The Private Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 96 
GEO. L.J. 777, 780-81 (2008). 
 112 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 105, at 45-49 (“States that have 
enacted employer sanctions legislation include California (1976), Connecticut (1972), 
Delaware (1976), Florida (1977), Kansas (1973), Maine (1977), Massachusetts 
(1976), Montana (1977), New Hampshire (1976), Vermont (1977), and Virginia 
(1977).”); see also De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (holding that a state 
provision that affects immigrations is not necessarily immigration policy and that 
Congress had not expressly preempted legislation regulating the relationship between 
employers and employees regarding immigration status). 
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Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), which required states to screen 
the identity and immigration status of those receiving federal 
benefits.113 After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the 
Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) increasingly encouraged state and local police to engage in 
third-party immigration screening as well where, for example, an 
individual was booked in jail or detained at a local facility.114 Over 
time, therefore, federal immigration policy has moved away from its 
former status as an exclusively federal foreign affairs and regulation of 
commerce matter.115 The result has been the “domestication of 
immigration.”116 
The federal government’s encroachment upon the states’ historic 
police power through the domestication of immigration policy 
weakens the federal government’s argument that it is defending its 
exclusive power to control immigration under the Supremacy Clause. 
Conversely, the cooperative nature of immigration enforcement 
activities between the federal and state governments weakens a state 
government’s argument that this domestication is a form of 
commandeering or a Tenth Amendment violation of state 
sovereignty.117 Nevertheless, this contested boundary is becoming the 
target of increasing controversy, as witnessed by recent legal 
challenges. Multiple state and local jurisdictions are increasingly 
rejecting federal proposals for further cooperation in federal 
immigration enforcement efforts.118 As this movement of 
“uncooperative federalism”119 grows into a new wave of immigration 
 
 113 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-3546 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.). 
 114 RANDY CAPPS, MARC R. ROSENBLUM, CRISTINA RODRÍGUEZ, & MUZAFFAR CHISHTI, 
DELEGATION AND DIVERGENCE: A STUDY OF 287(G) STATE AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT 8-17 (Migration Policy Institute 2011), available at 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/287g-divergence.pdf; Stumpf, States of 
Confusion, supra note 10, at 1594-95. 
 115 Id. at 1565 (“Beginning the mid-1980s, federal immigration law has evolved 
from a stepchild of foreign policy to a comprehensive legislative and regulatory 
scheme that intersects the triumvirate of state power: criminal law, employment law, 
and welfare. Shifting immigration law from international foreign policy to a more 
domestic connection with crime, employment, and welfare casts immigration law into 
a world infused already with state regulation.” (internal citations omitted)).  
 116 Id. at 1600. 
 117 Id. at 1570-79. 
 118 See id. at 1603-04 (describing multiple such cases). 
 119 Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 10, at 1258. 
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federalism, it is likely that state and local governments will raise anti-
commandeering principles under the Tenth Amendment as a method 
to challenge this encroachment by the federal government into states’ 
historic police powers. 
At the same time, states and local governments have not been 
passive spectators to the recent evolution, or devolution, of federal 
immigration law. As noted above, IRCA was a federal response to state 
efforts to discourage the hiring of undocumented illegal immigrants by 
sanctioning employers who hired such immigrants. In recent years, 
state and local governments have once again begun asserting their 
right to shape and enforce immigration policy at the state and local 
level through a remarkable growth of laws and ordinances, many of 
which can be viewed as encroachments upon the federal government’s 
exclusive power to control immigration.120 
The contemporary movement of immigration federalism can more 
or less trace its genesis back to Hazleton, Pennsylvania. On July 13, 
2006, the township of Hazleton, Pennsylvania, passed its own version 
of immigration reform, an ordinance titled the “Illegal Immigrant 
Relief Act.”121 The Hazleton ordinance touched off something virulent. 
Three months later, thirty-nine localities in sixteen states considered 
immigration-related ordinances similar to the Hazleton ordinance.122 
Thus began a national movement of state and local proposed 
immigration legislation, which now numbers in the thousands and has 
not abated. In the first quarter of 2011, for example, 1,538 
immigration bills and resolutions were considered in all fifty states 
 
 120 See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text. 
 121 Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-10 (2006), replaced by Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 
2006-18, amended by 2006-40, 2007-6. Michael Powell & Michelle Garcia, Pa. City 
Puts Illegal Immigrants on Notice: “They Must Leave,” Mayor of Hazleton Says After 
Signing Tough New Law, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2006, at A3. 
 122 Immigration-related ordinances had passed or were considered in Gadsden, 
Ala.; Huntsville, Ala.; Phoenix, Ariz.; Escondido, Cal.; Landis, Cal.; San Bernardino, 
Cal.; Vista, Cal.; Aurora, Colo.; Avon Park, Fla.; Palm Bay, Fla.; Carpentersville, Ill.; 
Newton, Mass.; Sandwich, Mass.; Valley Park, Mo.; Mint Hill, N.C.; Suffolk County, 
N.Y.; Riverside, N.J.; Allentown, Pa.; Altoona, Pa.; Ashland, Pa.; Bridgeport, Pa.; 
Courtdale, Pa.; Forty Fort, Pa.; Frackville, Pa.; Hazleton, Pa.; Lancaster, Pa.; Lansford, 
Pa.; McAdoo, Pa.; Nesquehoning, Pa.; Poccono, Pa.; Shenandoah, Pa.; Sunbury, Pa.; 
West Mahanoy, Pa.; Wilkes-Barre, Pa.; Beaufort, S.C.; Farmers Branch, Tex.; 
Kennewick, Wash.; and Arcadia, Wis. See also AMERICAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS 
ASSOCIATION, NAVIGATING THE IMMIGRATION DEBATE: A GUIDE FOR STATE & LOCAL 
POLICYMAKERS AND ADVOCATES (2009), available at http://www.aila.org/content/ 
fileviewer.aspx?docid=24681&linkid=172618; see also State Legislation Related to 
Immigration: Enacted and Vetoed, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Nov. 12, 2012), 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/immigrant-policy-2006-state-legislation-
related-t.aspx. 
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and in Puerto Rico.123 By December 7, 2011, forty-two states and 
Puerto Rico had enacted 197 new laws and 109 new resolutions in 
2011.124 Substantively, the scope and depth of these laws and 
ordinances is also unprecedented. For instance, state and local 
governments now delegate, or are attempting to delegate, third-party 
immigration screening duties to landlords, police officers, employers, 
teachers, and even doctors.125 
One of these Hazleton copycat statutes, LAWA, was signed into law 
on July 2, 2007, and made effective on January 1, 2008.126 Then-
Governor of Arizona, Janet Napolitano, announced that the Arizona 
statute would allow state county prosecutors to impose the “business 
death penalty” (i.e., permanent revocation of business license) on 
employers that “knowingly” and “intentionally” hire unauthorized 
workers.127 In her signing statement on July 2, 2007, Napolitano 
candidly admitted that LAWA was designed to compel congressional 
action reforming federal immigration law to comport with the harsher 
sanctions aimed at illegal immigrants and those who employ them in 
the Arizona statute.128 She admitted that the law is not a regulation of 
 
 123 2011 Immigration-Related Laws, Bills and Resolutions in the States: Jan. 1–Mar. 31, 
2011, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/immig/immigration-laws-and-bills-spring-2011.aspx. 
 124 2011 Immigration-Related Laws and Resolutions in the States (Jan. 1–Dec. 7, 
2011), NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/immigration/state-immigration-legislation-report-dec-2011.aspx. 
 125 Arizona, for example, is attempting to delegate immigration screening duties to 
landlords, police officers, employers, teachers, and doctors. See, e.g., S.B. 1611, 50th 
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011) (landlords); S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 
2010) (document-based screening and database screening duties imposed on police 
officers); Legal Arizona Workers Act, 2007 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1312 (E-Verify screening 
duties imposed on employers); H.B. 2008, 49th Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 2009) (state 
workers); S.B. 1407, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011) (teachers); S.B. 1141, 50th 
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011) (teachers); .S.B. 1405, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. 
(Ariz. 2011) (hospital workers). 
 126 Legal Arizona Workers Act, 2007 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1312 (codified at ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2009, 23-211 to 23-214 (2008)). 
 127 David G. Savage, The Enforcer of Border Laws: Janet Napolitano Could Be Taking 
her Tough Immigration Stance to the Department of Homeland Security, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 
23, 2008 at A17. For a first “knowing” violation, the court must require the dismissal 
of unauthorized aliens and order a three-year probationary period for the employer 
(during which time the employer must file quarterly reports concerning each new 
hire). ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(F)(1) (2011). The court has discretion to further 
suspend all licenses necessary for the employer to do business for a minimum period 
of ten business days. Id. § 23-212(F)(1)(d). A second violation during the 
probationary period triggers the permanent revocation of all licenses necessary to do 
business. Id. § 23-212(F)(2). 
 128 Letter from Janet Napolitano, Governor, Ariz., to Jim Weiers, Speaker, Ariz. 
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employment, something that would fall within a historic state police 
power, but rather is borne from “our desire to stop illegal 
immigration” and that such a law is needed “because it is now 
abundantly clear that Congress finds itself incapable of coping with 
the comprehensive immigration reforms our country needs.”129 
Shortly thereafter, in 2010, Arizona passed the highly controversial 
Senate Bill 1070 (SB 1070). Governor Jan Brewer and proponents of 
SB 1070 also argued that the Arizona immigration law was needed to 
coerce the federal government to take action on comprehensive 
immigration reform and to force the executive branch to more 
robustly enforce federal immigration law.130 While the new wave of 
state and local immigration laws is too broad for easy generalizations, 
LAWA and SB 1070 both epitomize one of the movement’s prominent 
tendencies — an effort at the state and local levels to challenge federal 
predominance in the field of immigration. State and local governments 
have not hidden that the purpose of these laws is commandeering, or 
coercive, in nature: to force the allocation of more federal resources 
and efforts to support immigration enforcement and deportation and 
to alter the nation’s current immigration policy into one much tougher 
and more unforgiving of immigration law violations.131 
C. Displacement of Plenary Power Doctrine with Preemption Doctrine 
Historically, state efforts to assert themselves in the field of 
immigration would have had to come to terms with the plenary power 
doctrine’s committal of that field to the federal government on 
constitutional terms. However, as scholars have recognized, the 
 
House of Representatives (July 2, 2007) at 1, available at www.azsos.gov/public_ 
services/Chapter_Laws/2007/48th_Legislature_1st_Regular_Session/CH_279.pdf. 
 129 Id. Gilbert notes that the movement is driven, in part, by a perception of 
“institutional failure on the part of the Department of Homeland Security,” which state 
and local governments view themselves as remedying. Gilbert, supra note 15, at 168. 
 130 Jan Brewer, Governor to Attend Federal Appellate Court Hearing on SB 1070, 
OFFICE OF THE ARIZ. GOVERNOR (Oct. 22, 2010), http://azgovernor.gov/dms/ 
upload/PR_102210_StatementBrewerAttendSB1070HearingNov1.pdf. 
 131 See generally DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH: DEPORTATION LAW AND THE NEW 
AMERICAN DIASPORA (Oxford Univ. Press 2012) (exploring the human rights 
consequences of the aggressive contemporary deportation policy of the United States); 
S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, The Importance of the Political 
in Immigration Federalism (forthcoming ARIZ. ST. L.J.) (manuscript at 48) (on file with 
author) (“[P]roliferating policies in politically receptive subfederal jurisdictions 
builds, rather than dissipates, pressure for restrictive action at the federal level and, 
more generally, enshrines a more restrictionist status quo.”).  
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doctrine is “in some state of decline.”132 It is not that the Court has 
repudiated the plenary power doctrine, but rather that the doctrine 
has increasingly fallen into disuse and is not typically utilized in 
resolving immigration federalism cases.133 Instead, as Congress 
enacted increasingly comprehensive federal immigration laws, a 
preemption framework evolved as the new norm for evaluating the 
legality and constitutionality of immigration federalism efforts.134 
Recent challenges to immigration federalism laws bear this out, with 
both Whiting135 and Arizona136 turning on the question of whether 
state immigration laws are preempted by federal law. The shelving of 
the plenary power doctrine in favor of preemption doctrine can be 
witnessed as early as the 1930s and early 1940s. Thus, for example, in 
Hines v. Davidowitz, decided in 1941, the Court noted that a state’s 
alien registration law was originally challenged as impermissibly 
“encroach[ing] upon legislative powers constitutionally vested in the 
federal government.”137 But given that in the interim between bringing 
the suit and review by the Supreme Court the United States had passed 
its own alien registration law, the Court concluded that it “must 
therefore pass upon the State Act in light of the Congressional Act.”138 
Nonetheless, the Court did not eschew addressing the constitutional 
question of whether a state has the power to enact alien registration 
laws by articulating a rule of judicial avoidance. It merely noted that in 
light of its preemption holding, it need not reach other 
constitutionally-based arguments raised by the litigants.139 
 
 132 Motomura, Phantom Constitutional Norms, supra note 12, at 549.  
 133 Motomura traces the “decline” of the doctrine, noting that while the Court 
revitalized it during the McCarthy era, nevertheless it has suffered inroads. Id. at 549, 
554-60. I should note that the decline of the doctrine is not subject to much mourning 
because, besides sharply limiting the role of state governments in the field of 
immigration, it also limits the role of courts in reviewing federal actions with regard to 
immigrants, effectually denuding immigrants of constitutional protections. Id. at 547. 
Thus, the inroads upon the doctrine of recent decades have resulted in an “expansion 
in the number and range of claims that courts, including the Supreme Court, would 
hear in immigration cases.” Id. at 560. 
 134 See id. at 613. 
 135 Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1975 (2011). 
 136 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2494 (2012). 
 137 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 60 (1941). 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. at 62 (explaining that the Court was “expressly leaving open . . . the 
argument that the federal power in this field, whether exercised or unexercised, is 
exclusive”). Hines, like Arizona, is rich with language justifying federal supremacy in 
the field of immigration along the traditional line that laws affecting immigrants 
trigger foreign policy concerns. Nevertheless, in both cases that recitation is put in 
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Yet, this shift from a constitutional plenary power framework to a 
statutory-driven preemption framework in evaluating state 
immigration laws has proven to be critically consequential. 
Preemption analysis shifts the focus from whether a state is usurping a 
power committed to the federal government to a question of whether a 
state law or regulation conflicts with a federal law or regulation. As 
has been recognized, over the course of the twentieth century, federal 
immigration laws and regulations multiplied while a vast 
administrative apparatus arose to implement them.140 Thus, state and 
local enactments now occur in the context of a detailed federal code 
addressed to regulate immigrants and immigration policy. Courts need 
not reach — or in any case, choose not to reach — the question of 
whether the Constitution deprives a state or local government of the 
power to make such an enactment. Instead, the question by which 
state and local enactments live or die is whether they are preempted by 
federal enactments. Federal laws guiding the Court’s preemption 
analysis include the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), 
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), and the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA). Thousands of pages of regulatory code and administrative 
rulemaking attach to these laws.141 They form a large part of what is 
considered immigration law.142 
 
service of the invocation of the Supremacy Clause, rather than a more stringent 
ousting of the states altogether from the field regardless of federal enactments. See id. 
at 66 (“Consequently the regulation of aliens is so intimately blended and intertwined 
with responsibilities of the national government that where it acts, and the state also 
acts on the same subject, ‘the act of congress or the treaty is supreme; and the law of 
the state, though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to 
it.’”) (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 211 (1824)). 
 140 See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 88, at 463 (“Over the twentieth century, 
Congress developed a detailed, rule-bound immigration code.”). Cox and Rodríguez 
argue persuasively that the result has been a growth of the Executive Branch’s 
discretion in determining how to enforce the numerous Congressional mandates. See 
id. (stating that “[t]his detailed code has had the counterintuitive consequence of 
delegating tremendous authority to the President to set immigration screening policy 
by making a huge fraction of noncitizens deportable at the option of the Executive”). 
 141 See Lucy Trevalyan, Passport to Progress? Politically There Can Be Few More 
Hotly Contested Issues Than Immigration, but for Economists It’s the Key to Long-Term 
Growth, 64 No. 5 INT’L BAR NEWS 51, 52 (2010) (“Gregory Siskind, attorney at US firm 
Siskind Susser Bland, says the US immigration system is probably the world’s most 
complex. ‘It is largely based on legislation passed in 1952 and major amendments 
every few years have resulted in a system with dozens and dozens of categories, 
numerous agencies governing the process, thousands of pages of regulations and an 
immigration Bar numbering more than 12,000 lawyers, multiple times larger than in 
any other country.’”); Jose Antonio Vargas, Not Legal Not Leaving, TIME, June 25, 
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The Court’s preemption doctrine is now the favored vehicle to 
examine the legality and constitutionality of state immigration laws. It 
is a doctrine that requires the Court to reconcile, often line-by-line 
and provision-by-provision, challenged components of the state 
immigration law with the federal immigration statutes and a vast 
immigration code. This doctrine includes several types of preemption: 
field preemption, obstacle preemption, and conflict preemption, for 
example.143 Field preemption occurs “where Congress has legislated 
comprehensively, thus occupying an entire field of regulation and 
leaving no room for the states to supplement federal law.”144 Obstacle 
preemption occurs where a state law “stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”145 Conflict preemption occurs where a state law “actually 
conflicts with federal law,” making compliance with both laws 
impossible.146 
Further complicating an already complicated doctrine, preemption 
can also be express or implied.147 Express preemption analysis is 
required when Congress has expressly preempted state action.148 This 
can occur, for example, through Congress’s inclusion of a specific 
preemption clause in the enactment of federal law or any explicit 
statutory language prohibiting state laws in a specific field of 
regulation. Even in express preemption cases, however, scholars have 
noted that preemption rules remain notoriously unclear.149 This is in 
 
2012, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2117243,00. 
html#ixzz2Au1m4U83 (“As Angela M. Kelley, an immigration advocate in 
Washington, told me, ‘If you think the American tax code is outdated and 
complicated, try understanding America’s immigration code.’”).  
 142 See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 88, at 476 (“As the modern administrative 
state developed in the latter half of the twentieth century . . . [there was an] increasing 
comprehensiveness of the statutory regime regulating immigration, coupled with 
Congress’s increased delegation within that regime to executive officials.”); 
Motomura, Phantom Constitutional Norms, supra note 12, at 548 (explaining 
“‘constitutional immigration law’” encompasses “immigration rules in 
subconstitutional form, including statutes, regulations, and administrative 
guidelines”). 
 143 Mgmt. Ass’n for Private Photogrammetric Surveyors v. United States, 467 F. 
Supp. 2d 596, 603 nn.10-11 (E.D. Va. 2006); Gilbert, supra note 15, at 159. 
 144 La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368 (1986). 
 145 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
 146 English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990). 
 147 See Jamelle C. Sharpe, Toward (A) Faithful Agency in the Supreme Court’s 
Preemption Jurisprudence, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 367, 380-81 (2011).  
 148 Id.  
 149 Id. at 387.  
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part because the Court itself has admonished the application of 
formulaic preemption rules: “[T]here can be no one crystal clear 
distinctly marked formula.”150 
The preemption doctrine thus requires federal courts to determine 
whether state immigration laws can be construed as consistent with 
federal immigration laws. Where they cannot, the state enactments are 
overturned. At the same time, however, preemption focuses the 
judicial inquiry on reconciling specific provisions and statutes rather 
than addressing whether state enactments are constitutionally 
permissible in the first place.151 The utilization of traditional tools of 
statutory interpretation to conduct an analysis under the preemption 
doctrine further removes from the inquiry a constitutional framework 
by which to interpret the constitutional implications of the state law. 
In effect, reliance on preemption doctrine moots the underlying 
constitutional inquiry that might have informed an appropriate 
evaluation of the legality and constitutionality of the state immigration 
scheme.152 Even when the state immigration law has been challenged 
under both the Supremacy Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the question of an unconstitutional 
incursion into federal sovereignty is not fully front and center.153 
As a result of preemption’s statutory-driven focus, the constitutional 
nature of the federal immigration statutory schema has been lost. 
Nonetheless, the plenary doctrine has never been expressly revoked, 
and the underlying concerns which drove the Court to elaborate it 
remain alive and vibrant today.154 Indeed, in the recent Arizona 
decision, the Court reaffirmed federal authority over immigration 
policy as a sovereign interest and rationalized it in the same way it did 
as far back as the Chinese Exclusion cases of the 1880s,155 and its 
 
 150 Hines, 312 U.S. at 67. 
 151 Young, supra note 11, at 3.  
 152 See Huntington, supra note 18, at 844 (“Instead a statutory preemption 
understanding begins with the assumption that such laws are constitutionally proper, 
at least to the extent that such actions accord with the authority of subnational 
governments to regulate health, safety, and other matters of local concern, and then 
asks whether Congress has preempted the conduct at issue.”). 
 153 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (invalidating a state law on equal 
protection grounds denying publicly funded K-12 school education to the children of 
unlawful immigrants, while opining that the better way to control unwanted 
migration was by targeting the employers who create an economic incentive for 
unwanted migration in the first place). 
 154 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 463 (Yale Univ. Press 2010). 
 155 See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) 
(establishing plenary power doctrine).  
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immediate predecessors, such as Chy Lung. The Chy Lung Court 
explained that “[i]t is fundamental that foreign countries concerned 
about the status, safety, and security of their nationals in the United 
States must be able to confer and communicate on this subject with 
one national sovereign, not the 50 separate States.”156 Nevertheless, the 
Arizona Court then noted that “[f]ederal governance of immigration 
and alien status is extensive and complex” and proceeded down the 
path of a preemption analysis.157 
Some may argue that the displacement of a plenary power analysis 
by a preemption analysis may, generally speaking, not mean much 
practically. The Arizona decision could be offered as evidence, for 
instance, that state and local laws which trench on federal turf are still 
likely to be struck down. The Arizona Court, after all, struck down 
three out of the four provisions of SB 1070 that were under federal 
preemption challenge. However, the preemption analysis is a 
treacherous venture in the immigration context because it demands 
that the federal courts sort through highly technical immigration 
statutes, and interpret a very dense immigration code and policy-
regulatory apparatus, both of which are not always consistent with 
each other.158 In fact, both federal immigration law enacted by 
Congress and federal immigration policy promulgated by the 
 
 156 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012). 
 157 Id. at 2499-500. It is worth noting that the Court was merely following the path 
set forth by the litigants who established and argued which claims were before the 
Court. 
 158 For example, the Whiting majority, in support of its decision to uphold the 
E-Verify mandate in LAWA, notes that, per an executive order issued under the Bush 
Administration, the federal government has “mandated” E-Verify use in the context of 
federal government contracts. Under what is called the FAR (Federal Acquisition 
Regulation) Rule, pursuant to Exec. Order No. 13465, 73 Fed. Reg. 33286 (2008), 
“executive agencies require federal contractors to use E-Verify as a condition of 
receiving a federal contract.” Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 
1968, 1985 (2011). Whether or not this executive order was legal under the federal 
immigration statute governing E-Verify, IIRIRA, was the basis of a challenge in 
Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Napolitano, 648 F. Supp. 2d 726, 732-34 (D. Md. 
2009), (granting summary judgment for defendant), motion denied, No. 09-2006 (4th 
Cir. 2009) (request for preliminary injunction to bar implementation of FAR Rule 
denied Sept. 3, 2009). The legality of requiring E-Verify use under the FAR Rule, 
therefore, remains unresolved because the issue has not been fully litigated. Yet, the 
Supreme Court relied upon the contested Executive Order to support its finding that 
LAWA did not conflict with federal immigration policy. See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 
1985. The Court suggested that LAWA’s mandatory expansion of E-Verify mirrored 
the federal policy of a mandatory expansion of E-Verify under the Executive Order. Id. 
at 1985-86 (“[T]he Federal Government has consistently expanded and encouraged 
the use of E-Verify.”). 
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executive branch can be criticized for containing potentially 
irreconcilable provisions within the same law or the same regulatory 
apparatus in some instances.159 This potential irreconcilability, and the 
problem it poses in the preemption doctrine, will be discussed below 
in the context of the Whiting decision. 
D. Displacement of Preemption Doctrine with Mirror-Image Theory 
Scholars have noted that preemption doctrine itself has not 
produced a particularly coherent body of case law precedent.160 
Regardless of the problems associated with the preemption doctrine 
and its application in the field of immigration law, the preemption 
doctrine has been a traditional bulwark in recent decades in ensuring 
federal objectives trump those set by state and local legislatures in the 
sphere of immigration law.161 Typically, when federal and state 
interests collide, preemption doctrine is the means of enforcing the 
Supremacy Clause. That doctrine requires the courts to strike state 
legislation that conflicts with or obstructs federal legislation in areas 
committed by the Constitution to federal governance. Thus, in the 
past, state and local efforts to carve themselves a role in setting and 
enforcing federal immigration policy have been judicially restrained by 
the preemption doctrine. 
But mirror-image theory is a game changer. In recent years, many of 
state and local immigration laws have been carefully crafted to survive 
federal preemption challenges through the application of what has 
been termed as mirror-image theory by criminal and immigration law 
scholars Gabriel “Jack” Chin and Marc Miller.162 Laws drafted 
pursuant to this theory seek to survive preemption challenges by 
 
 159 See infra Part II.D.1 (discussing how legislative history reveals that Congress 
recognized the potential that 8 U.S.C. § 1324a and 8 U.S.C. § 1324b could never be 
reconciled with one another). Future scholarship will address the irreconcilability of 
immigration law and policy. Also, it is important to note that the plenary power 
doctrine, as applied to state enactments, did not make for a more clear-cut analysis. 
The Court explained that states may regulate aliens so long as such regulation does 
not amount to “a determination of who should or should not be admitted into the 
country and the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain.” De Canas v. 
Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976), superseded by statute, Immigration Reform and Control 
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, sec. 101, § 274A(h)(2), 100 Stat. 3359, 3368, as 
recognized in Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968. 
 160 See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 15, at 160 (discussing trends in preemption 
jurisprudence and noting that “[t]he Court’s preemption decisions . . . are hard to 
reconcile”). 
 161 Chin & Miller, supra note 7, at 263-66. 
 162 See id. at 253-55. 
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mirroring, often word-for-word, federal statutes and incorporating by 
reference provisions defining immigration law violations. Based on 
these textual and substantive similarities, proponents argue that 
federal law does not preempt state law because the federal and state 
laws both criminalize or penalize the same behaviors, even if the state 
counterparts may offer different penalties and sanctions.163 States have 
argued that there can be no obstacle or conflict preemption if the 
federal and state laws say and do the exact same thing. Mirror-image 
statutes thus seek to circumvent the traditional judicial safeguards that 
have traditionally reigned in state efforts to usurp federal 
responsibilities in the area of immigration policy.164 
Mirror-image theory has had an enormous influence upon the 
unfolding immigration federalism movement.165 LAWA, SB 1070, and 
their copycat siblings, either under consideration or passed by other 
states, are drafted in accord with mirror-image theory.166 Through 
mirror-image theory, immigration federalism statutes are expanding 
the scope of third-party liability for supporting unauthorized 
immigrants into other realms. In Section 2(B) of SB 1070, recently 
upheld in Arizona, Arizona expands the structure into the realm of 
state and local law enforcement by delegating immigration screening 
duties to police officers in that state and imposing penalties on police 
officers that fail to properly screen.167 In Alabama’s copycat legislation, 
 
 163 See, e.g., United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 360 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. 
granted 132 S. Ct. 845 (2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 132 S. Ct. 845 (2011) 
(upholding the district court’s preliminary injunction, rejecting Arizona’s argument 
that the state immigration law serves the same ends as the federal immigration law). 
The Ninth Circuit noted that “‘a common end hardly neutralizes conflicting means.’” 
Id. (citing Motor Coach Emps. v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 273, 287 (1971)). 
 164 Chin & Miller, supra note 7, at 253-54. 
 165 Indiana, Georgia, Alabama, and Utah have enacted SB 1070-copycat laws. Chin 
& Miller, supra note 7, at 253-54 & nn.3-6. Dozens of state and local governments 
have already been spurred to create SB 1070-copycat legislation. NAT’L NETWORK FOR 
IMMIGRANT & REFUGEE RIGHTS, INJUSTICE FOR ALL: THE RISE OF THE U.S. IMMIGRATION 
POLICING REGIME 3 (2010), available at http://www.colawnc.org/files/pdf/injustice_ 
2011.pdf; Kim Severson, Immigrants Are Subject of Tough Bill in Georgia, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 16, 2011, at A14 (discussing the progress of proposed state legislation in 
Alabama, Indiana, Oklahoma, and South Carolina at the time of publication).  
 166 Chin & Miller, supra note 7, at 253-54 & nn.1-14. 
 167 As noted above, the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods 
Act, SB 1070, was signed into law in April of 2010. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 11, 
13, 23, 28, 41 (2010)), amended by Act of Apr. 30, 2010, ch. 211, 2010 Ariz. Sess. 
Laws 1070. The law includes citizen suit provisions that appear to be designed to hold 
state and local law enforcement officials accountable for “the full extent” of the 
enforcement of federal immigration law. 2010 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 11-1051(H) (2010) 
(“If there is a judicial finding that an entity has violated this section, the court shall 
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Alabama attempts to expand the structure into the realm of public 
education by delegating immigration screening duties on public school 
officials and teachers before admitting students.168 Alabama is also 
attempting to expand the structure into the realm of all contract law 
by punishing anyone who enters into a contract with an 
undocumented immigrant, thereby implicitly delegating immigration 
screening duties to any resident of Alabama who enters into a 
contract.169 In Georgia’s copycat legislation, Georgia attempts to 
expand the structure by imposing criminal penalties for transporting 
and harboring undocumented immigrants, and inducing them to enter 
the state.170 The ordinance challenged in Hazleton, Pennsylvania, 
 
order that the entity pay a civil penalty of not less than five hundred dollars and not 
more than five thousand dollars for each day that the policy has remained in effect 
after the filing of an action pursuant to this subsection.”); see also Gabriel J. Chin, 
Carissa Byrne Hessick, Toni Massaro & Marc L. Miller, A Legal Labyrinth: Issues Raised 
by Arizona Senate Bill 1070, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 47, 75-77 (2010) (“The citizen suit 
and ‘full extent’ provisions may be unwise policies from the standpoint of public safety 
. . . . In any event, these provisions are so unfamiliar that it is not clear whether the 
‘full extent’ and citizen suit provisions raise additional federal or state issues.”).  
 168 The Beason-Hammon Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act (H.B. 56) was signed 
into law in June of 2011. See ALA. CODE § 31-13-2 (2011), et seq. The law includes 
section 28, codified in ALA. CODE § 31-13-27 (2011), which sets forth a process for 
school officials to conduct screening and collect data on the immigration status of 
students enrolled in public schools. See Hispanic Interest Coalition of Ala. v. Governor 
of Ala., No. 5:11-cv-02484-SLB (11th Cir. August 20, 2012) (holding that section 31-
13-27 violates the Equal Protection Clause); see also United States v. Alabama, 691 
F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012) (concluding that it was unnecessary to conduct the 
preemption analysis because section 28 was found to be in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause, as held in the companion case, Hispanic Interest Coalition of 
Alabama).  
 169 In August 2011, the U.S. intervened in the lawsuit challenging the Alabama 
immigration law. See United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1293-95 (11th Cir. 
2012) (enjoining enforcement of section of Alabama law that would prohibit “the 
right to enforce nearly any contract”); see also Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer 
and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 Ala. Acts 535 § 27 (codified at ALA. CODE § 31-13-
26, (2011)) (refusing judicial enforcement of certain contracts entered into with 
undocumented immigrants).  
 170 Georgia’s Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act was signed into law 
as a part of H.B. 87 in April of 2011. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-200(a)(1), 
201(a)(2), 202(a) (codifying separate crimes for interactions with undocumented 
immigrants). The transporting, harboring, and inducing provisions were enacted 
within section 7 and codified at GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-5-200(b), 16-5-201(b), 16-5-
202(b) (2011). See Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Governor of Ga., 691 F.3d 
1250 (11th Cir. 2012) (affirming that section 7 is preempted by the INA’s criminal 
provisions pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1324). “The comprehensive nature of these federal 
provisions is further evident upon examination of how § 1324 fits within the larger 
context of federal statutes criminalizing the acts undertaken by aliens and those who 
assist them in coming to, or remaining within, the United States . . . . and the breadth 
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attempts to expand the theoretical and programmatic structure of 
IRCA’s third-party enforcement regime into the realm of the landlord-
tenant relationship by delegating immigration screening duties to 
landlords and imposing penalties when landlords fail to properly 
screen.171 
Many of these state immigration laws purport to be a mirror image 
of federal law or policy, with proponents arguing that they 
complement federal immigration enforcement efforts. Thus, mirror-
image laws present themselves as instances of “cooperative 
enforcement.”172 Yet, these laws present a radically new conception of 
cooperative federalism that allows states to directly and independently 
enforce federal immigration law, not simply enter into state-federal 
partnerships to cooperate in the enforcement of such laws as is often 
done, for example, in formal memoranda of understanding between 
DHS and state and local governments.173 
Mirror-image theory, rather, produces state legislation that mimes 
its federal counterpart as a means of enabling state enforcement 
initiatives that proceed independently of federal initiatives.174 As a 
consequence of “over-cooperative immigration federalism,”175 if the 
 
of these laws illustrates an overwhelmingly dominant federal interest in the field” Id. 
at 21 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1323, 1325, 1327, 1328).  
 171 The “Illegal Immigrant Relief Act” ordinance was signed into law in September 
2006. See Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-10 (2006), replaced by Hazleton, Pa., 
Ordinance 2006-18, amended by 2006-40, 2007-6. The ordinance included an anti-
harboring provision that subjected landlords to penalties for “harboring” 
undocumented immigrants in rental properties. Id. at section 5.B.(4). Specifically, it 
imposed a rental prohibition on undocumented tenants and included a potential 
revocation of rental licenses for violators. Id. In a companion ordinance, the “Rental 
Registration Ordinance,” Hazelton established a registration and screening protocol 
for residential property owners. Hazelton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-13. The “Rental 
Registration Ordinance” requires landlords to conduct immigration screening of 
tenants, or face civil and criminal penalties. Id.  
 172 See generally Kobach, Reinforcing, supra note 7 (arguing in favor of local 
immigration enforcement); Schuck, supra note 90 (tracing the historical evolution of 
American immigration law’s tradition as a “maverick, a wild card,” and concluding 
that “[t]he courts are busily razing the old structure and designing the new one, 
largely along the lines laid down by the contemporary administrative and 
constitutional orders.” Id. at 1, 90). 
 173 Chin & Miller, supra note 7, at 255. 
 174 Id. at 253-55.  
 175 Thank you to Ernie Young for this phrase. Ernest A. Young, Alston & Bird 
Professor of Law at Duke University School of Law, Immigration Regulation after 
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting: The States’ Expanded Authority Over Immigrants 
and Employers, American Law Institute (July 27, 2011), webcast available at 
http://www.ali-aba.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=courses.course&course_code=TSTU06. 
He attributes this phrase to his former student, Rocio Perez. 
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state can successfully argue that the state and federal government 
speak as one in text and purpose, there is no preemption conflict with 
the federal government. The state law, it is argued, does not frustrate 
or pose an obstacle to the federal enforcement effort, but rather 
establishes or reinforces a partnership in that effort. If the federal 
government provides an explicit avenue for state-federal partnerships 
in the enforcement of federal immigration law, either through 
congressional law or executive action, such as agency rulemaking or 
other executive indication,176 it is argued that there is no field 
preemption.177 
The Court’s inclination toward utilizing a textualist approach to 
construing statutes only improves the chances of a mirror-image statute 
surviving a preemption challenge. As explained by Justice Scalia, the 
textualist approach does not favor ventures into legislative materials 
because discerning the intent of Congress in drafting a statute is a 
hazardous pursuit, particularly since a legislative body is unlikely to 
have any real collective intent regarding a statute’s turn of phrase.178 
Congressional intent is displaced by a focus on giving effect to the 
words of the statute as they are understood “in accord with context and 
ordinary usage.”179 As we shall see, the Whiting decision suggests that 
such mirror-image statutes have a decent chance of surviving 
preemption challenges by closely replicating the statutory language of 
the federal statutes that threaten their preemption. By mirroring the 
language of federal statutes, the state statute’s words will have the same 
“context and ordinary usage” as their federal counterparts. This will 
enable the state to argue that state immigration laws can harmoniously 
integrate state enforcement and regulatory schemes with federal ones 
that might normally have occupied the field. 
 
 176 The dissent in the Ninth Circuit’s Arizona decision cites to an Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC), U.S. Department of Justice, memorandum concluding that state and 
local law enforcement have the “inherent authority” to conduct arrests for violations 
of civil immigration law. United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 385 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(Bea, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (stating the inherent authority to 
arrest on the basis of violations of civil immigration law creates a method to detain 
and refer individuals to DHS for deportation), cert. granted 132 S. Ct. 845, aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). This inherent authority to arrest on the basis of 
violations of civil immigration law creates a method to detain and refer individuals to 
DHS for deportation. Id. at 384-85. The legality of this theory is contested. See Chin, 
Hessick, Massaro & Miller, supra note 167, at 63. 
 177 See Gilbert, supra note 15, at 185. 
 178 Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 179 Id.  
  
2012] Reverse-Commandeering 579 
Whiting shows how the textualist approach to reading statutes 
works hand-in-glove with the mirror-image theory approach to 
legislatively drafting such state statutes. The ratification of mirror-
image theory in Whiting in effect substitutes a traditional preemption 
analysis with an inquiry limited to whether a state statute sufficiently 
mirrors its federal counterpart textually, regardless of the effects on 
the ground of state implementation. In so doing, it displaces a 
fundamental tenet of preemption: “inquiry into the scope of a statute’s 
pre-emptive effect is guided by the rule that ‘[t]he purpose of 
Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ in every pre-emption case.”180 
1. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting 
Whiting involved a preemption challenge to Arizona’s LAWA, a 
statute that allows for the permanent revocation of a state business 
license of an employer that “knowingly” and “intentionally” employs 
undocumented workers in violation of federal immigration law.181 
LAWA added a state law penalty to the already existing federal 
penalties mandated by IRCA in 8 U.S.C. § 1324a, known as the 
“employer sanctions provision.”182 LAWA does not itself create a new 
violation of immigration law, but it gives the Arizona Attorney 
General and county prosecutors authority and responsibility to 
prosecute violations of the federal immigration statute in state judicial 
forums for the purpose of assessing the new state penalty on the 
violator: the suspension of a business license for a first violation and 
the permanent revocation of a business license for the second 
violation.183 Arizona contended that LAWA advances a cooperative 
partnership in the enforcement of IRCA because, under LAWA, state 
officials are precluded from making their own employment eligibility 
 
 180 Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)). Other Supreme Court 
precedents support this “touchstone” preemption principle. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 
555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 
(1992); English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990); Schneidewind v. ANR 
Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 299 (1988); La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 
369 (1986); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983). 
 181 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(F)(2) (2011). 
 182 Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(F) (2012) (describing the state 
penalties for employing unauthorized aliens), with 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e) & (f) (2006) 
(describing the federal penalties for employing unauthorized aliens). For a more 
comprehensive discussion of LAWA’s provisions and history, see Gilbert, supra note 
15, at 157, 169-70. 
 183 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(D) (empowering county attorneys to initiate 
actions alleging violations of the Legal Arizona Workers Act). 
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determinations of suspected unlawful workers without consultation 
with the federal government.184 Yet, although the statute specifies that 
a state court may only consider the federal government’s 
determination, it also states that such a determination “creates a 
rebuttable presumption of the employee’s lawful status,” implying an 
opportunity for the county attorney to offer evidence attacking that 
presumption.185 
The Arizona statute also effectively requires employer participation 
in the federal E-Verify program. Before Whiting, E-Verify participation 
could not be made mandatory.186 It was an experimental identity 
management technology that was under voluntary testing by the 
federal government that allowed employers to attempt to verify the 
identity and citizenship status of employees through internet access to 
government databases.187 Under LAWA, if an employer uses E-Verify 
to check an employee’s work eligibility, the employer can claim an 
affirmative defense to defeat any liability arising if the employee was 
nevertheless unauthorized.188 Congress, however, expressly prohibited 
federal officials from requiring private employers to use E-Verify on 
anything other than a voluntary basis.189 As the district court noted, 
LAWA “plainly made E-Verify mandatory,” as “employers may be 
charged with knowledge of the E-Verify data that they wrongfully 
 
 184 Under the Arizona act, where the state official determines a complaint is not 
frivolous, they must notify the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement as well as 
local law enforcement authorities about the unauthorized individual. Id. § 23-212(C).  
 185 Id. § 23-212(I). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) (2006) (“The Immigration and 
Naturalization Service shall respond to an inquiry by a Federal, State, or local 
government agency, seeking to verify or ascertain the citizenship or immigration 
status of any individual within the jurisdiction of the agency for any purpose 
authorized by law, by providing the requested verification or status information.”); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(H) (“[T]he court shall consider only the federal 
government’s determination pursuant to 8 [U.S.C. §] 1373(c).”).  
 186 Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1972 (2011) 
(“‘[T]he Secretary of Homeland Security may not require any person or . . . entity’ 
outside the Federal Government ‘to participate in’ E-Verify.” (quoting the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, § 402 (a), (e))). 
 187 Margaret Hu, Biometric ID Cybersurveillance, 88 IND. L.J. (forthcoming Apr. 
2013) (discussing experimental identity verification technologies such as E-Verify that 
rely upon internet-driven database matching that purport to confirm identity and 
citizenship status).  
 188 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(I) (“[P]roof of verifying the employment 
authorization of an employee through the E-Verify program creates a rebuttable 
presumption that an employer did not intentionally employ an unauthorized alien.”). 
 189 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, § 402, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-3656 (codified at note following 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324a). 
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refuse to obtain.”190 The Whiting Court, using a strict textualist 
approach, concluded that Congress only prohibited the federal 
government from mandating E-Verify use. The federal law did not 
prohibit a state government from mandating E-Verify use. 
Immediately after Whiting was issued, in order to regain control of the 
reverse-commandeering of E-Verify by Arizona and bring uniformity 
to E-Verify use across all fifty states, Congress considered legislation 
that would mandate E-Verify use nationally.191 
The first issue in Whiting concerned whether LAWA was expressly 
preempted by IRCA. The Court therefore was required to construe 
IRCA’s express preemption clause, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2):192 “The 
provisions of this section preempt any State or local law imposing civil 
or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) 
upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, 
unauthorized aliens.”193 The Chamber of Commerce contended that 
Arizona’s law was expressly preempted, while Arizona countered that 
the law fell within the licensing exception because its sanctions did 
not reach beyond the suspension or withdrawal of business licenses.194 
In other words, Arizona argued that Congress saved “licensing and 
similar laws” from federal preemption and, thus, these four words of 
IRCA’s savings clause became a key focus of the Court’s preemption 
analysis. Finding the savings clause’s language to be plain and 
unambiguous, the Court dismissed the Chamber’s resort to IRCA’s 
legislative history and statutory structure to provide a narrowing 
 
 190 Ariz. Contractors Ass’n v. Napolitano, 526 F. Supp. 2d 968, 981 (D. Ariz. 
2007), aff’d in Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). 
 191 Legal Workforce Act, H.R. 2885, 112th Cong., § 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h112-2885 (introduced by Lamar 
Smith (R-TX)) (mandating national expansion of E-Verify and online employment 
eligibility verification system that purports to verify identity and citizenship status 
through government database screening); see also Julia Preston, Separate Bills Focus on 
Two Pieces of Immigration Puzzle, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2011, at Section A (reporting an 
increase in immigration bills introduced in Congress responding to immigration 
policy concerns following the Whiting decision).  
 192 Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973 (2011). 
 193 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006). 
 194 Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1977. For a discussion of a similar argument see Lozano 
v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 207 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated sub nom. City of 
Hazleton, Pa. v. Lozano, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011). The case is currently pending in the 
Third Circuit on remand. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, Pa., 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 
2012). Like Arizona in Whiting, Hazleton in Lozano argues that the Hazleton 
ordinance is a licensing law that falls within IRCA’s licensing exception and therefore 
is not preempted by IRCA. Id. 
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“context” for understanding the meaning of “licensing.”195 With regard 
to the only legislative material on these four words of IRCA’s savings 
clause (“licensing and similar laws”), a House Report, the Court 
explained: “we have previously dismissed that very report as ‘a rather 
slender reed’ from ‘one House of a politically divided Congress.’”196 
The majority deemed the rest of the legislative record irrelevant.197 
The majority dismissed the dissenting Justices’ efforts to look 
outside the text in part because, in the end, the two dissents arrive at 
materially different views of IRCA’s preemption clause.198 Justice 
Breyer offers a reading of the clause that is guided by IRCA’s overall 
goal of balancing competing policy aims of: (1) deterring unlawful 
immigration through employer sanctions; (2) avoiding placing an 
undue burden on employers; and (3) preventing employer 
discrimination against those who might appear foreign.199 He rejects 
the majority’s reading of the savings clause because it allows Arizona 
to disrupt that delicate balance by adding draconian employer 
sanctions into the mix: the permanent revocation of a business license 
without any countervailing anti-discrimination protections for lawful 
workers who might appear or sound foreign.200 
Meanwhile, for Justice Sotomayor, IRCA’s statutory scheme shows 
that Congress meant to foreclose any independent state action against 
employers for hiring unauthorized aliens.201 Rather, Justice Sotomayor 
concludes that IRCA allows for state penalties only after the federal 
government has taken action against the employer. In other words, the 
state licensing sanctions may attach to the business licenses of an 
employer who violates IRCA, but only in cases where the federal 
government has first investigated the employer and has proven such a 
federal immigration violation occurred in the first place.202 Thus, even 
if a state law license revocation skews Congress’s balance of concerns 
 
 195 Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1980 (noting peremptorily that “[w]e have already 
concluded that Arizona’s law falls within the plain the text of IRCA’s savings clause”).  
 196 Id. (quoting Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 149, 150 
n.4 (2002)). 
 197 Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1980. 
 198 See id. at 1980 n.6. 
 199 Id. at 1988 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 200 See id. at 1992 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Either directly or through the 
uncertainty that it creates, the Arizona statute will impose additional burdens upon 
lawful employers and consequently lead those employers to erect ever stronger 
safeguards against the hiring of unauthorized aliens — without counterbalancing 
protection against unlawful discrimination.”). 
 201 Id. at 1998 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 202 Id. at 2004 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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between the employer sanctioning provision of IRCA and the anti-
discrimination provision of IRCA, it is nevertheless appropriate 
according to Justice Sotomayor, provided that state enforcement is 
limited to cases where the state licensing sanction follows federal 
enforcement.203 All this allows the majority to quip: “It should not be 
surprising that the two dissents have sharply different views of how to 
read the statute. That is the sort of thing that can happen when 
statutory interpretation is so untethered from the text.”204 
Nevertheless, the dissenters reached thoroughly defensible 
interpretations of IRCA, and the fact that they arrived at inconsistent 
results reflects more the complex and often conflicting congressional 
intentions underlying federal immigration law. Justice Breyer focused 
his analysis more on 8 U.S.C. § 1324b of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, as amended by IRCA. Through this analysis, he found 
that LAWA conflicted with the anti-discrimination provision of the 
federal immigration code. Specifically, Justice Breyer concluded that 
LAWA’s harsh employer sanctioning provision is likely to undermine 
IRCA’s purpose of discouraging the discrimination against those 
appearing foreign.205 
Justice Sotomayor, meanwhile, focused her analysis more on 8 
U.S.C. § 1324a of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by 
both IRCA and IIRIRA. She found that LAWA upset the congressional 
purpose of reasserting federal control over the prosecution of 
immigration law violations occurring in the workplace. Justice 
Sotomayor explained: “I cannot believe that Congress intended for the 
50 States and countless localities to implement their own distinct 
enforcement and adjudication procedures for deciding whether 
employers have employed unauthorized aliens.”206 
Whiting’s two dissents thus revealed a fundamental tension within 
two sister provisions of federal immigration code passed under IRCA, 
codified within 8 U.S.C. § 1324a and 8 U.S.C. § 1324b. In fact, a 
careful review of the legislative history reveals that Congress itself 
recognized that it could be possible that both 8 U.S.C. § 1324a and 8 
U.S.C. § 1324b could never be reconciled with one another. Therefore, 
when IRCA was passed in 1986, Congress anticipated that it was 
possible that one or both provisions could be subject to repeal.207 The 
 
 203 Id. 
 204 Id. at 1980 n.6. 
 205 Id. at 1987-88 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 206 Id. at 2003 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 207 See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 
§ 101(l)(1), 100 Stat. 3359, § 101(l)(1) (1986) (establishing conditions under which 8 
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congressional record further demonstrated that there were multiple 
attempts to repeal 8 U.S.C. § 1324a in the early 1990s.208 Thus, 
Whiting demonstrates how the majority and two dissents can all reach 
three correct results under the existing preemption jurisprudential 
framework. 
In the end, however, it was the majority’s textualist approach which 
prevailed, and that approach similarly guided the Court’s finding that 
LAWA was not impliedly preempted as well. In addressing that claim 
— that even if the licensing exception permits legislation like LAWA, 
the Arizona statute is still preempted because its provisions conflict 
with the congressional purposes IRCA was meant to achieve — the 
majority’s approach seems to vindicate mirror-image theory.209 The 
Court takes pains to demonstrate that “Arizona went the extra mile in 
ensuring that its law closely tracks IRCA’s provisions in all material 
respects.”210 The Court compares the state and federal statutes and 
approvingly notes the multitude of similarities. First, the Court notes 
that the definition of license, as used in the Arizona statute, comports 
with that used by Congress for the same word in the Administrative 
Procedure Act.211 The Court explains that the Arizona law adopts 
IRCA’s definition of “unauthorized alien”; that state investigators must 
verify work authorization with the federal government; that state 
courts can only consider the federal government’s determination; that 
the state law tracks its federal counterpart in its prohibitions on 
knowingly employing unauthorized aliens and provides that its terms 
are to be interpreted consistently with IRCA; that employers have the 
 
U.S.C. § 1324a will terminate, which includes a GAO report of widespread 
discrimination). Specifically, IRCA’s original statutory language provides that the 
employer sanctions provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a, will terminate if the GAO determines 
that it has led to widespread discrimination, running afoul of the anti-discrimination 
provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1324b. Id. (“(1) IF REPORT OF WIDESPREAD DISCRIMINATION AND 
CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL. – The provisions of this section shall terminate 30 calendar 
days after receipt of the last report required to be transmitted under section (j), if . . . 
there is enacted . . . a joint resolution [by Congress] approv[ing] the findings.”). In 
1990, the GAO found that IRCA had led to widespread discrimination. See generally 
Pham, supra note 111, at 781 (discussing GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS, IMMIGRATION REFORM: EMPLOYER SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF 
DISCRIMINATION 38-39 (1990)). However, Congress did not repeal 8 U.S.C. § 1324a. 
 208 See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 536, 101st Cong. (1990) (introduced by Rep. Bill 
Richardson (D-NM)) (recommending repeal of employer sanctions provision, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324a, because it had been found by GAO to produce widespread discrimination). 
 209 See generally Chin & Miller, supra note 7, at 253 (“The [mirror-image] theory 
proposes that states can help carry out federal immigration policy by enacting and 
enforcing state laws that mirror federal statutes.”). 
 210 Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1981. 
 211 Id. at 1978. 
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same affirmative defense under the state law as they do under federal 
law; and that under both state and federal law, an employer using E-
Verify acquires a rebuttable presumption of statutory compliance.212 
Along the way, the Court uses phrasings that ratify the mirror-image 
theory approach to legislative drafting by the states. The Court 
approves of the manner in which Arizona “largely parrots”213 the 
federal text of the federal employer sanctions provision, 8 U.S.C. § 
1324a, stating that it “went the extra mile in ensuring that its law 
closely tracks IRCA’s provisions in all material respects”;214 “continues 
to trace the federal law [in defining the state violation]”;215 and 
“provides employers with the same affirmative defense.”216 The Court 
then notes approvingly that unlike other state actions that were struck 
down on preemption grounds, “[t]here is no similar interference with 
the federal program in this case; that program operates unimpeded by 
the state law.”217 
Yet, the Court concedes that the state and federal statutes are not a 
perfect reflection of each other. It recognizes that LAWA and the 
federal immigration law part company most glaringly in: (1) the 
imposition of what then-Governor Janet Napolitano referred to as 
“business death penalty” sanctions against employers found by 
Arizona courts to hire undocumented immigrants (e.g., permanent 
revocation of a business license at the state level and no such 
draconian penalty at the federal level); and (2) the failure of Arizona 
to enact an anti-discrimination provision that is a mirror-image of the 
federal statute’s anti-discrimination provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b of the 
INA, to protect lawful employees from LAWA’s spillover 
discrimination (e.g., employment discrimination against those lawful 
employees who may be targeted by employers attempting to comply 
with LAWA because the employee may look or sound foreign). 
The Court defuses the notion that Arizona is trenching on properly 
federal turf by recalling that the workplace is a typical site of state 
regulation and that “[r]egulating in-state businesses through licensing 
laws has never been considered such an area of dominant federal 
concern.”218 Thus, while the sanctions levied by the Arizona law might 
well outweigh the sanctions in the federal scheme — and an employer 
 
 212 Id. at 1981-83, 1987.  
 213 Id. at 1978. 
 214 Id. at 1981. 
 215 Id. at 1982. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. at 1983. 
 218 Id. 
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might well fear state sanction for hiring unauthorized aliens much 
more than it fears federal sanction for unlawful discrimination — at 
the end of the day, the Court concluded that license revocation is 
simply a “typical attribute[] of a licensing regime,” because all state 
licenses come with conditions for their “suspension and 
revocation.”219 
2. Arizona v. United States 
If Whiting appeared to signal judicial approval for mirror imaging as 
a means to circumvent preemption challenges, Arizona suggested 
sharp limits on what mirror-image statutes will survive scrutiny.220 
Thus, the Arizona Court only upheld Section 2(B), arguably, the 
closest mirror of the four provisions that were challenged. The statute 
at issue, SB 1070,221 was much more controversial than LAWA, being 
referred to by critics as Arizona’s “racial profiling” law and “show me 
your papers” statute.222 
In Arizona, the dissenters in Whiting were able to craft a majority 
opinion by joining with Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy, 
resulting in a preemption analysis with more teeth than that utilized in 
Whiting. However, Arizona does not spell the end of the current 
immigration federalism movement, nor the mirror-image legislation 
promoted by it, for the same reason that the decision does not purport 
 
 219 Id. at 1983-84. See also Leading Cases, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 291, 291 (2011) 
(“Whiting’s focus in its implied preemption analysis on the IRCA’s express savings 
clause did significant harm to the Court’s established preemption framework and 
undermined the comprehensive federal immigration scheme the IRCA sought to 
create.”). 
 220 See generally Chin & Miller, supra note 7 (defining mirror-image theory and 
exploring the constitutionality of its application in the context of SB 1070). 
 221 Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, ch. 113, 2010 
Ariz. Sess. Laws 450 (codified in scattered sections of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 11, 13, 
23, 28, 41 (2010)), amended by Act of Apr. 30, 2010, ch. 211, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 
1070. 
 222 As noted below, SB 1070 effectively requires persons to carry evidence of their 
legal status by enabling police to arrest those believed to be unlawfully present. The 
statute’s controversy is explained in part by a decades old observation of the Court 
that “[t]he requirement that cards be carried and exhibited has always been regarded 
as one of the most objectionable features of proposed registration systems, for it is 
thought to be a feature that best lends itself to tyranny and intimidation.” Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 71 n.32 (1941); see also Gilbert, supra note 15, at 169 
(asserting that SB 1070 “imposed a tangible threat to virtually anyone in Arizona who 
looked or sounded foreign, including Arizona residents and persons just passing 
through who were identified by State or local police as present in violation of the 
immigration laws”).  
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to overturn Whiting. At this juncture, all the Arizona decision marks is 
a competing approach to Whiting. This competing approach is favored 
by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor and opposed by Justices 
Scalia, Alito, and Thomas.223 
A quick overview of the federal preemption challenge in Arizona 
illustrates how mirror-image theory was adapted from the Whiting 
approach, but nonetheless allowed for the theory to be further 
entrenched deep within the Court’s preemption doctrine. Four 
provisions of SB 1070 were challenged as preempted by federal law. 
First, the statute in Section 3 made it a state misdemeanor to fail to 
comply with federal alien registration requirements.224 Second, in 
Section 5(C), the statute made it a state misdemeanor for an 
unauthorized alien to seek or engage in work in Arizona.225 Third, in 
Section 6, SB 1070 authorized state police officers to arrest individuals 
a police officer believes (with probable cause) to be unlawfully present 
in the country.226 Fourth, and finally, in Section 2(B), SB 1070 
required police officers conducting a stop, detention, or arrest of an 
individual to make a reasonable effort to ascertain the person’s 
immigration status.227 
With regard to Section 3, the state argued that its statute adopted 
federal standards and served the same purpose as the federal statutory 
provisions it mirrors.228 These arguments were embraced by the Court 
in Whiting with regard to LAWA’s mirroring of federal law, but, unlike 
in Whiting, there was no federal provision expressly permitting state 
regulation within a narrowly circumscribed area. Consequently, the 
Arizona Court was free to find the field occupied by federal law, just as 
it had years earlier in the case it relied upon, Hines v. Davidowitz.229 In 
Arizona, the Court elaborated concerns about whether the mere fact of 
mirroring federal law resolved questions of federal-state conflict. 
The Court in Arizona noted first that, although arguably 
complementary, the state law actually represented a usurpation of 
what would otherwise be a federal monopoly on prosecutorial 
discretion. That, in turn, created a potential for prosecutions that 
 
 223 Justice Kagan was recused in Whiting and Arizona. 
 224 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1509 (2012); Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 
2492, 2497 (2012). 
 225 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2928(C) (2012); Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2497-98. 
 226 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3883(A)(5) (2012); Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498. 
 227 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2012); Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498. 
 228 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2502. 
 229 Id. at 2503.  
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served state ends but frustrated federal policies.230 This in effect was 
the point of Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Whiting: that the savings 
clause in IRCA was most properly construed to allow the state to 
piggyback on federal prosecutions, but that it was not an independent 
grant of prosecutorial authority to the states. Along similar lines, the 
Court noted the difference between state and federal penalties and 
concluded that the difference upset the federal scheme.231 And that, in 
turn, was the point of Justice Breyer’s dissent in Whiting: that the 
severe state sanctions for hiring unauthorized aliens would disrupt a 
carefully designed federal statutory scheme — one designed to 
discourage employment discrimination against those who may look or 
sound foreign as well as discourage the hiring of unauthorized 
workers. 
In Whiting, the textualist approach employed discarded the 
dissenters’ concerns as too ephemeral to warrant influencing its 
interpretation of IRCA’s express preemption provision as well as its 
implied preemption analysis. None of this is to suggest that Arizona 
marks a repudiation of Whiting, a case the Arizona Court relies upon 
in its preemption analysis. Rather, it is to note the uncertainty facing 
future mirror-image legislation affecting areas outside the scope of the 
workplace or alien registration requirements. 
With regard to the second challenged provision, Section 5(C), the 
Court found no mirroring insofar at the provision criminalized a 
behavior (seeking work by those unauthorized to do so) that was only 
subject to civil penalties under federal law.232 While the Court noted 
that IRCA’s express preemption clause was silent on whether 
employment applicants could be subject to state laws, it concluded 
that “the text, structure, and history of IRCA” make clear that 
“Congress decided it would be inappropriate to impose criminal 
penalties on aliens who seek or engage in unauthorized 
employment.”233 Similarly, with regard to Section 6, the provision 
allowing for the warrantless arrest of persons suspected of 
unauthorized presence in the country, the Court noted this provision 
parted from federal law, which provided narrow circumstances in 
 
 230 Id. (“Were § 3 to come into force, the State would have the power to bring 
criminal charges against individuals for violating a federal law even in circumstances 
where federal officials in charge of the comprehensive scheme determine that 
prosecution would frustrate federal policies.”). 
 231 Id. (“This state framework of sanctions creates a conflict with the plan Congress 
put in place.”). 
 232 Id. at 2505.  
 233 Id. 
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which a federal officer may arrest an individual subject to removal 
under federal law.234 The Court also stressed again that independent 
state authority to arrest individuals would be exercised in derogation 
of federal authority: “This would allow the state to achieve its own 
immigration policy.”235 Accordingly, the Court found this provision 
preempted as well.236 
The one provision upheld by the Court, Section 2(B), was 
challenged on two grounds: first, that the mandatory checks of a 
person’s immigration status “interferes with the federal immigration 
scheme”; and second, that a person may be detained a constitutionally 
impermissible length of time while a check of the person’s 
immigration status is undertaken.237 The Court disposed of the second 
concern by noting that Section 2(B) need not be construed to raise a 
Fourth Amendment problem.238 As to the first concern, the Court 
found no interference thanks to its mirroring, by express 
incorporation, of federal law. In other words, Section 2(B) was 
arguably the most precise mirror, and, thus, was upheld. 
Section 2(B) is a mirror-image provision by virtue of its express 
incorporation of a federal standard, 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c). That federal 
provision requires DHS to: “respond to an inquiry by a Federal, State, 
or local government agency, seeking to verify or ascertain the 
citizenship or immigration status” of individuals within the 
jurisdiction of the requesting agency.239 However, unlike other mirror-
image provisions rejected in Arizona, the Court determined that 
Section 2(B) did not appear to potentially usurp federal prosecutorial 
discretion, insofar as inquiring about a person’s status is not the same 
 
 234 Id. at 2496 (“Section 6 attempts to provide state officers even greater authority 
to arrest aliens on the basis of possible removability than Congress has given to 
trained federal immigration officers.”). 
 235 Id. at 2506. While Arizona argued that its authority was cooperative insofar as 
state officers were only arresting those in violation of federal law, the Court countered 
that “the unilateral decision of state officers to arrest an alien for being removable 
absent any request, approval, or other instruction from the Federal Government” was 
outside any “coherent understanding of the term ‘cooperation.’” Id. at 2507. 
 236 Id.  
 237 Id. at 2508. 
 238 Id. at 2507. The Court noted that the provision only requires a “reasonable 
attempt” to verify a person’s immigration status and concluded that a reasonable 
attempt would not involve unconstitutionally prolonging the detainment of person 
solely for the purpose of ascertaining their immigration status. Rather, the 
requirement to verify immigration status operates only so long as the person is 
reasonably detained for other reasons (like suspicion of a crime). Id. at 2507-08. 
 239 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) (1996). 
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as undertaking their removal or imposing some other sanction.240 
Because federal law permits such inquiries and the state statute merely 
directed state officers to act pursuant to the federal provision, that was 
the end of the inquiry for the Court.241 
Thus, while Arizona rejected a number of mirror-image provisions, 
it did not reject them all and, in any event, it is worth reiterating that 
Whiting remains good law. Yet, Whiting is highly problematic in that it 
allows states to structure concurrent state employer sanctioning 
regimes that run parallel to the federal employer sanctioning regime 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1324a. The Whiting decision now allows states to 
pass laws that mirror the “employer sanctions” provision of the INA, 
so long as the state sanctions are characterized as licensing 
penalties.242 Under LAWA, Arizona county attorneys can now seek the 
suspension and permanent revocation of business licenses of 
employers that state superior courts determine have violated a 
provision of federal law which prohibits employers from “knowingly” 
hiring undocumented workers.243 In a dramatic departure from past 
precedent, under Whiting, states can now prosecute, adjudicate, and 
assess penalties for violations of federal immigration law before the 
federal government has had an opportunity to investigate or find a 
violation of federal immigration law — a state of affairs rejected by the 
Arizona Court in its analysis of SB 1070.244 
Some may argue that, on a substantive level, LAWA and SB 1070 
differ significantly, and these differences can explain the Court’s 
divergent approach to the preemption doctrine in Whiting and 
Arizona. One might contend, for instance, that a key difference 
between the two decisions is that LAWA purports to primarily impact 
the behavior of employers and advertised itself as a licensing law, not 
as an immigration enforcement law. Meanwhile, SB 1070 does not 
hide that its objective is to impact the behavior of immigrants directly. 
In fact, as the Arizona Court noted at the outset of its opinion, the 
stated purpose of SB 1070 is to “discourage and deter the unlawful 
 
 240 The federal government noted that its enforcement priorities were irrelevant to 
state authorities, while the Court noted that state “officers must make an inquiry even 
in cases where it seems unlikely that the Attorney General would have the alien 
removed.” Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2508. 
 241 Id.  
 242 See Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1978 (2011) 
(“[E]ven if a law . . . is not itself a ‘licensing law,’ it is at the very least ‘similar’ to a 
licensing law, and therefore comfortably within the savings clause.” (quoting 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324a(h)(2)). 
 243 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(F)(2) (2011). 
 244 See Leading Cases, 125 HARV. L. REV. 291 (2011). 
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entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by persons 
unlawfully present in the United States.”245 Consequently, SB 1070 
advertised itself as an immigration statute and appeared on its face to 
run afoul of the plenary power doctrine. Thus, it could be argued that 
the kinds of international and foreign policy concerns at play in 
Arizona are not found in Whiting. Or one may argue that the state has 
greater leeway to regulate in the workplace because, as the Court in 
Whiting stressed, that is the site of the exercise of traditional state 
police powers. At this juncture, however, it is instructive to note that 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy are the only two members 
of the Court who found themselves with the majority in both cases. In 
other words, the jury is still out with regard to how other mirror-
image statutes will fare against preemption challenges. 
In summary, it appears that the Court has developed two 
approaches to mirror-image statutes under the preemption doctrine 
that is now unfolding within this new wave of immigration federalism 
laws. The first approach, undertaken by the Whiting Court, favors a 
strict textualist approach, examining whether the state statute “largely 
parrots” the federal statute textually. The second approach is a more 
traditional preemption approach.246 The Arizona Court examined 
whether the mirroring statute might nonetheless pose an obstacle to or 
conflict with the federal statute, or whether Congress intended to 
occupy the field. 
Yet, in both approaches — the Whiting textualist approach and the 
Arizona non-textualist approach — the Court has started with an 
assumption of the validity of mirror-image theory and that assumption 
informs the initial preemption inquiry.247 In the first approach, the 
 
 245 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2497 (quoting Note following ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §11-
1051 (2012)). 
 246 Some scholars assert that mirror-image theory had been rejected in Arizona. See, 
e.g., Martin, supra note 8, at 42 (arguing that in Arizona the Court “rejected a ‘mirror-
image’ theory propounded by SB 1070’s proponents that promised much future state 
legislative mischief”). 
 247 After Whiting’s ratification of mirror-image theory, Arizona, in its briefs and at 
argument, pressed the theory before the Court a second time in Arizona v. United 
States and thereby implicitly urged Whiting’s textualist approach. See, e.g., Brief for the 
Petitioner 52, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No.11-182). “The 
Court also noted that ‘Arizona went the extra mile in ensuring that its law closely 
tracks IRCA’s provisions in all material respects.’ So too here. Section 3 simply seeks 
to enforce the federal registration requirements and tracks federal law in all material 
respects.” (quoting Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1981); Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, 
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-182) (“MR. CLEMENT 
[Arizona]: . . . I do think, as to Section 3, the question is really — it’s — it’s a 
provision that is parallel to the Federal requirements and imposes the same 
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Court asks whether the state immigration law is mirroring federal 
immigration law textually. In Whiting, the majority appears to find this 
textual mirroring as dispositive: there is no conflict or obstacle where 
the state and federal government can speak with textual and 
substantive unity. In the second approach, the Court asks whether, in 
light of the textual and other similarities between the state and federal 
immigration laws, the state law can proceed under concurrent 
jurisdiction. In Arizona, the majority answered in the affirmative in 
one provision, Section 2(B). The Court struck the remaining three 
provisions that were under challenge. The Court reasoned that Section 
5(C) and Section 6 were not a close enough mirror to justify Arizona’s 
argument in favor of concurrent jurisdiction in the implementation of 
those provisions. The Court held that Section 3 could not be upheld as 
just a mirror-image statute because it determined that Congress had 
already intended to occupy the field of alien registration laws. 
III. REVERSE-COMMANDEERING & THE DEVOLUTION OF IMMIGRATION 
POWER TO STATES 
The fate of mirror-image statutes, and the current immigration 
movement whose legislative initiatives often hang on mirror-image 
theory, remains in doubt after Arizona. Yet, as I noted above, it is far 
from foreclosed because Whiting remains good law. The current 
movement is, in some respects, a deliberate attempt to break the sole 
prerogative power of the federal government to dictate immigration 
policy. This growing movement represents an effort to control the 
terms of what federal resources must be allocated to accommodate 
state immigration programs. These laws attempt to coerce the 
appropriation of additional federal resources and federal officers to 
 
punishments as the Federal requirement. So it’s, generally, not a fertile ground for 
preemption.”). The Court analyzed SB 1070 within the framework proffered by 
Arizona, preempting those portions of the statute that failed to properly mirror federal 
law, and upholding Section 2(B), the one provision that mirrored, through express 
incorporation, a screening protocol “where the federal government had encouraged its 
use.” Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2508. “The federal scheme thus leaves room for a policy 
requiring state officials to contact ICE as a routine matter. Cf. Whiting, 563 U.S., at --, 
131 S. Ct., at 1985-86 (rejecting argument that federal law preempted Arizona’s 
requirement that employers determine whether employees were eligible to work 
through the federal E-Verify system where the Federal Government had encouraged 
its use).” Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2508. Thus, through its reference to Whiting, the Court 
suggested that Section 2(B) mirrored federal policy. See id. The express incorporation 
of Section 1373(c) of the INA within the text of Arizona’s Section 2(B) ensured there 
was a perfect textual mirror between state and federal law regarding the screening 
protocol.  
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carry out state immigration enforcement schemes and, thus, turn them 
to state ends. In the process, these laws usurp the policymaking 
powers of Congress, as well as usurp the prosecutorial and other 
discretionary policy authority of the Executive.248 The stated goal of 
some state lawmakers and proponents of SB 1070-copycat laws is to 
force the political branches to follow the states’ lead in immigration 
reform.249 The state takeover of federal immigration database screening 
protocols in particular imposes significant resource costs and 
prosecutorial conflict, thereby frustrating the implementation of a 
coherent immigration policy at the federal level. 
While LAWA, Section 2(B), and similar laws may survive 
preemption scrutiny, they nevertheless undermine the federal 
government’s ability to dictate and implement a coherent immigration 
policy across all fifty states. Moreover, these state laws usurp federal 
law enforcement prerogatives and resources.250 These laws, in effect, 
exemplify the inverse of the problem posed by the federal 
commandeering of state resources. This reverse-commandeering is 
both express and implicit. It is express in that the state and local laws 
typically rely on federal databases to perform the screening to 
determine if an individual is work-authorized, lawfully present, or 
otherwise compliant within the federal immigration scheme.251 It is 
implicit in that insofar as state authorities can now investigate and 
independently prosecute federal immigration violations, under the 
guise of enforcing state law, federal prosecutorial discretion — with all 
its policymaking implications about where and how intensively to 
enforce — has been usurped.252 
 
 248 Motomura, The Discretion that Matters, supra note 18, at 1826-36. 
 249 See, e.g., GULASEKARAM & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 17, at 1 (“[P]olitical 
dynamics at the subnational level on immigration are also tied to political dynamics at 
the national level. This is particularly true in the case of restrictive local policies on 
immigration, where activist groups such as the Federation for American Immigration 
Reform (FAIR) and NumbersUSA have sought to stall moderate legislation at the 
federal level that includes some form of legalization, while at the same time fomenting 
restrictionist legislation at the state and local level.”). 
 250 Motomura, The Discretion that Matters, supra note 18, at 1822 (“In fact, state 
and local criminal arrests are just as likely to trigger federal civil removal. This allows 
state and local police to use arrest powers to decide who will be exposed to federal 
immigration enforcement.”). 
 251 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(B) (2011) (“When investigating a 
complaint, the attorney general or county attorney shall verify the work authorization 
of the alleged unauthorized alien with the federal government pursuant to 8 United 
States Code section 1373(c).”). 
 252 Vesting state prosecutors, subject to the pressures of political election, with the 
power to prosecute federal immigration law increases the risk of politicizing the 
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Moreover, these state laws attempt to dictate the terms on which 
federal databases will be used within a given state. In LAWA, for 
example, Arizona mandates that all employers in that state screen new 
hires through the E-Verify databases. In Section 2(B) of SB 1070, 
Arizona mandates that local law enforcement determine — during the 
course of any lawful stop, arrest, or detention — whether an 
individual is lawfully present in the U.S., if the officer has reasonable 
cause to believe the individual may be unlawfully present. Section 
2(B), as upheld in Arizona, first requires an inspection of physical 
documents (e.g., driver’s license or immigration document). A follow-
up database screening is mandated under Section 2(B) if an inspection 
of the physical identity document cannot confirm an individual’s 
identity and citizenship status. 
In the progression of immigration legislation and policymaking in 
recent decades, and particularly after 9/11, the federal government is 
increasingly attempting to compel identity verification database 
screening by private entities (e.g., employers through E-Verify) and 
state officials (e.g., local law enforcement through Secure 
Communities) in order to “secure the border.”253 Moreover, when 
examining the prevailing trend in federalism generally, and federal 
immigration policy in particular as it has unfolded for the past few 
decades, scholars have observed that the federal government is 
increasingly encroaching upon states’ historic police powers.254 
Specifically, through both congressional legislation and executive 
regulatory action, the political branches are actively engaged in the 
“devolution” of immigration law by delegating essential immigration 
screening, or federal immigration gatekeeping duties and 
responsibilities, to private third-parties, such as employers, and state 
agents, such as state and local police officers.255 
 
prosecutorial discretion of an already highly charged political issue. Even at the 
federal level, immigration-related prosecutions can lead to political consequences. See, 
e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States Attorneys, 6 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 369, 379 (2009) (explaining that the firing of U.S. Attorney Carol Lam 
for the Southern District of California was motivated in part by “her failure to adhere 
to the President’s and Department’s priorities by bringing an insufficient number of 
gun and immigration cases”). 
 253 Hu, supra note 187 (discussing increasing reliance on identity management 
technologies to implement immigration control objectives and counterterrorism goals 
simultaneously). 
 254 See Stumpf, States of Confusion, supra note 10, at 1613-14.  
 255 See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976), superseded by statute, 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 274A(h)(2) 
(1986), 100 Stat. 3359, 3368, as recognized in Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. 
Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1974 (2011) (permitting states to require employers to 
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Laws like LAWA and SB 1070 take this trend one step further, 
although it is a constitutionally questionable step. Instead of being 
federal partners, willing or unwilling, in the job of policing the 
population for violators of federal immigration laws, these state laws 
effectually put state authorities in the driver’s seat for the federal laws 
they enforce with state sanctions.256 These state and local laws derive 
not from a desire to cooperate with the federal government, but, 
rather, arise from what the Ninth Circuit characterized as “rising 
frustration with the United States Congress’s failure to enact 
comprehensive immigration reform.”257 The implication of such 
statements, of course, is not that states wish to complement federal 
immigration laws, like IRCA, with their own immigration initiatives 
through a model of cooperative federalism, but, instead, that states 
such as Arizona wish to discard IRCA as inefficacious. Mirroring 
IRCA’s language is the means whereby state authorities seize control 
of immigration policy from their federal counterparts. By seizing 
control of the federal immigration legal and regulatory apparatus, and 
displacing federal immigration efforts, state and local governments are 
attempting to skew the immigration enforcement power in their favor. 
In Part III, I now attempt to explain how this state and local effort 
amounts to the reverse- commandeering of federal resources, federal 
policy and prosecutorial discretion, the ability of the national 
government to establish a national immigration enforcement policy 
and strategy, as well as the ability of the federal government to control 
the foreign policy implications of federal immigration policy. 
 
conduct identity and citizenship status database screening of employment applicants 
through E-Verify). See generally Wishnie, supra note 18, at 532-52 (concluding that 
the legislative and executive branches may, by statute, devolve to the states some 
power to regulate immigration, but these activities cannot be granted the same judicial 
deference afforded federal immigration legislation).  
 256 See Chin & Miller, supra note 7, at 278-85.  
 257 Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 860 (9th Cir. 2009). 
Arizona includes the purpose of SB 1070 in Section 1, titled “Intent.” Support Our 
Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, ch. 113, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450 
(2010) (codified in scattered sections of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 11, 13, 23, 28, 41), 
as amended by Act of Apr. 30, 2010, ch. 211, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1070. The drafters 
of SB 1070 first set forth a theory of cooperative immigration federalism: “The 
legislature finds that there is a compelling interest in the cooperative enforcement of 
federal immigration laws throughout all of Arizona.” Id. Next, SB 1070 explains that 
“attrition through enforcement” is the objective. Id. “The legislature declares that the 
intent of this act is to make attrition through enforcement the public policy of all state 
and local government agencies in Arizona.” Id.  
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A. Reverse-Commandeering Database Screening Protocols & Resources 
Reverse-commandeering may occur where state cooperation in 
enforcement of federal immigration provisions enables the state to 
require federal resources that would not otherwise be committed.258 
This occurs most concretely where the federal government needs to 
shoulder the fiscal burden of widespread usage of federal databases. 
A crucial component of mirror-image laws is the availability of 
federal databases to serve state and local ends. Because these statutes 
operate by mirroring or simply incorporating federal standards, they 
typically establish as a violation of state law something that previously 
violated only federal law. Doing so, however, requires use of federal 
resources in the form of national databases accumulating information 
about the identity and citizenship or immigration status of individuals 
nationwide. SB 1070 does this by using the databases maintained by 
two federal agencies: DHS’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).259 In 
implementing SB 1070, under Section 2(B), upon a request from an 
Arizona law enforcement official, DHS performs the relevant status 
checks on detained individuals through the screening of personally-
 
 258 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156, 161 (1992) (“Congress 
exercises its conferred powers subject to the limitations contained in the Constitution 
. . . . As an initial matter, Congress may not simply ‘commandee[r] the legislative 
processes of the states by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal 
regulatory program.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)). 
 259 The FBI maintains the IAFIS (Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification 
System) database. Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, FEDERAL 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/ 
iafis/iafis (last visited Feb. 26, 2012). DHS maintains the IDENT (Automated 
Biometric Identification System) database. “IDENT is a Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS)-wide system for the collection and processing of biometric and limited 
biographic information for DHS.” U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., US-VISIT PROGRAM 
OFFICE, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE AUTOMATED BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION 
SYSTEM (IDENT) 2 (July 31, 2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ 
xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_usvisit_ident_final.pdf. The database screening 
process can be summarized as follows: “1. The arresting LEA [law enforcement 
agency] sends the subject’s fingerprints and associated biographical information to 
CJIS [Criminal Justice Information Services]/IAFIS . . . 2. CJIS electronically routes 
the subject’s biometric and biographic information for all criminal answer required 
(CAR) transactions to US-VISIT/IDENT to determine if there is a fingerprint match 
with records in that system.” U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T 
OF HOMELAND SEC., SECURE COMMUNITIES: QUARTERLY REPORT – FISCAL YEAR 2010 
REPORT TO CONGRESS FOURTH QUARTER (Jan. 3, 2011), available at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/congressionalstatusreportfy104th
quarter.pdf. 
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identifiable data through DHS and FBI databases, pursuant to the 
authority of 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c).260 LAWA mandates database-driven 
status checks through resort to the federal E-Verify program,261 
primarily relying upon the databases of two additional federal 
agencies, DHS’s United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS) and the Social Security Administration (SSA).262 
Specifically, under Section 2(B) of SB 1070, state and local law 
enforcement officers are required to screen out unauthorized 
immigrants from the street. During the course of a lawful stop, 
detention, or arrest, the law enforcement officer may confirm identity 
and citizenship status “where reasonable suspicion exists that the 
person is an alien [unlawfully present in the U.S.].” Yet, how exactly 
can Arizona’s law enforcement officials assess the immigration status 
of the individual, since lawful immigration status is a federal 
determination and only the federal government has access to this 
information?263 First, Section 2(B) of SB 1070 creates a list of 
 
 260 United States v. Arizona, 703 F.Supp. 2d 980, 995 (D. Ariz. 2010). “Pursuant to 
8 U.S.C. § 1373(c), DHS is required to ‘respond to an inquiry by a Federal, State, or 
local government agency, seeking to verify or ascertain the citizenship or immigration 
status . . . for any purpose authorized by law, by providing the requested verification 
or status information.’ DHS has, in its discretion, set up LESC [Law Enforcement 
Support Center], which is administered by ICE and ‘serves as a national enforcement 
operations center that promptly provides immigration status and identity information 
to local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies regarding aliens suspected of, 
arrested for, or convicted of criminal activity.’ (Pl.’s Mot. at 6–7 (citing Palmatier Decl. 
¶¶ 3–6).).” Id. 
 261 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212 (2011). 
 262 The Social Security Administration maintains the NUMIDENT (Numerical 
Identification System) database, which includes the name, place of birth, date of birth, 
and other biographical information of Social Security Administration applicants. 
Andorra Bruno, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40446, ELECTRONIC EMPLOYMENT ELIGIBILITY 
VERIFICATION 2 (2009). United States Citizenship and Immigration Services maintains 
the VIS (Verification Information System) database, which is “comprised of 
citizenship, immigration, and employment status information from several DHS 
system of records.” U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE VERIFICATION INFORMATION SYSTEM 
SUPPORTING VERIFICATION PROGRAMS 2 (April 1, 2007), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_uscis_vis.pdf. 
 263 Section 2(B) of SB 1070 provides: “For any lawful stop, detention or arrest 
made by [an Arizona] law enforcement official or a law enforcement agency . . . in the 
enforcement of any other law or ordinance of a county, city or town or this state 
where reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien and is unlawfully present 
in the United States, a reasonable attempt shall be made, when practicable, to 
determine the immigration status of the person, except if the determination may 
hinder or obstruct an investigation. Any person who is arrested shall have the person’s 
immigration status determined before the person is released.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
11-1051 (2012). 
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documents that are acceptable proof of lawful presence in the U.S.264 If 
the officer is unable to confirm lawful presence through the document 
inspection, next SB 1070 relies upon the database screening protocol. 
In particular, 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) of the INA allows the state to seek 
database-driven information from DHS to determine whether an 
individual is lawfully present. This database screening protocol 
requires the collection of the biometric data (e.g., fingerprints) and 
facilitates the screening of personally-identifiable data and biometric 
data through the DHS and FBI databases. 
Similarly, LAWA mandates employer use of the federal E-Verify 
database. E-Verify allows Arizona authorities to seek, in effect, a 
federal determination of who is lawfully present without actually 
having to confer with any federal authorities.265 This is crucial to the 
ambition of the new immigration federalism movement, which seeks 
to enable states to independently formulate and implement 
enforcement strategies. E-Verify is an internet-based database 
screening program that purports to allow an employer to electronically 
verify identity and citizenship status by screening employee social 
security numbers and other personally-identifiable data through 
databases maintained by DHS and SSA.266 
Because federal law does not mandate use of E-Verify by employers, 
the petitioners in Whiting argued that LAWA’s transformation of a 
voluntary program into a mandatory one within Arizona was 
preempted by federal law. The Court rejected this aspect of the 
challenge. The majority acknowledged that IIRIRA prohibits DHS 
from requiring any person or entity to use the E-Verify program and 
 
 264 The documents permitted under SB 1070 are much more restrictive than the 
documents provided on the DHS Employment Eligibility Verification Process (Form I-
9). SB 1070 only allows for the following documents set forth in Section 2(B). Section 
2(B) of SB 1070 states that “A person is presumed to not be an alien who is unlawfully 
present in the United States if the person provides to the law enforcement officer or 
agency any of the following: 1. A valid Arizona driver license. 2. A valid Arizona 
nonoperating identification license. 3. A valid tribal enrollment card or other form of 
tribal identification. 4. If the entity requires proof of legal presence in the United 
States before issuance, any valid United States federal, state or local government issued 
identification.” Id.  
 265 See Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 2006 (2011) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Arizona Act directly regulates the relationship 
between the Federal Government and private parties by mandating use of a federally 
created and administered resource.”). 
 266 See id. at 1975 (“Originally known as the ‘Basic Pilot Program,’ E–Verify ‘is an 
internet-based system that allows an employer to verify an employee’s work-
authorization status.’” (quoting Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 
856, 862 (9th Cir. 2009)).  
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expressly states that E-Verify participation is by “voluntary” election. 
Yet, the majority concluded that the statute says nothing with regard 
to whether a state law may mandate its use.267 For a textualist 
approach that “begin[s] again with the relevant text,” that is 
dispositive since “E-Verify contains no language circumscribing state 
action.”268 
Analyzing a claim of implied preemption, the Court noted the three 
statutorily expressed policy objectives underlying E-Verify: “ensure 
reliability in employment authorization verification, combat 
counterfeiting of identity documents, and protect employee 
privacy.”269 Without any analysis, the Court concluded that the 
mandated use of E-Verify frustrates none of these objectives.270 The 
remainder of the discussion addressed two policy arguments raised to 
support why the E-Verify mandate is impliedly preempted: (1) 
whether E-Verify could feasibly be expanded to the other states; and 
(2) whether E-Verify is reliable.271 In both cases, it is enough for the 
majority to note that the federal government, in its submissions to the 
Court, disagrees that the concerns are valid.272 Moreover, the Court 
concluded that LAWA is a mirror of the broader policy mandate of the 
federal government since DHS has itself supported expansion of the 
program.273 Although the Court never expressed its own views about 
the propriety of E-Verify’s transition from a voluntary to a mandatory 
program, at the same time, the Court failed to exercise judicial 
restraint in leaving matters of policy to the political branches because 
the majority seeks to justify its textual reading of IIRIRA on policy 
grounds. 
In addition to LAWA, Arizona, like many other states, is 
experimenting in the creation of other third-party liability 
enforcement sanctioning regimes and the delegation of immigration 
screening to third-party immigration screeners. For example, in 
addition to the establishment of a police sanctioning regime in SB 
1070,274 the state proposes a landlord sanctioning regime in SB 
 
 267 Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1985.  
 268 Id.  
 269 Id. at 1986.  
 270 Id. 
 271 Id.  
 272 Id. 
 273 Id. 
 274 Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, ch. 113, 2010 
Ariz. Sess. Laws 450 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 11, 13, 23, 28, 41), amended by Act of Apr. 30, 2010, ch. 211, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 
1070. 
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1611,275 a state worker sanctioning regime in HB 2008,276 a hospital 
worker sanctioning regime in SB 1405,277 and a public school worker 
or teacher sanctioning regime in SB 1407278 and SB 1141.279 Each of 
these sanctioning regimes requires an immigration screening protocol, 
either paper-based inspection of identity documents or database 
screening, because otherwise Arizona could not verify who is an 
unauthorized immigrant and who is not. The gatekeeping screening 
aspect of various state and local laws has resulted in an unprecedented 
expansion of document inspection and database-driven screening 
protocols.280 
The current movement characterizes these efforts to make federal 
databases serve state ends as cooperative in nature, proposing a state-
federal partnership in immigration enforcement. State and local 
immigration federalism laws passed or under consideration attempt a 
dramatic expansion of IRCA’s third-party liability enforcement scheme 
to hold individuals beyond employers — such as police officers, 
landlords, teachers, hospital workers, and state workers administering 
benefits — vicariously liable for the presence of unauthorized 
immigrants in the United States.281 They also expand — oftentimes 
into uncharted waters — the developing utilization of specific 
immigration screening protocols, either through document screening, 
database screening, or both. This trend at the state level tracks the 
prevailing federal trend to implement database screening protocols 
and identity management technologies in a broad spectrum of 
contexts, purportedly to advance national security objectives and to 
control immigration and crime.282 At the same time, it also empowers 
the state to determine whether such protocols are voluntary or 
mandatory, and what sanctions apply in the wake of failure to 
 
 275 S.B. 1611, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011). 
 276 H.B. 2008, 49th Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 2009). 
 277 S.B. 1405, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011). 
 278 S.B. 1407, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011). 
 279 S.B. 1141, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011). 
 280 See, e.g., Hu, supra note 187 (discussing unprecedented expansion of data 
surveillance, or “dataveillance,” and biometric ID cybersurveillance technologies as a 
result of federal and state immigration policy). 
 281 See Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, ch. 113, 2010 
Ariz. Sess. Laws 450 (codified in scattered sections of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 11, 13, 
23, 28, 41 (2010)), amended by Act of Apr. 30, 2010, ch. 211, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 
1070. 
 282 See, e.g., Hu, supra note 187 (surveying multiple identity verification protocols 
and database-driven identity management systems, which are purportedly 
implemented to “secure the border”). 
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implement the immigration screening protocol or the failure to 
conduct database screening through various identity verification 
programs. For example, state and local third-party liability schemes 
may hold third-party immigration screeners, or deputized immigration 
gatekeepers, strictly liable for the presence of unauthorized 
immigrants where the gatekeepers fail to inspect identity documents 
or fail to use the mandated database screening protocols.283 
The mandated use of database screening in laws like LAWA and SB 
1070 requires the federal allocation of resources to support such 
screening protocols. Thus, both the dissenting opinions in Whiting 
found Arizona’s requirement that employers use the E-verify system to 
determine employment eligibility objectionable in part because it 
involved allowing states to require an allocation of federal resources.284 
The dissenters noted that an increased use of the E-Verify database 
nationally, on terms set by the states, will require federal resources — 
to both maintain and develop the database, as well as to iron out the 
various wrinkles in this experimental technology — as resort to E-
Verify becomes a state law prerequisite to employment. Justice Breyer 
explained that Congress has “strong reasons for insisting on the 
voluntary nature of the [E-Verify] program,” because “making the 
program mandatory would have been hugely expensive,” and the E-
Verify records against which employers check employee data “are 
prone to error.”285 
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Whiting specifically focused more 
directly on the question of the use of federal resources for state ends. 
For Justice Sotomayor, the problem was not simply that a state law 
makes mandatory something otherwise voluntary under federal law. 
The problem was that “the Arizona Act directly regulates the 
relationship between the Federal Government and private parties by 
mandating use of a federally created and administered resource.”286 
After stating this principle, her approach was pragmatic. Congress 
refused to mandate E-Verify because a mandatory national program 
was estimated to cost over $11.7 billion annually and require a 
 
 283 Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 177-80 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated sub 
nom. City of Hazelton, Pa. v. Lozano, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011). The case is currently 
pending in the Third Circuit on remand. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, Pa., No. 07-3531 
(3d Cir. 2012). 
 284 Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1995 (2011) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2006 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 285 Id. at 1996 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 286 Id. at 2006 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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significant increase in the E-Verify program staffing.287 Allowing states 
to mandate the E-Verify program in effect allows them to overturn the 
Congressional decision not to incur the costs and burdens of a 
national E-Verify program at this time.288 In sum, for Justice 
Sotomayor, a federally created and managed resource is the site of a 
“uniquely federal interes[t]” which a state may not commandeer.289 
Just as the federal government may not commandeer state legislatures 
and state officers as tools to implement federal policies across the 
public body, so states may not “regulate[] the relationship between the 
Federal Government and private parties” by altering the terms on 
which federal databases are available to the general public.290 
The same problem of the reverse-commandeering of federal database 
screening resources is posed under Section 2(B) of SB 1070. From a 
query conducted pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c), it is implied that 
DHS will use the current database screening protocol structured under 
the Law Enforcement Support Center of DHS. In Arizona, the federal 
government argued that the immigration system, nonetheless, would 
be overwhelmed by such inquiries. The district court in enjoining this 
provision agreed, finding: “Federal resources will be taxed and 
diverted from federal enforcement priorities as a result of the increase 
in requests for immigration status determination that will flow from 
Arizona if law enforcement officials are required to verify immigration 
status whenever, during the course of a lawful stop, detention, or 
arrest, the law enforcement official has reasonable suspicion of 
unlawful presence in the United States.”291 The Ninth Circuit agreed 
and affirmed.292 
The Arizona Court, however, disagreed. The majority did not find 
persuasive that Section 2(B) amounted to a commandeering of federal 
resources and officers during the course of Arizona’s new data 
collection and database check protocol required under SB 1070. 
Congress has recognized in recent years, however, the cost of 
expanding state-federal cooperation in immigration enforcement and 
the database check process required under 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c). For 
 
 287 Id.  
 288 Id.  
 289 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 
U.S. 500, 504 (1988)).  
 290 Id. 
 291 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 998 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d, 641 
F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 845, aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 132 S. 
Ct. 2492 (2012).  
 292 United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted 132 S. Ct. 
845, aff’d in part, rev’d in part, remanded by, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).  
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example, congressional appropriations for the 287(g) program (state-
federal partnership in enforcement of federal immigration law) have 
risen dramatically in recent years, from $16 million in Fiscal Year 
2007 to $68 million in Fiscal Year 2010.293 During oral argument in 
Arizona, the federal government itself admitted that there are 
limitations to the efficacy of the federal database screening protocol.294 
The reason for the limitation was articulated when the federal 
government explained the following to the Justices: “There isn’t a 
citizen database . . . . [T]here is no reliable way in the database to 
verify that you are a citizen unless you are in the passport database. So 
you have lots of circumstances in which people who are citizens are 
going to come up [as a database] no match.”295 
Arizona would be unable to implement its immigration laws without 
co-opting the federal immigration screening databases, as Arizona 
does not have its own national database on the citizenship status and 
identity of individuals present in the U.S. Even if Arizona could 
establish its own citizenship and identity verification database and, 
thus, could establish its own criteria for work eligibility or its own 
criteria for lawful presence, such new criteria would be preempted.296 
The federal effort to enlist all employers as mandatory immigration 
gatekeepers under IRCA,297 and to enlist all state and local law 
enforcement as voluntary immigration screeners under IIRIRA, now 
provides the states an avenue for reverse-commandeering in the digital 
age. In fact, paradoxically, Section 2(B) forces state and local law 
enforcement officers to conduct mandatory status checks in a way that 
likely would be prohibited under the anti-commandeering doctrine 
had Congress not made such status checks voluntary under IIRIRA. 
Under Printz, the Court found that enlisting state law enforcement to 
 
 293 CAPPS, ROSENBLUM, RODRÍGUEZ, & CHISHTI, supra note 114, at 29. 
 294 Transcript of Oral Argument at 65-66, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 
(2012) (No. 11-182), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/ 
argument _transcripts/11-182.pdf. 
 295 Id. at 65. 
 296 See Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1981 (2011) 
(“[T]he Arizona law expressly provides that state investigators must verify the work 
authorization of an allegedly unauthorized alien with the Federal Government, and 
‘shall not attempt to independently make a final determination on whether an alien is 
authorized to work in the United States.’ [ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.] § 23-212(B). What is 
more, a state court ‘shall consider only the federal government’s determination’ when 
deciding ‘whether an employee is an unauthorized alien.’ § 23-212(H) (emphasis 
added). As a result, there can by definition be no conflict between state and federal 
law as to worker authorization . . . .”). 
 297 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 101, 100 
Stat. 3359, 3360 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2012)). 
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conduct background checks on behalf of the federal government was 
proscribed by anti-commandeering principles. Under Section 2(B), 
however, Arizona now mandates state law enforcement to conduct 
background checks on behalf of the federal government through 
reverse-commandeering. 
In summary, the reverse-commandeering of federal immigration law 
can now occur through states agile enough to craft their enforcement 
and regulatory regimes around the databases. Arizona, in effect, found 
a method to reverse-commandeer the E-Verify-SSA-DHS database 
screening protocol mandated in LAWA, as well as reverse-
commandeer the DHS-FBI database screening protocol enabled by 8 
U.S.C. § 1373(c) utilized in both LAWA and SB 1070. 
B. Reverse-Commandeering Policy Discretion in Round-Ups 
State statutes that in effect enable state enforcement authorities to 
exercise independent discretion in investigating and prosecuting what 
are federal immigration violations298 may pose a reverse-
commandeering problem.299 To the extent that such discretion enables 
state authorities implementing their statute to set the terms of when, 
where, and how intensively federal violations will be prosecuted 
independently of federal authorities, federal legislation, and federal 
prosecutorial authority have been reverse-commandeered.300 Federal 
resources may also be commandeered to the extent that the state 
efforts to round up individuals subject to potential deportation may 
require federal follow-through in the deportation proceedings. 
Under LAWA and LAWA-copycat laws, states may bring 
investigations and prosecutions (in state courts) of those employers 
allegedly in violation of IRCA’s employer sanctions provision.301 Under 
SB 1070 and SB 1070-copycat laws, the states may round up those 
suspected of “unlawful presence” but leave it to the federal officials to 
investigate, prosecute, and deport those detained by state law 
enforcement officers.302 All of these actions amount to a 
 
 298 Motomura, The Discretion That Matters, supra note 18, at 1829-36; see also Lee, 
De Facto Immigration Courts, supra note 10, at 4-6. 
 299 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997). 
 300 My discussion of the importance of executive discretion in the context of 
immigration law is deeply indebted to Hiroshi Motomura and, in particular, his 
forthcoming work, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW (Oxford Univ. Press). 
 301 Legal Arizona Workers Act, 2007 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1312 (codified at ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2009, 23-211 to 23-214 (2008)).  
 302 Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, ch. 113, 2010 
Ariz. Sess. Laws 450 (codified in scattered sections of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 11, 13, 
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commandeering of federal enforcement discretion — in both its 
policymaking form and in the shape of prosecutorial discretion.303 
It is useful to note that state and local authorities are not directly 
commandeering federal officers in the precise way the federal 
government did in Printz. But the coercive on-the-ground impact plays 
out as if they were. The Court noted in Printz that the problem with 
conscripting state officers to perform even the most ministerial tasks 
was that the state officers then became the face of the federal policy, 
thereby rendering the states accountable for the political costs of 
enforcing the federal program.304 
The Printz Court also instructed that executive action, however 
ministerial, almost always involves some policymaking component.305 
While federal officers may not be directly commandeered, the policy 
and prosecution decisions of state authorities can nullify federal 
decisions. Decisions not to prosecute individuals of one national 
origin because of the politically sensitive nature of foreign relations 
with the relevant country can be vitiated by a state authority decision 
to go after that very group. And, of course, a decision to implement a 
policy impartially can be voided by state authorities seeking political 
leverage by heavily prosecuting against specific groups or regions in 
the state. In short, once state authorities have the power to 
independently prosecute federal law, federal authorities have lost 
control of enforcement discretion. That is precisely the reason why the 
Court has often enforced federal supremacy in the realm of 
immigration — because state immigration “policies” may lead to 
foreign policy ramifications for which only the national government 
can be held accountable.306 
In the case of SB 1070, state authorities cannot conduct independent 
prosecutions, but they may still conduct round-ups of those suspected 
of being present in the country unlawfully. The immigration round-
 
23, 28, 41 (2010), amended by Act of Apr. 30, 2010, ch. 211, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 
1070. 
 303 As Motomura has noted, discretion is exercised by federal authorities at two 
levels. One level is that of prosecutorial discretion, the case-by-case decision of who to 
arrest as well as who to prosecute; and the other level is that of policy: “systemic 
choices to commit resources and to set priorities.” Motomura, The Discretion That 
Matters, supra note 18, at 1826. 
 304 Printz, 521 U.S. at 930. 
 305 Id. at 927.  
 306 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012) (“It is fundamental that 
foreign countries concerned about the status, safety, and security of their nationals in 
the United States must be able to confer and communicate on this subject with one 
national sovereign, not the 50 separate States.”). 
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ups themselves can be problematic or the source of foreign tensions 
where foreign nationals of specific countries or regions appear to be 
the targets.307 Moreover, even if the federal government retains 
discretion about whether to begin investigations, prosecutions, and 
deportations, the very fact of forcing the question will have political 
fallout that acts as a curb on the exercise of federal enforcement 
discretion. The federal government will, in the end, bear the political 
blowback, whether it chooses to see through immigration enforcement 
actions initiated by Arizona or whether it declines to enforce. In the 
first case, by effectively ratifying Arizona’s enforcement efforts, the 
federal government will become the target of objectors concerned 
about immigrant civil rights as well civil liberties in general.308 In the 
second case, the federal government will bear the brunt of public 
frustration with underenforcement of immigration laws — which state 
actors mobilized as political capital in the passage of state immigration 
laws in the first place.309 Along with the commandeering of federal 
discretion, there is also the commandeering of the federal resources 
necessary for the follow-through, resources that otherwise could be 
committed by federal policy makers and enforcement authorities to 
other objectives.310 
 
 307 Motomura discusses the political costs of “[t]he decision not to proceed” by 
federal authorities in the face of round-ups by state or local authorities, noting that 
“the federal government is much more politically exposed. The decision not to 
proceed — whether it reflects resource constraints or policy priorities — is much 
more likely to attract criticism, including the accusation that the government is 
disregarding the law.” Motomura, The Discretion that Matters, supra note 18, at 1853. 
 308 See Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, The Political Economies of Immigration Law, 2 
U.C. IRVINE L. REV., 101 (2012), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2027278 
(“Drastic changes in employer verification – involving either increased enforcement or 
greater federal surveillance and control – would generate either interest group 
opposition or concern over civil liberties and the centralization of state power.”). 
 309 See id. at 59 (noting growing public concern over immigration issues mounting 
steadily since the passage of IRCA in 1986). Cuellar notes that immigration laws 
meant to crack down on undocumented immigrants have the effect of increasing the 
size of the population subject to deportation, which, in turn, exacerbates public 
frustration and concern about the national government’s inability to effectively 
enforce immigration laws. See id. at 69. 
 310 Bulman-Pozen makes this point as well in connection with the effect of Section 
2 of SB 1070: “As a practical matter, section 2 is likely to force DHS to remove 
individuals it has identified as being unlawfully present.” Bulman-Pozen, supra note 2, 
at 485. Bulman-Pozen finds this upshot to be salutary and constitutionally 
unproblematic; but nevertheless, she is in agreement that SB 1070 will effectively 
divert federal enforcement discretion and federal resources to the attainment of state 
enforcement objectives. 
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C. Balkanization of State Immigration Laws 
Reverse-commandeering may occur where the federal government 
needs to counterbalance state immigration enforcement efforts with 
increased civil rights enforcement to address spillover discrimination 
or racial profiling of groups targeted by state enforcement efforts. As 
noted above, IRCA made employers subject to penalties for hiring 
persons not work-authorized, but it also made it unlawful to 
discriminate against individuals on the basis of citizenship status and 
national origin.311 State and local laws punish the employment of non-
work-authorized aliens, but do not speak to the question of 
employment discrimination that may derive from employer sanction 
laws. This also effectively usurps federal prerogatives and either 
reverse-commandeers the federal resources necessary to 
counterbalance the foreseeable discrimination deriving from 
immigration enforcement or simply allows a state to discard federal 
efforts to establish carefully balanced immigration and civil rights 
enforcement efforts. 
As exemplified by LAWA, Whiting now ratifies the balkanization of 
state laws imposing state employment eligibility verification 
requirements on some or all employers. These requirements may go 
beyond those already imposed by the federal government as part of the 
federal employer sanctioning regime pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1324a.312 
The Hazleton ordinance, for example, imposes a strict liability 
standard and does not require that an employer have knowledge that 
an employed individual was unauthorized in order to be liable for his 
employ, unlike the federal statute.313 Furthermore, the Hazleton 
ordinance makes no allowance for a “good faith” defense for 
employers to avoid liability.314 As a 1980 General Accounting Office 
(GAO) report indicated, these were two of the most problematic 
aspects of state employer sanctioning laws, problems that Congress 
sought to correct through IRCA.315 In addition, the report had 
indicated that this combination of strict liability and no evidentiary 
method to establish an affirmative defense elevates the potential for 
racial profiling by “gatekeepers” because there is no amount of “good 
 
 311 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a) (2006). 
 312 See supra Part II. 
 313 See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 177-80 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. 
granted, vacated sub nom. City of Hazelton, Pa. v. Lozano, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011). The 
case is currently pending in the Third Circuit on remand. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 
Pa., No. 07-3531 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 314 See id. at 199. 
 315 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 105, at 47-49.  
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faith” screening that can protect against liability and prosecution.316 
Furthermore, almost no state or local immigration-enforcement law 
includes an antidiscrimination provision that mirrors the civil rights 
protections articulated in IRCA to prevent immigration-related 
discrimination that might result from such laws.317 
The state-by-state patchwork of E-Verify schemes is especially 
problematic, as several states require some or all employers use 
E-Verify. Alabama, Arizona, and Mississippi require all employers to 
use E-Verify.318 Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, and Utah require most employers to use E-Verify.319 South 
Carolina requires that all employers either participate in E-Verify or 
employ only workers who: (1) have a valid South Carolina license; (2) 
are eligible for a South Carolina license; or (3) are possibly eligible for 
a driver’s license or identification card from a state with requirements 
at least as strict as South Carolina’s.320 Beyond concerns that these laws 
may contradict federal law, which makes E-Verify largely voluntary, 
South Carolina’s law contradicts the E-Verify enabling statute and 
rules by requiring — rather than permitting — an employer to 
terminate any employee not found work authorized by E-Verify.321 
Utah also requires that contractors use an electronic verification 
program to verify new hires but permits contractors to choose from 
more than one verification program, including E-Verify and the Social 
 
 316 Id. 
 317 See Kati L. Griffith, Discovering “Immployment” Law: The Constitutionality of 
Subfederal Immigration Regulation at Work, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 389, 423 (2011) 
(“[W]hen subfederal laws place additional burdens and penalties on employers 
(beyond IRCA) they increase the incentives for employers to discriminate based on 
race and national origin in order to avoid new forms of potential liability under the 
subfederal law.”).  
 318 ALA. CODE § 31-13-25 (2011); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-214 (2011); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 71-11-3 (2011). 
 319 GA. CODE ANN. § 13-10-91 (2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38:2212 (2010); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. §§ 153A-99.1, 160A099.1, 64-26 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 8-14-20, 41-8-
20 (2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-703 (2012); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63G-12-301, 
63G-12-302 (2011). 
 320 S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-8-20(D) (2008). 
 321 Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-8-20(D) (“If a new employee’s work 
authorization is not verified by the federal work authorization program, a private 
employer must not employ, continue to employ, or re-employ the employee.”), with 
E-VERIFY, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING Art. II.C.10 (2009), available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/E-Verify/Customer%20Support/Employer%20MOU%20 
(September%202009).pdf (“If the employee does not choose to contest a tentative 
nonconfirmation or a photo non-match or if a secondary verification is completed and 
a final nonconfirmation is issued, then the Employer can find the employee is not 
work authorized and terminate the employee’s employment.”). 
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Security Number Verification Service (“SSNVS”).322 Utah’s law is 
particularly problematic because SSNVS is intended only to “verify 
SSNs and names solely to ensure that the records of current or former 
employees are correct for the purpose of completing Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) Form W-2 (Wage and Tax Statement)” and does not 
make any statement about an employee’s immigration status.323 Many 
other states require subsets of employers — such as public employers, 
contractors, and subcontractors — to enroll in E-Verify. These states 
include Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, 
Nebraska, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia.324 
Whether the Whiting Court’s interpretation of E-Verify may conflict 
with the Privacy Act is now an unresolved matter of law.325 
 
 322 See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63G-12-302(3)(a)(i), 63G-11-103(4)(b)(iii) (2011). 
 323 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER VERIFICATION SERVICE (SSNVS) 
HANDBOOK 4 (2011), available at http://www.ssa.gov/employer/ssnvshandbk/ 
ssnvsHandbook.pdf. The Privacy Act allows SSA to disclose Social Security numbers 
for certain restricted purposes. See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3) (2006). 
The Privacy Act and the Social Security Act both impose limitations on SSA’s ability to 
disclose information from the SSA database. See id.; Social Security Act § 1106, 42 
U.S.C. § 1306(a) (2006). SSA through promulgating regulations has set forth a 
“routine use” definition to guide its disclosure of Social Security numbers and 
includes within its “routine use” definition the disclosure of numbers to employers for 
the purpose of ensuring accurate wage reporting. See 20 C.F.R. § 401.150 (2007) 
(describing the regulatory basis to issue a routine use disclosure of Social Security 
number information to employers). Whether disclosure of Social Security number 
information to employers for immigration control purposes under state requirements 
that an employer engage in SSNVS database screening would violate the Privacy Act 
and Social Security Act is an unsettled matter of law. 
 324 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-17.5-102 (2011); IND. CODE §§ 22-5-1.7-10, 22-5-1.7-11 
(2011); MO. ANN. STAT. § 285.530 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 4-114 (2009); OKLA. STAT. tit. 
25 § 1313 (2007); SB 637; Act of July 5, 2012, 2012 Pa. Laws SB 637; VA. Code Ann. 
§§ 40.1-11.2, 2.2-4308.2 (2011); Act of March 10, 2012, WV Laws SB 659; Executive 
Order Number 11-02, Verification of Employment Status (2011), available at 
http://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/scott.eo_.two_.pdf; Executive Order 
Number 2009-1, Establishing a Policy for All State Agencies Concerning Public Funds 
Repealing and Replacing 2006-40 (2009), available at http://gov.idaho.gov/mediacenter/ 
execorders/eo09/eo_2009_10.html. 
 325 IIRIRA’s creation of E-Verify technically did not violate the Privacy Act because 
E-Verify was considered a voluntary “test pilot” program. If Congress makes E-Verify 
mandatory, Congress most likely would need to revise the Privacy Act to allow for the 
mandatory disclosure of Social Security numbers under the E-Verify program. 
Whether LAWA violates the Privacy Act by mandating Social Security number 
disclosure by virtue of requiring E-Verify use is a separate legal matter that is 
unresolved. Those attempting to challenge the mandatory disclosure of Social Security 
numbers to employers under IRCA and the federal “Employment Eligibility 
Verification Process” under the DHS Form I-9 have been rejected. See, e.g., Cassano v. 
Carb, 436 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (rejecting plaintiff’s claim that 
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Further, many states and localities impose other employment 
eligibility verification requirements on employers beyond or even in 
conflict with the INA’s requirements, pursuant to the DHS 
Employment Eligibility Verification Process (Form I-9).326 For 
example, Colorado requires employers to make copies of the 
documentation employees provide them when completing their Form 
I-9,327 while the INA solely permits making copies of Form I-9 
documentation and only to comply with the INA’s verification 
requirements.328 West Virginia restricts the types of documents an 
employee may present to establish his or her employment eligibility in 
that state.329 West Virginia’s list conflicts with the federal list of 
acceptable documents because, for example, under West Virginia’s 
law, “a valid photo identification card issued by a government agency” 
is acceptable to establish work authorization, whereas under federal 
law, a state identification card is acceptable only to establish one’s 
identity.330 Though Louisiana does not create additional documentary 
requirements, an employer is shielded from liability under its law if 
the employer maintains for each employee a copy of a document from 
a list contained in the law.331 That list includes three documents no 
longer accepted for completing the Form I-9, and it omits several 
accepted documents.332 
In addition to state laws creating additional verification 
requirements, some states require contractors to certify they do and 
 
mandatory disclosure of Social Security number to employer is a violation of law 
including the Privacy Act).  
 326 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-208, § 402, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-3656 (codified at note following 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324a(b)) (establishing documentary verification process for employers to verify 
identity and citizenship status of employees in order to avoid criminal and civil 
penalties). 
 327 COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-122 (2011). 
 328 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(4) (2006). 
 329 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-1B-3(c) (2011) (“For purposes of this article, proof of 
legal status or authorization to work includes, but is not limited to, a valid social 
security card, a valid immigration or nonimmigration visa, including photo 
identification, a valid birth certificate, a valid passport, a valid photo identification 
card issued by a government agency, a valid work permit or supervision permit 
authorized by the Division of Labor, a valid permit issued by the Department of 
Justice or other valid document providing evidence of legal residence or authorization 
to work in the United States.”).  
 330 Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(1)(v) (2010). 
 331 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:992.2 (2011). 
 332 See id.  
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will employ a lawful workforce.333 Other states impose sanctions 
against employers who employ unauthorized workers, without 
mandating additional verification or certification requirements.334 
Penalties for failure to comply with these state laws vary. Penalties can 
include loss of a license required to do business in the state,335 civil 
fines,336 damages for breach of contract for state contractors,337 
debarment,338 and even criminal penalties for “paperwork” or 
“database screening” violations.339 
Although most states use the federal definition for unauthorized 
worker, at least two states appear to vary from federal law in 
identifying which individuals are considered unauthorized to work in 
the state. The Arkansas definition of “illegal immigrants” in its state 
immigration law includes any person who is not a U.S. citizen who 
entered the United States in violation of the INA.340 This definition has 
raised concerns that any work-authorized non-U.S. citizen whose 
entry to the United States was unlawful is prohibited from working in 
 
 333 E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-11-105(c) (2011); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-17.5-
102(1) (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. §12-4-124(a)(3) (2011); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 
§ 2264.051 (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4311.1 (2011); Idaho Exec. Order No. 2006-
40 (Dec. 13, 2006); Mass. Exec. Order No. 481 (Feb. 23, 2007), available at 
http://www.mass.gov/governor/legislationeexecorder/executiveorder/executive-order-
no-481.html. 
 334 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.09 (2011) (imposing penalties against employers 
who employ unauthorized workers in Florida); HAW. REV. STAT. § 444-17 (2011) 
(imposing penalties against contractors found to have “knowingly or intentionally” 
employed an unauthorized worker); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:992 (2011) (imposing 
penalties against employers who employ unauthorized workers in Louisiana); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-A:4-a (2011) (prohibiting employers from employing 
unauthorized workers in New Hampshire). 
 335 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212 (2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-11-3(7)(e) 
(2011); MO. ANN. STAT. § 285.535 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-8-50(D) (2011); W. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 21-1B-7 (2011); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-931 (2011) (allowing 
the state to dissolve or revoke relevant certifications for a variety of corporate entity 
types if an entity “has been convicted for a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f), as 
amended, for actions of its officers and directors constituting a pattern or practice of 
employing unauthorized aliens in the Commonwealth”). 
 336 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-122 (2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.09(2); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 23:993 (2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-A:5 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 
41-8-50(D); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-1B-5 (2011). 
 337 ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-11-105; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-17.5-102(3); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 71-11-3(7)(e); MO. ANN. STAT. § 285.535; Mass. Exec. Order No. 481.  
 338 MISS. CODE ANN. 71-11-3(7)(e); MO. ANN. STAT. § 285.535; TENN. CODE ANN. 
§12-4-124(b); Minn. Exec. Order No. 08-01 (Jan. 7, 2008).  
 339 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.09(3); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-1B-5. 
 340 ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-11-105. 
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Arkansas.341 New Hampshire’s law prohibits employers from 
employing an individual the employer knows is “not a citizen of the 
United States and not in possession of Form I-151, Alien Registration 
Receipt Card, or any other document issued by the United States 
Immigration and Naturalization Service or the Attorney General of the 
United States which authorizes him to work.”342 This is problematic 
because it invites employers to commit document abuse in violation of 
8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(6) by requiring non-citizens to produce DHS-
issued documentation to complete the Form I-9. Louisiana exempts 
from its law employees working in several categories of agricultural-
related jobs.343 West Virginia’s enforcement scheme is problematic 
because it relies on information held by state agencies to determine if a 
worker is unauthorized.344 
This overview describes mass proliferation of state immigration laws 
in the narrow area of immigration regulation in the workplace. The 
upshot is that there is no longer a coherent national policy with regard 
to employer obligations to ensure persons not work authorized are not 
hired — something the Chamber of Commerce complained would be 
the impact of a favorable ruling for Arizona in Whiting. This 
flourishing body of state and local immigration laws means that the 
federal government’s constitutional responsibility to implement a 
national immigration policy has been commandeered by non-federal 
laws that, on their face, mirror federal provisions even as they reshape, 
state by state and locale by locale, the legal regime employers and 
employees must cope with on a daily basis. National policy objectives, 
like addressing national origin discrimination alongside with setting 
immigration policy, are frustrated and lost in this web of state and 
local law. 
 
 341 See ACLU Arkansas, 2007 Legislative Session, available at 
http://www.acluarkansas.org/content/index.php?option=com_content&task=category
&sectionid=1&id=2&Itemid=99999999&limit=30&limitstart=0 (discussing HB 1024, 
now ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-11-105, and its definition of “illegal immigrant”).  
 342 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-A:4-a (2011). 
 343 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:992.1(B) (2011) (“The provisions of this Part shall not 
apply to: (1) Aliens employed in the planting and harvesting, on the premises where 
produced, of agricultural, forestry, or horticultural products. (2) Aliens employed in 
the production and gathering on the premises where produced, of livestock, dairy, or 
poultry products. (3) Aliens employed in the field of animal husbandry. (4) Aliens 
employed in the care, feeding, and training of horses.”). 
 344 To determine whether a worker is employment eligible in an enforcement 
action under the state law, West Virginia permits the West Virginia Labor 
Commissioner to “access information maintained by any other state agency, including, 
but not limited to, the Bureau of Employment Programs and the Division of Motor 
Vehicles . . . .” W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-1B-3(d) (2011). 
  
2012] Reverse-Commandeering 613 
D. Over-Cooperative Immigration Federalism: Impact on Foreign Policy 
The state-by-state patchwork of immigration enforcement law not 
only interferes with the sphere of federal immigration policy, however, 
but also the spheres of foreign policy and commerce policy as well. 
The Arizona Court cited immigration decisions dating back to Chy 
Lung for the proposition that immigration policy implicates foreign 
policy, and, therefore, the power to establish immigration policy is 
properly a national one. The Third Circuit in Lozano v. City of 
Hazleton likewise justified its decision to invalidate the Hazleton 
ordinance on the grounds that it would interfere with federal 
immigration policy and thus foreign policy.345 The Ninth Circuit used 
this same reasoning in granting the preliminary injunction of key 
sections of SB 1070.346 
Indeed, in the case of SB 1070, its passage precipitated expressions 
of concern from numerous governments with nationals likely to be 
affected, as the Ninth Circuit noted: 
Thus far, the following foreign leaders and bodies have 
publicly criticized Arizona’s law: The Presidents of Mexico, 
Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Guatemala; the 
governments of Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, and Nicaragua; 
the national assemblies in Ecuador and Nicaragua and the 
Central American Parliament; six human rights experts at the 
United Nations; the Secretary General and many permanent 
representatives of the Organization of American States; the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights; and the Union 
of South American Nations.347 
In response to the concern that state governments might interfere 
with foreign policy, one state, Utah, enacted state immigration reform 
legislation that encourages fostering cooperation with Mexico.348 First, 
Utah modifies its SB 1070-copycat legislation with a softer approach, 
requiring state and local police officers to verify identity and 
 
 345 Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 196-206 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. granted 
and judgment vacated sub nom. City of Hazleton, Pa. v. Lozano, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011). 
The case is currently pending in the Third Circuit on remand. Lozano v. City of 
Hazleton, Pa., No. 07-3531 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 346 See United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 353-54 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted 
132 S. Ct. 845, aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
 347 Id. at 353. 
 348 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 17-22-9.5, 76-9-1003 to 1009 (2011); see also Utah Coal. of 
La Raza v. Herbert, No. 2:11-cv-401 CW 2011 WL 7143098 (D. Utah 2011) 
(challenging the Utah SB 1070-copycat law). 
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immigration status for offenders of serious crimes only.349 Second, 
Utah creates a state-level guest worker visa program for unauthorized 
workers.350 Under this state-level approach to immigration reform, 
Utah proposes to issue work permits to undocumented workers after 
these workers pass background checks by Utah police and pay fines to 
the Utah Treasurer for the violation of unlawful presence in Utah. 
Utah suggests seeking a federal waiver of federal immigration law in 
order to issue such state-level work permits. The Utah law further 
proposes to allow the Utah Governor to work directly with the 
government of Mexico to supply workers to Utah employers through 
the state-level guest worker program.351 
In effect, Utah recommends the implementation of a state work visa 
regime that “mirrors” the federal work visa structure. Utah, therefore, 
takes the mirror-image theory approach to immigration federalism to 
almost its furthest logical conclusion. If LAWA can allow Arizona to 
structure a state immigration enforcement scheme through concurrent 
jurisdiction over federal immigration law, Utah now under Whiting 
may attempt to argue that it should be allowed to mirror the federal 
effort in structuring a state-level guest worker program that runs 
concurrent with the federal guest worker program. Under Arizona, if 
the state law adopts a perfect mirror through the direct express 
incorporation of federal immigration law, the state mirror-image law 
might survive a preemption challenge. 
The Utah approach merely renders most starkly the foreign policy 
implication of all state-level immigration laws: they represent a 
decentralization of the national government’s responsibility to make a 
coherent foreign policy. To the extent a power committed to the 
national government is now being exercised by state authorities, 
reverse-commandeering is occurring to the detriment of the federalist 
system of governance. 
IV. ANTICIPATING OBJECTIONS TO REVERSING THE ANTI-
COMMANDEERING DOCTRINE 
An anti-reverse-commandeering approach will, like the anti-
commandeering approach of New York and Printz, derive from the 
judicial branch’s obligation to the dual sovereignties instituted by the 
Constitution and ensure that neither of the two sovereigns infringes 
the sovereign prerogatives of the other. Ultimately, it simply ensures 
 
 349 See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 17-22-9.5, 76-9-1003 to 1009. 
 350 Id. 
 351 Id. 
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that the federal government receives the same judicial solicitude that 
the states receive when the Court invokes the Tenth Amendment as a 
restraint on federal power.352 
In other words, maintaining federal supremacy in the immigration 
field requires more than a federal court inquiry into whether the state 
immigration law in question purportedly mirrors and cooperates with 
the federal immigration enforcement scheme — the preemption 
analysis undertaken in Whiting. In the wake of mirror-image theory, 
determining whether state immigration laws conflict textually with 
federal immigration laws does not suffice to preserve uniform 
coherency over the federal immigration scheme.353 The federal courts 
need the anti-reverse-commandeering doctrine to examine the 
substantive impact of mirror-image theory on federal immigration 
policy as a coherent whole; otherwise, in the absence of a unified 
immigration policy, foreign diplomacy, international treaties, foreign 
aid policy, labor shortages, federal resource allocation, prosecutorial 
discretion, civil rights law, and interstate commerce may all be 
affected.354 In short, an anti-reverse-commandeering doctrine 
recognizes, at least within the limited confines of immigration law, 
that traditional preemption doctrine post-Whiting/Arizona and post-
mirror-image theory falls short. 
In anticipation of potential objections to the arguments advanced in 
this Article, in Part IV, I briefly address the merits of four potential 
counter-arguments to flipping the anti-commandeering doctrine in the 
opposite direction: (1) objection to reinvigorating the Court’s plenary 
power doctrine as it pertains to adjudicating immigration matters; (2) 
objection on the basis that Congress can correct any purported 
commandeering action by the states through legislative action (e.g., 
enacting future immigration laws that include strong express 
preemption language); (3) objection to limiting concurrent 
 
 352 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). 
 353 See Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 2002 (2011) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 354 For a discussion on how state immigration laws impact treaties, see John F. 
Coyle, The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation in the Modern Era, 51 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. (forthcoming 2013) (on file with author) (“As late as 1946, 
for example, 48 states barred noncitizens from practicing law, 39 states barred them 
from the liquor trade, 17 states barred them from working as embalmers at funeral 
homes, 9 states barred them from working as barbers, and 2 states barred them from 
working as auctioneers. During this era, FCN [Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation] treaties served as an important check on the ability of the states to enforce 
such laws against aliens whose home countries had entered into these treaties with the 
United States[.]”) (citations omitted). 
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jurisdiction in the immigration policy realm and depriving states of 
power to regulate immigrants through historic state police powers; 
and (4) objection that an anti-reverse-commandeering doctrine is 
preemption doctrine by another name. 
A. Objection to Reinvigorating the Plenary Power Doctrine 
The plenary power doctrine is objectionable on a number of fronts, 
including, most prominently, that it sharply curtails judicial scrutiny 
of federal actions taken with regard to immigrants and thereby 
precludes judicial review of what would otherwise be cognized as 
constitutional violations.355 While not advocating for the wholesale 
reinvigoration of that doctrine, this Article contends that the 
constitutional angle of immigration law must be resuscitated in order 
to grasp the constitutional impact of state immigration laws. The 
plenary power doctrine, at a minimum, recognized that there are 
constitutional limits on the kinds of laws state legislatures could enact 
— even in the absence of any federal statute that could preempt it.356 A 
judicial ban on reverse-commandeering statutes reinvigorates only this 
aspect of the plenary power doctrine, without upsetting the Court’s 
more recent proclivity towards end runs around that doctrine where 
the doctrine would otherwise deprive potential deportees of 
constitutional protections or judicial review. Indeed, because the 
argument is that the Court’s anti-commandeering doctrine provides 
the basis for overturning state laws that usurp federal power, the 
plenary power doctrine is not really invigorated at all, even if it 
provides a precedential backdrop for the theory espoused here. 
 
 355 Multiple scholars have discussed persuasively and eloquently why the plenary 
power doctrine is constitutionally anomalous and objectionable. See, e.g., Cleveland, 
supra note 83 at 13 (examining the formulation of the inherent powers doctrine with 
regard to Indians, aliens, and territories and exploring how prohibiting judicial review 
in these areas undermines mainstream “principles of American political theory and 
national identity”); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A 
Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1987) (surveying 
Supreme Court immigration caselaw and criticizing the plenary power doctrine’s 
break from fundamental constitutional principles); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration 
Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255 (asserting 
that the Court should “abandon the special deference” it traditionally gives to 
Congress in immigration law); Motomura, Phantom Constitutional Norms, supra note 
12, at 583, 610-11 (arguing that “phantom constitutional norms” stemming from 
plenary power doctrine result in improper application of the avoidance canon and 
questionable statutory interpretation: “the court effectively undermines what would 
seem to be the governing principles of constitutional immigration law”).  
 356 See discussion supra Part II.A.  
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B. Objection that Congress Can Correct State Commandeering 
Legislatively 
Along similar lines, it could be argued that there will never be a real 
need for such a flip in the doctrine because Congress will always have 
the power to address any reverse-commandeering problem. In other 
words, Congress could resolve the state usurpation of federal authority 
legislatively. Thus, there can never be any real reversal of the 
commandeering problem posed by the impermissible incursion of the 
federal government into state sovereignty. For example, to address the 
commandeering concern in Whiting, Congress could enact a law 
removing the licensing exception from IRCA, thereby ending any 
reverse-commandeering problems posed by LAWA. The fact that 
Congress could preempt a state law that trenches on federal 
prerogatives has not stopped the Court from fulfilling its judicial 
responsibility in the context of the plenary power doctrine, as noted 
above. 
Yet, the Court noted in its recent healthcare decision, NFIB, the fact 
that Congress has the ability to circumvent a commandeering problem 
neither moots the commandeering controversy nor prevents the 
applicability of the anti-commandeering doctrine. The Court 
explained that when “conditions” upon the receipt of federal funds 
“take the form of threats to terminate other significant independent 
grants, the conditions are properly viewed as a means of pressuring 
the States to accept policy changes.”357 In applying the latter rule, the 
Court concluded that ACA’s expansion of Medicaid amounted to the 
establishment of a new program. This logical leap enabled the Court to 
then conclude that by threatening to deny all Medicaid funds, 
Congress was actually threatening to punitively deny the funding of 
another separate program if the states did not buy into the ACA 
Medicaid expansion.358 
The Court acknowledged Justice Ginsburg’s point that, had 
Congress proceeded differently, it could have achieved the same result 
without offending the Constitution.359 Justice Ginsburg argued that 
had Congress simply repealed the entire Medicaid program and then 
passed legislation that reinstated it with the new ACA expansion, there 
would be no commandeering problem even though states would have 
to make the exact same choice the ACA currently would 
 
 357 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012). 
 358 Id. at 2604-05.  
 359 Id. at 2606 n.14. 
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unconstitutionally require of them.360 The Court’s riposte to this point 
is to note that “it would certainly not be that easy” given the practical 
constraints on such a legislative maneuver.361 Justice Ginsburg also 
pointed out that Congress could simply alter Medicaid into a purely 
federal program in which the states play no role. This observation 
received the following response from Chief Justice Roberts in his 
majority opinion: something like that is easier said than done.362 In 
short, the fact that Congress could have achieved its ends by a 
different path did not deter the Court from assessing whether the 
legislation currently before it presents a commandeering problem. 
Along similar lines, the fact that Congress could either preempt or 
ratify, through a savings clause permission, a state law that potentially 
reverse-commandeers is not relevant to the judiciary’s responsibility to 
assess the constitutionality of the law before it in the context of what 
Congress has actually done. Furthermore, within the preemption 
doctrine, scholars have noted that there is an institutional choice 
problem that creates a blind spot for Congress.363 If the Executive 
follows a reading of a federal immigration statute that is inconsistent 
with Congressional intent, and if federal courts favor the Executive 
reading over Congress’s intent, Congress is effectively locked out of 
the conversation. Congress, in other words, will have difficulty 
reasserting its primacy once the judiciary begins to favor the Executive 
as the authoritative institution of choice in the interpretation of the 
meaning of federal statutes. 
The manner in which the federal immigration code is inconsistent 
with federal immigration policy, for example, has now come to a head 
in cases such as Whiting and Arizona. Legal scholarship has taken note 
that, in such instances, a substantive analysis about “the content of the 
law” is not necessarily the key question.364 Instead, the key question 
becomes “which institution should determine the content of the law 
— that is, [the key question is] ‘deciding who decides.’”365 Who 
decides how to reconcile potentially irreconcilable conflicts between 
 
 360 Id. 
 361 Id. Justice Ginsburg notes that this amounts to a “ritualistic requirement” that 
Congress “repeal and reenact spending legislation” rather than simply amend it to 
accommodate changing national needs. Id. at 2629 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 362 Id. at 2606 n.14. 
 363 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. REV. 521, 523 
(2012); Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: “Agency-Forcing” Measures, 
58 DUKE L.J. 2125, 2127 (2009).  
 364 Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV 727, 
727 (2008). 
 365 Id. 
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Congress’s intent and the executive agency interpreting Congress’s 
intent has created an institutional choice problem in the preemption 
doctrine.366 
For example, the Whiting Court identified legal support in the 
current immigration regulatory scheme promulgated by the 
Executive.367 To demonstrate that congressional intent had been 
satisfied, the Whiting Court seized upon four words in the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA): “licensing and 
similar laws.”368 IRCA in effect over-ruled the Court’s decision in De 
Canas and preempted state governments from enacting laws that 
penalized employers for hiring undocumented workers.369 But, as 
explained in the discussion above, in its express preemption language, 
Congress included a “savings clause” for licensing sanctions.370 
Congress “saved” one form of penalty that was not preempted by 
IRCA: states are permitted to penalize an employer for hiring 
undocumented workers through licensing laws and regulations.371 
Arizona argued in Whiting that the state law is a licensing law and 
not an immigration law. The majority agreed and explained that it 
could not find any evidence in the legislative history on the crafting of 
those four words, “licensing and similar laws,” that was helpful.372 It is 
worth noting, however, that the original congressional sponsors of 
IRCA, former Representative Romano L. Mazzoli, former Senator 
Arlen Specter, and former Representative Howard L. Berman, filed a 
brief in favor of the Chamber of Commerce, stating explicitly their 
position on congressional intent: “The Exception in IRCA’s 
Preemption Provision for ‘Licensing and Similar Laws’ Was Not 
Intended to Permit Laws Like the Legal Arizona Worker’s Act.”373 
 
 366 See id. 
 367 See supra note 158. 
 368 Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973 (2011) 
(discussing IRCA’s preemption clause, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2012)). 
 369 Id. at 1974-75. 
 370 See id. at 1973. The savings clause is technically seven words and not four 
words: “other than through licensing and similar laws.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2).  
 371 Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1973. The entire preemption clause (including the savings 
clause) reads as follows: “The provisions of this section preempt any State or local law 
imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) 
upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized 
aliens.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2). 
 372 Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1980 (noting peremptorily that “[w]e have already 
concluded that Arizona’s law falls within the plain the text of IRCA’s savings clause”).  
 373 See Brief for Representative Romano Mazzoli, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners, Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011) 
(No. 09-115), 2010 WL 3511290, at *8. 
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Thus, even though Congress previously attempted to correct prior 
reverse-commandeering by the states in the immigration realm 
through passage of IRCA and the inclusion of strong express 
preemption language, Whiting demonstrates that where the Court 
favors Executive interpretation of the federal statute, Congress’s ability 
to reassert its primacy in this sphere may be of limited utility. Further, 
even when members of Congress who drafted the legislation come 
forward to file a brief with the Court to offer evidence of congressional 
intent on whether a state law should be preempted, the Court can 
choose to ignore this evidence, as it did in Whiting. 
Along similar lines, one might argue that because states cannot 
really force the federal government to do anything, they cannot coerce 
the national government and, therefore, there can be no real reverse-
commandeering. NFIB should put that objection to rest insofar as 
there the federal commandeering technically did not force states to do 
anything: states remained free to opt out of the Medicaid program if 
they did not wish to comply with the ACA’s new requirements. The 
Court, however, accepted the argument that coercion exists, even 
where there is a choice, because of the kind of fiscal pressure that 
could be exerted on which choice each state would make. NFIB moves 
the doctrine beyond New York, where the Court found 
commandeering to occur in the form of a choice presented to states by 
a federal statute of either taking title to low level radioactive waste 
generated within state borders or regulating such waste according to 
federal standards.374 Either option, the Court explained, “would 
‘commandeer’ state governments into the service of federal regulatory 
purposes, and would for this reason be inconsistent with the 
Constitution’s division of authority between federal and state 
governments.”375 But in NFIB, the choice posed to states was either 
comply with federal standards or lose federal funding, a kind of choice 
the Court noted that it had upheld as constitutional in other 
contexts.376 The problem in NFIB was not that Congress lacks the 
power to impose conditions on the receipt of federal funds, but that 
the conditions posed in that case were “properly viewed as a means of 
pressuring States to accept policy changes.”377 States may not be able 
to force the federal government to do anything in realm of 
 
 374 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175-6 (1992). 
 375 Id. at 175. 
 376 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2603-04 (“We have upheld Congress’s authority to 
condition the receipt of funds on the States’ complying with restrictions on the use of 
those funds….”). 
 377 Id. at 2604. 
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immigration policy, but the same cannot be said about the ability of 
states to pressure the federal government and to effect policy changes 
through such pressure. 
C. Objection to Depriving States Concurrent Power to Regulate 
Immigration 
Some may object to depriving states of powers to regulate 
immigrants, and may point to the benefits of concurrent jurisdiction 
in the area of immigration law. Yet, application of the anti-
commandeering doctrine in the specific context of state immigration 
law would not preclude state action with regard to immigrants. As 
discussed above, the Court has noted that states retain authority to 
pass laws regulating immigrants. In the context of plenary power 
doctrine cases, the court used language to the effect that state statutes 
be “necessary and proper” to achieving legitimate state ends.378 
Subjecting state laws to judicial scrutiny to determine if they reverse-
commandeer only would provide a lens, outside the preemption 
context in the strong version of the argument, to assess whether state 
and local laws mirroring federal legislation are in fact usurping the 
federal responsibility to enforce national immigration law. 
New York stands for the proposition that one sovereign cannot 
commandeer another’s legislature.379 Printz stands for the proposition 
that one sovereign cannot commandeer another’s law enforcement 
officers.380 Further, in explaining why such commandeering was a 
problem in Printz, the Court explained that it was objectionable in at 
least three respects. First, commandeering personnel was also a 
commandeering of fiscal resources and implicitly involved the ability 
of one sovereign to force another to pick up the tab for its regulatory 
policies and enforcement schemes. Second, the Court noted that 
commandeering personnel enabled one sovereign to force another 
sovereign to assume a regulatory program’s public face and thereby to 
shoulder whatever popular discontent derives from such a program. 
Finally, the Court noted that commandeering personnel also involved 
commandeering another sovereign’s policymaking discretion because 
executive action is not extricable from executive policymaking. All 
 
 378 See Cleveland, supra note 83, at 90. 
 379 New York, 505 U.S. at 179 (“No comparable constitutional provision authorizes 
Congress to command state legislatures to legislate.”). 
 380 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925-35 (1997) (holding that Congress 
cannot circumvent the anti-commandeering doctrine by conscripting the state officers 
directly). 
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those concerns are at play in laws like LAWA and Section 2(B) of SB 
1070, even if, as Whiting and Arizona held, these state immigration 
laws pass legal muster when examined through the relatively myopic 
lens of preemption doctrine alone. 
D. Objection that Anti-Reverse-Commandeering Is Preemption by 
Another Name 
The question remains as to whether there is any real need for an 
anti-reverse-commandeering doctrine and whether the preemption 
doctrine already addresses the same issues. Courts finding mirror-
image laws preempted have recognized that federal enforcement 
discretion can effectually be usurped by state statutes that textually 
adhere to federal standards.381 Moreover, immigration scholar Hiroshi 
Motomura has argued persuasively that preemption analysis has to be 
more than a statutory inquiry in the sphere of immigration law 
because the exercise of federal enforcement discretion is the very 
substance of federal immigration law.382 
 
 381 See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2526-27 (2012). Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion acknowledges the importance of executive discretion in 
immigration law. Id. at 2505 (“The federal statutory structure instructs when it is 
appropriate to arrest an alien during the removal process. For example, the Attorney 
General can exercise discretion to issue a warrant for an alien’s arrest and detention 
‘pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.’”) 
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)); see also Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, 
793 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1335 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (“Thus, although Section 7 appears 
superficially similar to § 1324, state prosecutorial discretion and judicial 
interpretation will undermine federal authority ‘to establish immigration enforcement 
priorities and strategies.’”) (quoting United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 352 (9th 
Cir. 2011), cert. granted 132 S. Ct. 845 (2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 132 S. Ct. 
2492 (2012)), aff’d sub nom, Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Governor of Ga., 
691 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2012) (affirming that section 7 is preempted by the INA’s 
criminal provisions pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1324); United States v. South Carolina, 840 
F. Supp. 2d 898, 917 (D.S.C. 2011) (holding that a South Carolina statute mirroring 
federal immigration law “was part of a larger state effort to alter federal immigration 
enforcement priorities and to assert state control over such policy decisions.”), on 
remand, Nos. 2:11-2958, 2:11-2779, 2012 WL 5897321 (D.S.C. Nov. 15, 2012) 
(holding that in light of the Arizona decision, the court’s preliminary injunctions were 
improper regarding provisions permitting law enforcement to check immigration 
status on individuals during lawful stops, and upholding injunctions on other 
provisions, including those making it unlawful to fail to carry immigration 
documents, and provisions criminalizing the transportation or housing of 
undocumented immigrants). 
 382 “Federal immigration law consists of myriad highly discretionary decisions on 
the ground. Any state or local role that allows state or local employees to exercise 
meaningful discretion is preempted, because any state or local variation in 
discretionary outcomes represents a conflict with federal immigration enforcement.” 
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But, the future of preemption doctrine and its role in addressing the 
tidal wave of immigration federalism efforts is not clear. There is no 
final word on this question, as the differing results of Whiting and 
Arizona show. The differences between Whiting and Arizona are 
particularly striking given both cases dealt with immigration 
federalism laws that were recently enacted by the Arizona legislature, 
and both preemption cases were decided by the Court in back-to-back 
terms. It has been noted, after all, that the Court’s preemption doctrine 
pulls in different directions, in part because the Justices themselves 
have differing views on how to discern congressional intent, the 
touchstone of preemption analysis.383 
Discerning congressional intent is further complicated by the trend 
of concurrent jurisdiction in federal immigration law. Contemporary 
federalism scholars, such as Ernest Young, argue persuasively that we 
have moved from a dual sovereign world to one of concurrent 
jurisdiction. According to Young and others, in this modern era of 
concurrent jurisdiction, federal courts have largely given up patrolling 
the jurisdictional boundaries of the state and federal sovereigns 
because it is a practical impossibility in the context of our integrated 
national economy.384 Instead, Young contends that federalism values 
are protected today by using preemption doctrine to mediate federal 
supremacy and state autonomy.385 As discussed above, both the 
Executive and Congress have invited states to play a more active role 
in the enforcement of federal immigration law in recent decades. 
Because the political branches have encouraged state cooperation in 
 
MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW, supra note 300, at 111; see also 
Motomura, The Discretion That Matters, supra note 18, at 1826; Hiroshi Motomura, 
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affirmative decisionmaking. Consequently, any decisions by state and local officials 
put them in conflict with the knowing balance of enforcement and tolerance that 
constitutes actual federal immigration law.”). In many respects, this Article is an 
attempt to build upon Motomura’s important recognition of the role of enforcement 
discretion in the fabric of federal immigration law. 
 383 See Young, supra note 11, at 255-56 (“Moreover, even though the Justices are 
beginning to develop broadly principled frameworks for deciding preemption cases, 
the different methodological commitments held by individual Justices have thus far 
prevented the Court from coalescing around a single theory. Textualists approach 
these cases differently from purposivists, and Justices willing to defer to administrative 
agencies will embrace distinct approaches from those who view the agencies with 
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 384 Id. at 258. 
 385 Id. at 261-65; see also Young, supra note 27, at 31 (“[P]reemption cases are the 
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immigration enforcement, this trend of concurrent jurisdiction lends 
support for Young’s view that preemption serves federalism values 
even in the context of immigration law. With concurrent jurisdiction 
as the operative norm, nothing guarantees that preemption doctrine 
can or should be solicitous of whatever happens outside the statutory 
text where the federal law text and the state law text establish the 
same standards and provide for their enforcement.386 
By contrast, the anti-commandeering doctrine is a limited 
revitalization of a dual sovereign conceptualization of federalism. The 
doctrine establishes jurisdictional limits on the state and federal 
sovereigns by prohibiting the phenomena of commandeering. Like the 
Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, the anti-reverse-commandeering 
and anti-commandeering doctrines are not keyed to congressional 
action or intent.387 They are keyed to the federalist form of 
government established by the Constitution. The Court’s role in 
conducting an anti-reverse-commandeering analysis is to ascertain 
whether a power reserved to or inherent in the sovereignty of one 
sovereign has been usurped by the other. Printz teaches that the 
executive actions of one sovereign, no matter how ministerial, have 
policymaking implications. Where one sovereign usurps another’s 
policymaking authority, particularly in a field constitutionally 
committed to the other sovereign, reverse-commandeering occurs. An 
anti-reverse-commandeering doctrine, therefore, offers something a 
preemption doctrine does not: a role for the federal courts to continue 
to meaningfully police the boundaries of the dual sovereign system. 
The anti-commandeering doctrine preserves state sovereignty. The 
anti-reverse-commandeering doctrine preserves federal sovereignty. 
Preemption doctrine, if it truly is conforming itself to a world of 
concurrent jurisdiction as Young suggests, may not effectively track 
federal-state conflict past the statutory letter and into where 
Motomura argues the heart of federal immigration law resides — 
 
 386 Young suggests all areas of law should submit to the principle of concurrent 
jurisdiction, including those affecting foreign relations, like immigration law. In 
recognizing the implications of the Court’s Whiting decision, Young urged the Court 
to follow through and use the (at the time) undecided Arizona case as a vehicle to 
make clear that “dual federalism is dead, and that concurrent regulation is the norm 
even in fields like immigration that impact foreign relations.” Id. at 340. 
 387 See generally Delaney, supra note 71, at 1826 (contending that the common 
methods for challenging state immigration laws, such as through preemption and 
Equal Protection challenges, “are insufficiently attentive to the national coordination 
concerns that lie at the heart of the federal interest in controlling immigration[,]” 
arguing that the Dormant Commerce Clause offers preferable constitutional analysis). 
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executive policymaking discretion.388 Anti-commandeering doctrine is 
also a creature of modern federalism, but it is one that thus far has 
served to restrain the federal government from becoming too 
expansive even in the era of concurrent jurisdiction. An anti-reverse-
commandeering doctrine would restrain the state government from 
becoming too expansive in the era of concurrent jurisdiction as well. 
And while Congress always has authority to cure a preemption 
decision it disapproves by enacting new legislation either expressly 
preempting or permitting the state conduct challenged, an anti-
reverse-commandeering doctrine forces attention on hard 
constitutional limits to the authority of state and local governments to 
take the reins of federal immigration policy.389 
An anti-reverse-commandeering doctrine offers a distinct and 
constitutionally necessary analysis that should be employed alongside, 
but separate from, the preemption doctrine. At a minimum, and in 
keeping with the modest claim, the federalism values embodied in an 
anti-reverse-commandeering doctrine should mobilize the preemption 
inquiry to address whether permitting concurrent jurisdiction in a 
given area of law allows states to exercise properly federal powers. 
CONCLUSION 
In Arizona and Whiting — two recent decisions issued back-to-back 
— the Supreme Court determined that state immigration laws such as 
Section 2(B) of SB 1070 and LAWA can survive preemption scrutiny. 
These laws nevertheless undermine the federal government’s ability to 
dictate and implement a national immigration policy, and, moreover, 
they do so by usurping federal law enforcement prerogatives and 
resources. These laws, in effect, exemplify the inverse of the problem 
posed by federal commandeering. 
Consequently, the growing proliferation of proposed state and local 
immigration laws should be examined doctrinally within an anti-
commandeering jurisprudential frame. This is particularly needed if 
the Court returns to the textualist approach to reading statutes in the 
context of applying preemption doctrine as it did in Whiting. 
Otherwise state and local governments will have the ability to upset 
the carefully balanced system of dual state and national sovereignties 
that comprises our federalist system by passing laws that mirror 
federal standards while co-opting them to achieve state ends. Put 
another way, absent a judicial lens to assess whether federal 
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prerogatives and resources are being usurped at the state and local 
level, the federal government’s ability to develop and implement a 
coherent, efficacious, and uniform immigration policy at the national 
level will be obstructed. 
To resolve this concern, this Article simply proposes that federal 
courts apply the principles set forth in Printz and New York to protect 
federal sovereignty as well as state sovereignty. The Court has 
concluded that commandeering is unconstitutional when it allows one 
sovereign to infringe upon the sovereignty of the other in violation of 
principles of federalism. To decide whether a state or local 
government is commandeering federal law or resources, a court would 
need only to continue to apply its anti-commandeering principles in 
order to protect the sovereignty of both sovereigns in the federal 
system, the federal sovereign interest as well as state sovereign 
interests. This could be done as a specifically constitutional inquiry in 
the same manner as its anti-commandeering jurisprudence. Or it could 
be implemented in the form of a reinvigorated preemption doctrine. 
Either way, the Court would simply be ensuring that the balance 
between the dual sovereigns of our federalist system is maintained. 
The future of state and local mirror-image legislation remains 
unclear in the wake of Arizona and Whiting. The upsurgence of 
support for state and local immigration laws is too politically virulent 
to believe that federal courts will not be further called upon to review 
new specimens of mirroring statutes. That review should not be 
limited to the question of preemption. An anti-reverse-
commandeering frame is needed to assess the constitutionality of 
immigration federalism statutes crafted by state and local legislatures 
to mirror federal immigration law and place federal databases in 
service of state and local prosecutions. Applying anti-commandeering 
principles to state mirror-image statutes and other immigration 
federalism laws can critically assist federal courts. It creates a lens 
whereby textual mirroring can be understood as textual usurping 
where the cooperative harmony of the two statutes creates the space 
for discordant state and local policies, investigations, regulations, and 
prosecutions independent of federal efforts to enforce the same 
statutory provisions in derogation of federal immigration law and 
policy. 
Specifically, applying an anti-reverse-commandeering doctrine to 
the current wave of immigration federalism laws is the logical 
evolution of an analytical framework that is needed to excavate the 
answer to a constitutional query. Immigration federalism laws were 
historically examined within a constitutional frame. A new 
constitutional frame, rather than the statutory interpretive frame of 
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preemption doctrine, now must be applied to quasi-constitutional 
immigration statutes in order to prevent usurpation of federal 
sovereignty in the immigration realm. The constitutional dimension of 
the anti-reverse-commandeering doctrine saves the substantive 
analysis and normative commitment of the inquiry, an inquiry that is 
now obscured in what misleadingly appears to be a preemption-driven 
inquiry, and, thus, misleadingly appears to be a statutory-driven 
question for the courts. In Whiting and Arizona, the preemption 
inquiry is too simplistic to capture the potential underlying 
constitutional harm. Under a preemption doctrine framework, the 
Justices were preoccupied with the following types of questions: Is the 
employer sanctions provision of LAWA in conflict with Sections 1324a 
and 1324b of the INA, as amended by IRCA? Is the E-Verify provision 
in LAWA in conflict with IIRIRA or DHS policy? Is Section 2(B) of SB 
1070 in conflict with Section 1373(c) of the INA, as amended by 
IIRIRA? 
The central concern is not whether any particular provision of a 
state immigration law is consistent or inconsistent with particular 
aspects of the federal immigration code and regulatory policy. The 
primary inquiry is whether these state laws pose a threat to the vertical 
separation of powers. Thus, the more relevant question, and the 
analysis required by federal courts applying an anti-reverse-
commandeering jurisprudential framework, is whether the state 
immigration law allows state authorities to undermine or usurp the 
enforcement discretion of the federal government, while also 
potentially commandeering the federal resources and officers 
necessary to support such enforcement efforts. An anti-reverse-
commandeering analysis would allow federal courts to protect 
sovereign identity and bring greater coherency to federal immigration 
law. This doctrinal shift, from the preemption doctrine to the anti-
commandeering doctrine, allows federal courts to examine the 
constitutionality of state immigration laws through a more explicit 
federalist lens. 
